Abstract
The conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh territory between Azerbaijan and Armenia has not been resolved within a quarter century. There are interests of different states vested in the resolution of this conflict, which is also one of the reasons behind the continuation of the status quo. Although this dimension of the conflict has been addressed in the academic literature, scholars have largely neglected the role of the private sector on the peacemaking process of this conflict. This research aims to fulfill this gap in the academic literature on this
conflict. For this purpose, the research refrains from the homogeneous approach to the private sector and the binary approach to its impact on the peacebuilding by the general scholarly literature. Thus, this research employs a new approach: it divides the businesses into four categories on the basis of the size, sector, and location, and separately addresses the level and direction of impact by each category on the peacebuilding. The findings suggest that every category has a different level of impact in a negative or positive direction or has no impact at all. The highest level of impact by the private sector on the peacebuilding process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is in a negative direction.
Keywords: business, private sector, peacebuilding, conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh
The Role of Business in the Peacebuilding Process
Case Study: the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Introduction
Background
Nagorno-Karabakh is a territory in the western part of Azerbaijan, and there is conflict over this territory between Armenians and Azerbaijanis dating back to 1988 (Maresca, 1996). In 1991, Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno Karabakh declared its independence from the Republic of Azerbaijan. It led to military confrontations around the frontiers of Nagorno Karabakh, resulting in a war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, members of societies that had newly become independent upon the breakup of the USSR (Maresca, 1996). “A unique feature of the Karabakh conflict is its many-sided asymmetry” by involving interested parties such as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Russia, the Armenian Diaspora, and the oil and gas industry (Maresca, 1996, p. 476). While the Armenians living in this territory claim that they have exercised their right to self-determination, the Azerbaijani side regards them as an armed rebel group and perceives Armenia as the other side of the conflict, since Armenia supports the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh (Maresca,
1996). In 1994, the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides signed a ceasefire agreement, however, since then the resolution of the conflict have been delayed (Özkan, 2008).
This conflict “has a very strong international dimension, being a cause of inter-state war” and “a major unresolved legal problem in the OSCE area” (Panossian, 2001, p. 143). The conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh is an entrenched conflict, which is neither a peaceful nor warlike situation (Kemp, 2004). As the status-quo of the conflict continues, the academic literature has been emerging around this topic. Predominantly, scholars, such as Özkan
(2008) and Panossian (2001), have addressed the questions of why the resolution of this conflict became an impasse and what the vested interests are in the continuation of status-quo as well as examined the roles of different actors at the individual, state, and international
level. However, scholars have mostly neglected the role of the private sector in the peace- building process of this conflict. Considering the fact that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict involves many interested parties at the state level, the impact of non-state actors on the peacebuilding process might have been perceived as marginal. Or else, when scholars regarded non-state actors as influential players in this process, they have mainly referred to international organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, or non-governmental organizations.
Even if at some point governments reach a peace agreement, there is a broken relationship between Armenians and Azerbaijanis due to years of propaganda promoting mutual mistrust and animosity (Ayunts et al., 2016). There is a need for huge efforts and investment to transform this current situation into a long-lasting peaceful relationship
(Ayunts et al., 2016). The key to peace is not official signatures, but “middle-out and bottom- up activities” by non-state actors that can transform “attitudes and behavior within individual and group”, otherwise, the situation of no-war-no-peace will sustain (Ayunts et al., 2016, p.
554). In this regard, the business sector “is perhaps the most important part of the peacebuilding process” (Ayunts et al., 2016, p. 552). “The economic dimensions of armed conflict are often overlooked, but they should never be underestimated. The role of business, in particular, can be crucial, for good and for ill” (Annan, 2004). Therefore, the impact of this group of non-state actors on the peacemaking process of this conflict needs to be addressed. For this matter, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict presents a particular case study where the links between business practices by the private sector and peacebuilding process can be observed at different levels.
The Contribution of the Research
The gap in the general scholarly literature concerning the role of the private sector in peacemaking is that the literature mostly approaches the private sector under one umbrella or as a ‘black box’, as if the private sector is homogeneous, which is not true in reality. Moreover, there is a binary approach in the literature by either claiming the private sector as a positive force for peace or a negative one. By this approach, the literature misses an
important dimension of the reality, which is the fact that different categories of businesses can simultaneously have different levels of impact on the process of peacemaking either in a positive or negative direction or can have no impact at all. This research paper contributes to the general peacebuilding literature by dividing the businesses into different categories and analyzing the impact of each category on the peacebuilding process, rather than approaching all categories under the broad umbrella of ‘the private sector’. This approach treats the private sector as a heterogeneous concept, which would explain the ‘business-conflict’ dynamics better. Thus, the research offers a new approach to the study of this topic. When it comes to the specific contribution of this research concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the research aims to find the impact of the businesses by the private sector on the peacemaking process of this conflict.
At this point, it is useful to distinguish between different categories of businesses that can have different levels of impact on the peacebuilding process. The categorization can be applied based on the size of the businesses such as large businesses on one hand, and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on the other. Similarly, the sector within which businesses operate can be another basis for the categorization. In the context of this paper, the term ‘sector’ is not used as a synonym to the industry, rather, it implies the distinction between formal and informal business activities. The formal sector includes businesses that
are generally considered legal such as telecommunication services and mining, the informal sector includes illegal business activities such as smuggling of drugs or other types of merchandise, arms trade, and human trafficking. Moreover, as this paper is specifically focused on the case study of Nagorno-Karabakh, a distinction can be made between businesses that operate within and outside of this territory. A business can belong to each categorization at the same time, such as being an SME in the informal sector operating outside Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, in the case of the Sadakhlo market which will be discussed later in the paper. Thus, I have identified four distinct categories of businesses,
whose influence on the peacemaking process of this conflict will be analyzed in this research. These categories are as following:
• Businesses Outside Nagorno-Karabakh in the Formal Sector
• Businesses Outside Nagorno-Karabakh in the Informal Sector
• Businesses Inside Nagorno-Karabakh in the Formal Sector
• Businesses Inside Nagorno-Karabakh in the Informal Sector
The analysis of these categories will address the following research question in the paper: How and to what level do different business categories impact the peacebuilding process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? My hypothesis is that the different categories of businesses simultaneously make different levels of impact on the peacemaking process in a negative or positive direction or make no impact at all.
Literature Review
The general literature on the role of business in peacebuilding revolves around the debate that business can be a peace-positive actor, or it can exacerbate the situation. Zandvliet (2005) argues that company activities in conflict zones can result in either positive
or negative impacts on conflict dynamics, however, they are never neutral. By specifically focusing on the companies in the extractive industries, he identifies the different ways companies’ operations can feed into conflict, one of which being the tension between the company and government authorities. On the other hand, Miller et al. (2019) report that private sector companies can play effective roles such as a catalyst for positive change, facilitator of constructive activities, and influencer of actors to have a positive impact on peace at both the macro and the local level. However, the authors state that companies are most willing to engage in peace-building activities if the presence of conflict threatens their ability to operate.
Moreover, Peradze (2014) argues that members of societies, which are divided due to a conflict, can find avenues for interaction and mutual benefits through the private sector. Such communication would lead these societies to build “a bridge of trust” by changing their imagination for the other, and the business can play the role of mediator for this matter (Peradze, 2014, p. 58). Furthermore, Ganson (2014) claims that companies can take advantage of their political and economic leverages to significantly affect drivers of conflict and fragility by influencing the behavior of governments and other actors. However, the degree of leverage can change at different stages of operations: a company holds more leverage before investing in a country, whereas this leverage might decline after making the investment (Ganson, 2014). Concerning the investment decisions in conflict-affected areas, Driffield, Jones, and Crotty (2013) suggest that home country governance and institutions
play an important role in explaining such FDI decisions. Moreover, the motivation of firms to engage in FDI determines the impact these firms make on the host location (Driffield, Jones,
& Crotty, 2013).
Methodology
While conducting this research, I have applied qualitative methods. I have referred to secondary sources, such as scholarly literature on this topic and NGO reports, and primary sources, such as statements by corporations and a government report. The scholarly literature includes the general literature on the role of the private sector in peacebuilding, and the specific academic literature on the study of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Moreover, I conducted passive participant observation of the conference named “Impacts of Illegal Economic Activities in Conflict Areas on Human Rights” organized by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the UN Office and other International Organizations in Geneva in partnership with the University for Peace on April
9, 2019. The conference was held at the Room XXIII of the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Since the topic of the conference was directly related to this research, I deemed it to be a crucial source of information. The importance of this conference for the government of Azerbaijan could be noted in the high positions of the government officials attending this event coming from the capital and other cities around the world. To name a few, Mahmud Mammadguliyev (Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan), Hikmat Hajiyev (Head of the Foreign Policy Affairs Department of the Office of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan), Tofig Musayev (Counselor of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United Nations in New York), Rovshan Sadigbayli (Counselor of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the OSCE in Vienna), and Ambassador Farid Shafiyev (Chairman of the Centre for Analysis of International Relations) were among panelists. Alongside, Ambassador Vaqif Quliyev (The Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan in Geneva) was present with the accompany of all his
delegation. I also noted the participation of the diplomats from the Armenian diplomatic delegation in Geneva as well as Armenian students.
Limitations
There were a few difficulties in obtaining information while conducting this research. One of them was a result of language limitation I have experienced due to my lack of Russian and Armenian. I could not employ the academic literature and the media sources in Russian regarding this conflict, that could have contributed to this research to a great extent.
Moreover, one of the attempts was obtaining information from the websites of the local companies in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, these websites were in the Armenian language, without a translation to English. Moreover, another limitation was the time constraint. I attempted to conduct an interview with one of the officials at the diplomatic delegation of Azerbaijan in Geneva. In response, I was told that for the interview I had to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Azerbaijan and wait to be directed to an official who would be an expert in this field. However, this was beyond the time-frame the research was supposed
to be concluded. Thus, I could not obtain further official information in this regard, and I was limited to my participant observation of the above-mentioned conference. Lastly, my nationality was another constraint, due to which I could not contact the diplomatic delegation of Armenia in Geneva for this research.
Findings
Based on the case study of the peacemaking process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the findings of this research confirm my hypothesis and suggest that different categories of businesses can simultaneously influence the peacemaking process at different levels or not make any influence at all. The first category addressed in the paper includes
businesses outside Nagorno-Karabakh in the formal sector. Currently, there is no business in this category that engages actors from conflicting states. However, the size of business especially matters in this category: large businesses are perceived as unable to independently contribute to the peacemaking process due to their close association with governments, whereas, SMEs are regarded as having more potential to influence the process. Nevertheless, there is no evidence on the actual impact of either large businesses or SMEs in this category on the peacebuilding process. Thus, this research regards this category of business as not making any impact on the peacebuilding process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The second category includes businesses operating in the informal sector outside Nagorno-Karabakh. The Sadakhlo market, an SME in Georgia is the only known example of business belonging to this category, where Azerbaijanis and Armenians met and conducted an illegal trade of the smuggled merchandise. The analysis of this market revealed that the members of the conflicting ethnicities can co-exist in a conflict-free manner for the purpose of economic gains. However, the impact of such an SME remains limited to building trust between a group of people from the most disadvantaged class of both societies, who are not
in the position to challenge the status-quo. Thus, this category of business demonstrates a low level of positive impact on the peacemaking process.
The third category concerns businesses in the formal sector operating inside Nagorno- Karabakh. In contrast to the first category, large businesses are the key actors in this
category, whereas there is no evidence suggesting any impact of SMEs in this category on the peacemaking process. Therefore, this category focuses on large businesses, including both local companies and TNCs. The research finds that the third category of businesses demonstrates the highest level of impact among others, and this impact is in the negative direction. Since the government of Azerbaijan regards these business activities as illegal, the
continuation of such activities pushes this side of the conflict further away from making a compromise to reach a long-term peace agreement.
The last category covers the businesses in the informal sector inside Nagorno- Karabakh, which are engaged in illicit activities such as drug smuggling, human trafficking, and arms trade. The engagement of influential actors in this category implies that these are large businesses in terms of their size. Since these businesses benefit from the status quo, achieving a long-term peace agreement is not in their interests. For this reason, they do not have any incentive to engage in peacemaking activities, rather their impact on this process would be in the negative direction. Actors behind these businesses remain unknown, however, it is highly likely that bureaucrats in the government of the so-called Nagorno- Karabakh conflict are in control of these activities or they cooperate with the ones in charge. Due to the difficulty of investigating this category, it remains ambiguous at what level and
through which routes this category of business makes an impact on the peacemaking process.
Thus, by analyzing different categories of businesses, this research finds that each category of business differs from the other by the direction and the level of impact it makes on the peacebuilding process. Moreover, the research suggests that as these categories
influence the process simultaneously, it is naïve to propose the role of the private sector in the peacebuilding process in one direction even on the subject of one particular case. Regarding the peacemaking process of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this research reveals that the highest level of impact by the businesses is in the negative direction.
Discussion
Businesses Outside Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Sector
There is no direct trade between Azerbaijan and Armenia, “apart from illegal trade through middlemen and intermediaries” (Juvarly & Shabanov, 2004, p. 242). Therefore, there
is no business in the formal sector outside Nagorno-Karabakh territory that brings together actors from the conflicting states, which could have potentially contributed to the peacemaking process. It could also lead to “the realization of creating new, regular markets in contrast to smuggling across the border of both countries”, which is in the interests of entrepreneurs (Ayunts et al., 2016, p. 552). However, a businessman in Yerevan during an interview revealed that “private sector representatives are one of the groups that have the greatest number of risks: if they engage in peacebuilding practices in the current hostile atmosphere, they are vulnerable to government pressure and intimidation” (Ayunts et al.,
2016, p. 552). Consequently, “local businesses hardly ever contribute to peacebuilding initiatives implemented by NGOs” (Ayunts et al., 2016, p. 552).
In terms of the size, the role of the large businesses and SMEs differs in regard to their impact on the peacemaking process of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. “Large businesses are in no position to challenge the status quo in South Caucasus because they are either too closely associated with government, or are actively profiting from the no-war-no-peace situation” (Mirimanova, 2006, p. 541). However, SMEs could be “the most promising agents of change in the Caucasus” (Waal, 2010, para. 22). “Indeed, business leaders in small towns or villages can be de facto community leaders respected by all parties, thereby giving them proportionately greater influence than even the owners of national businesses” (Killick, Srikantha, & Gündüz, 2005 p. 16). They can develop into “peace constituency” once they are free from political pressure and financially independent (Mirimanova, 2006, p. 541).
An attempt for this purpose was made in 2005 with the establishment of the Caucasus Business and Development Network (CBDN), based on the “belief that economic interdependence and mutually beneficial regional cooperation are the cornerstones of stability and peace in the region” (CBDN, n.d.). It was an initiative directed at SMEs in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh
(CBDN, 2016). The aim was to provide business communities in the South Caucasus with a platform for dialogue and information exchange (Mirimanova, 2006). The Economy and Conflict Research Group (ECRG) of South Caucasus, the co-founder of the CBDN, perceived the establishment of such a regional SME network as “an important tool for peacebuilding and conflict transformation” (Killick, Srikantha, & Gündüz, 2005, p. 10). However, the website of the CBDN does not provide any updates on their activities since
2017, which might be signaling that they have paused or terminated their activities.
Moreover, there has not been any assessment on the impact of the CBDN in the peacemaking process concerning the conflicts in the South Caucasus or empowering SMEs in this regard.
Thus, there is no evidence that large businesses and SMEs operating in the formal sector outside the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh play a role in the peacebuilding process of this conflict. Therefore, this research finds that this category has no impact on the peacemaking process in this particular context.
Businesses Outside Nagorno-Karabakh: Informal Sector
Although actors from conflicting states do not engage in business activities in the formal sector, Azerbaijanis who live in Georgia close to the border with Armenia interact with Armenians for economic gains. The Sadakhlo market is an example of such interaction, where Azerbaijanis and Armenians met and exchanged by avoiding the topic of politics (Killick, Srikantha, & Gündüz, 2005). The market was established at the beginning of the
1990s and located in Georgia close to the Georgian-Azerbaijani border and the Georgian- Armenian border (Juvarly & Shabanov, 2004). The market is an SME and belongs to the informal sector, since “Sadakhlo traders participated in smuggling” (Mirimanova, 2006, p.
539) and there was “illegal trade in oil products”, where large deals were “usually protected by powerful figures in the two countries’ governments” (Juvarly & Shabanov, 2004, p. 229).
Custom authorities in Georgia closed the market in 2006, which resulted in the termination of the direct contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani traders (Mirimanova, 2006). However, the analysis of this market is important, since the Sadakhlo market is a demonstration of the complexity of grassroots economic activity: on one hand, the profits from the trade in the market increased during the conflict time, and on the other hand, even during the conflict,
two ethnic groups continued the economic interaction in the market (Killick, Srikantha, & Gündüz, 2005).
The closure of this market revealed that “the potential impact of ‘small’ economic projects on finding a solution to the conflict is not as significant as expected” (Juvarly & Shabanov, 2004, p. 242). Most of those traders were from the most disadvantaged part of society, consequently, they had no influence on either local or national politics (Mirimanova,
2006). Nevertheless, the existence of the market demonstrated that “the region is still a place of dynamic individuals, not only warring group identities” (Waal, 2010, para. 23). There was “surprising levels of trust” between ordinary Azerbaijanis living in Georgia and Armenians, which demonstrated “conflict-free co-existence” of people of conflicting ethnicities (Mirimanova, 2006, p. 539-540). Although people mostly trusted each other, a deep lack of trust remained (Juvarly & Shabanov, 2004). The peacebuilding element in this example is “the humanization of relations between members of the warring parties” (Mirimanova, 2006, p. 540).
The conclusion could be drawn that an SME operating in the informal sector of business outside Nagorno-Karabakh can have a positive impact in peacebuilding process of this conflict to the extent that it brings people from two conflicting ethnicities together on a daily basis. This interaction results in building mutual trust between these groups of people. However, the impact of such an SME remains limited to this level, without playing any role
at the official level such as bringing governments of two countries closer to a long-term peace
agreement or leading people to call an action on their governments in this regard. Thus, the level of the positive impact of this category on the peacemaking process of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict remains low.
Businesses Inside Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Sector
In this section of the paper, the division of businesses on the basis of size will not be considered and the focus will remain on the large businesses. The reason behind this approach is that SMEs inside Nagorno-Karabakh do not bring Azerbaijanis and Armenians together as in the case of the Sadakhlo market. Therefore, they do not contribute to the peacemaking process by creating interaction and building trust between the conflicting ethnicities by a bottom-up approach. Moreover, SMEs are a means for people living in Nagorno-Karabakh to provide for their daily life, and there is no research suggesting their
engagement in the peacemaking process. When it comes to the large businesses in the formal sector operating inside Nagorno-Karabakh, they are local and transnational companies (TNCs). The economy of Nagorno-Karabakh is diaspora-driven, thus, “[i]nvestment
decisions tend to be motivated by senses of history and historical responsibility, and personal ties, rather than financial criteria” (Wood and Demirbag, 2015, p. 918). Who Else Profits (2017) reports the protests by the government of Azerbaijan regarding the activities of large businesses that are foreign-based in Nagorno-Karabakh and lists the names of companies engaged in such activities such as Orange SA (France), Credit Agricole SA Group (France), Vodafone (Britain), Aurubis AG (Germany), and Vimpelcom / Veon (Netherlands, Russia).
The government of Azerbaijan regards activities of large businesses inside Nagorno- Karabakh illegal on the basis that these activities change the demographics of conflict- affected territories and result in destruction and unlawful appropriation of property, which are designed as war crimes under international criminal law (Concept Note of the Conference).
The report presented during the conference refers to the statement by the co-chairman of OSCE Minsk Group that “prolonged continuation of this situation could lead to a fait accompli that would seriously complicate the peace process” (p. 6). Not only the government of Azerbaijan but also large businesses registered in Azerbaijan are responsive to the activities of large local businesses. For instance, the new partnership between the local company in Nagorno-Karabakh, Karabakh Telecom, and the international company, Etisalat,
the mobile operator of UAE, led to the termination of long-term cooperation between Etisalat and Bakcell, the mobile operator of Azerbaijan (GSMA, 2018). On the website of Bakcell, a press release reports that “Bakcell highly values the measures undertaken in this direction by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and expresses a deep gratitude to the ministry for the works done for elimination of this problem” (GSMA, 2018, para. 4). This statement also signals that the pressures by the government of Azerbaijan have played a role in the decision of Bakcell regarding the termination of cooperation with Elisat.
The conference highlighted the mining activities in Nagorno-Karabakh and regarded them as illegal activities, which is also addressed in the above-mentioned report (2019) under the title of “Exploitation and pillage of natural resources” (p. 24 – 35). Illicit natural resource exploitation is an example of a negative influence of the business in peacebuilding (Killick, Srikantha, & Gündüz, 2005). During the Questions and Answers session of the conference, there was a noticeably increased tension among Armenian students. One of them left the
room without waiting for Ambassador Farid Shafiyev to finish answering the question the student himself raised. This observation supports the above-mentioned statement by the co- chairman of OSCE Minsk Group that the engagement of companies in Nagorno-Karabakh complicates the peace negotiations between two nations, which does not come as a surprise if an informative conference on this situation can cause increased tension in the room.
The activities of large businesses in this category of business, whether local companies or TNCs, have a considerable negative impact on the peacemaking process of this conflict. The level of impact by this category of business is observable by the importance given to this topic by the government of Azerbaijan as well as other large businesses operating in Azerbaijan. Such activities are under the constant watch of and considered
illegal by the government of Azerbaijan. The fact that such activities continue despite the objection by the government of Azerbaijan pushes this side of conflicting parties even further from making a compromise to achieve a long-term peace with the other side.
Businesses Inside Nagorno-Karabakh: Informal Sector
There is another spectrum of business activity inside Nagorno-Karabakh, which falls under the category of informal business. One of the crucial factors to understand and analyze the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is “economies under blockades that generate illegal profit networks in the context of the Soviet legacy” (Özkan, 2008, p. 574). After the end of the war, well-known warlords such as Samvel Babayan, former defense minister of Nagorno- Karabakh, established criminal networks and mafia organizations “to benefit from the black- market trade across borders, created by economic isolations” by looting occupied territories (p. 586). Thus, the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is “prone to illicit business and demonstrates some of the symptoms of patrimonial capitalism, i.e. the abuse of the state resources by authorities” and the perpetuation of this no-war-no-peace situation “feeds unregistered illegal sectors, such as drug and human trafficking and arms trade” (Lis, 2016, p.
29). “Illicit economic activities such as trade of drugs or illegal weapons in the region are not a subject of taxation and they are source of great revenue available for extraction” (Lis, 2016, p. 26). Since there are influential actors engaged in such illegal activities benefiting from the status quo, peace and normalization of relations between two nations are detrimental to their
economic and political interests (Özkan, 2008). Thus, they will try to maintain it as long as possible (Lis, 2016). Moreover, the engagement of influential actors in this category implies that these are large businesses in terms of their size.
This category of business does not profit from the peacemaking process in the first place. Consequently, maintaining the status quo is in the interest of businesses in the informal sector and their impact on the peacemaking process would be in a negative direction. “Those engaged in criminal activities such as illegal arms or drugs trade remain unknown, most
likely protecting their identity” (Lis, 2016, p. 27). However, the example of the Sadakhlo market revealed that powerful figures in the governments are in charge of the large deals in the informal sector of the economy. Therefore, it is highly likely that officials in the government of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic are in charge of these activities to some extent or collaborate with the people controlling these businesses. Thus, this category can be influential to a great degree in terms of its impact on the peacemaking process. However, there is a need for conducting further researches to explore the routes through which this category influences this process and suggest a high level of impact by this category. For this reason, its level of impact on the peacemaking process or the means through which this type of businesses makes their impact remain unclear.
Conclusion
By employing qualitative methods and a case-study approach, this research aimed to address the question of how and to what level different business categories impact the peacebuilding process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The research contributes to the existing academic literature on the role of the private sector in peacebuilding process by refraining from treating the private sector as a homogenous concept. Rather, this research considered the private sector as a heterogeneous concept and divided it into categories based
on the size of the business, the sector in which it operates, and its location. Moreover, this research refrained from a binary approach to the impact of the private sector on the peacemaking. Instead, the research suggested that different categories of the business by the private sector can have a negative or positive impact at the same time on a particular case. Thus, the main contribution of the research is offering a new approach to this topic, which explains the business-conflict dynamics better. The contribution of the research to the scholarly literature on the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh was assessing the impact of the private sector on its peacemaking process, which has been largely neglected. The hypothesis of this research was that these categories concurrently make different levels of impact on the peacebuilding process in a positive or negative direction or make no impact at all. The findings of this research confirmed the hypothesis.
The findings suggest that the first category, which includes businesses operating in the formal sector outside Nagorno-Karabakh, does not have an impact on the peacemaking process of this conflict. The second category, which contains businesses in the informal sector outside Nagorno-Karabakh, has a low level of positive impact on this process. The third category, concerning businesses in the formal sector inside the territory of Nagorno- Karabakh, has the highest impact on the peacemaking process of this conflict. The impact of this category is in a negative direction, since it pushes the government of Azerbaijan further
away from making a compromise to achieve a long-term peace agreement with Armenia. The last category involves businesses operating in the informal sector inside Nagorno-Karabakh. The direction of influence by this category on the peacemaking is a negative one, since these businesses benefit from the continuation of the status quo. However, the level of impact and the routes through which this category influences this process remains ambiguous. In conclusion, all four categories of businesses simultaneously make an impact on the
peacemaking process and the highest level of impact is in the negative direction on this process for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
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