Introduction
In Europe with the rise and relative success of the far-right, especially during the last decade, new geopolitical frameworks for respective countries have been put forward with a pro-Eastern direction. Russia as an attractive destination and reference point has always figured prominently within such frameworks. Rejecting the notions of liberalism, globalization and US-dominated international order far-right actors in various European countries proposed Eastern option as an alternative with Russia as a gravity center. Russia and in general, the East was seen as embodiment of a place where traditional values are preserved and this, in turn, attracted the far-right scene of Europe as a solution to the so-called cultural degradation triggered by globalization and liberal policies of “corrupt elites” supported by the US.
Such discourses have oftentimes included Eurasianist conception which was mainly formalized and developed in Russia. However, in different countries and even in same countries different far-right actors interpret the Eurasianist option in various ways.[1] Nevertheless, Russia has always been constant in this diversity. With that in mind, the case of Jobbik, a far-right party in Hungary differed from its European counterparts with the ideology of Turanism (or/and Neo-Turanism; used interchangeably) which also included pro-Eastern foreign policy outlook, anti-EU and anti-liberal stances. Turanism compared to other pro-Eastern ideological frameworks in Europe possessed ethnocultural elements making it more lasting for the Hungarian far-right. In the modern period, Neo-Turanism once promoted by Jobbik has sometimes been introduced as the Hungarian version of Eurasianism.[2] Indeed, several notions of these two frameworks coincided and with such parallels, Russia and Jobbik ties were narrated. However, when we look at closely some fundamental differences and contradictions can be seen as well. Especially, Russia’s place within the general framework of Turanism seems not to follow the viewpoints of other European counterparts and Russian-made Eurasianism. Therefore, I will argue for the idea that Jobbik’s Turanism was incompatible with Eurasianism due to its inherent Russocentric character and that it can be considered Eurasianist only in non-Russian senses of the concept that have been present in Central Asian countries and always positioned itself towards Russia ambiguously. To that end, this essay will review both ideological conceptions and analyze the main lines to assess the potential overlaps and variances between them. In this way, the two mentioned claims will be explained from both ideological perspectives analyzing basic political and historical premises and practical perspectives by looking at opinions of party members and their stance towards Russia and Turanism.
The structure of the essay will be as follows. Firstly, in order to understand Turanism its brief evolution in Hungary will be provided. This will be followed by a description of Neo-Turanism in Jobbik’s discourse looking at geopolitical, cultural, economic and historical factors that pushed the party to adopt such an ideology. After that, the second part of the discussion will be about the Neo-Eurasianism ideology which is the central focus of the discussion with regard to the Turanism. Although differing variants of Eurasianist thought have existed throughout history, Neo-Eurasianist one is chosen for comparison due to one main reason. The fact that Neo-Eurasianism emerged after the 1990s in Russia and had the most chance to influence other groups outside Russia is the primary reason for this choice. Linked to this, as a contemporary of Jobbik and its pro-Eastern discourse it would be expected that Neo-Eurasianism played a key role in developing such narrative as well. In the following section, a discussion of differences and overlaps alongside the essay’s central argument will be examined in light of the ideologies’ special visions. In the end, concluding remarks will follow briefly summarizing the essay’s findings.
Hungarian Turanism: Historical roots and the discourse of Jobbik
Turanism as an ideology in Hungary dates back to the 19th century while first time reaching its popularity at the beginning of the 20th century. In more general terms, Turanism implied common roots of Hungarians with Asiatic and especially, Turkic nations of the East.[3] As in the modern period, this ideology was associated with an identity question regarding the background of Hungarians and comprised a kind of “soul-searching” outside Europe. Max Muller is considered the forerunner of Turanist idea in Hungary with his book, On the Classification of Turanian Languages published in 1854, where he classified all non-Indo-European and non-Semitic tongues into the group named “Turanian”.[4] Although this pursuit was widely rejected and became scientifically unsuccessful, its impact on political, nationalist movements turned out to be persistent. As a geographical and sometimes, cultural concept, the term Turan implied the Eastern territories of Central Asia and its people providing ground for “a counter-ideology against Western-oriented depictions of Hungarian historiography.”[5]
As said, during the subsequent period Turanism reached its peak and served as a nationalist myth to formulate a specific past and identity for Hungarians. Scientific and political circles in Hungary were debating on the roots of Hungarians, which divided the whole elite into two rival camps of those who supported the idea of Hungarians being descendants of Finn-Ugor people and those who were for the contrary Ural-Altaic theory.[6] The latter was embraced by Turanists and provided a ground for the emergence of the Turanist movement in the country.
Apart from nationalist function within Hungary, Turanism as a policy guide had pragmatic propositions as well. The ideology was perceived as a counterweight against rising Pan-Slavism that was being promoted by Moscow in both Tsarist and Soviet periods and Pan-Germanism around the region while it also promised new markets within the Eastern nations.[7] In parallel, there was support by Turanists for the Hungary-Turkey rapprochement during the interwar period.[8] Another source of such a pro-Eastern outlook was the Treaty of Trianon signed in 1920 reconfiguring the borders of Hungary after the World War I making the country landlocked. The Hungarian public blamed the West for “Trianon betrayal” creating feelings of loneliness and desire to find a “family” in the East.[9] Such atmosphere reinforced the idea of Turanism within the country up until the emergence of Mussolini’s fascism in Italy. Benito Mussolini became a point of admiration for the Turanists for his revolution, struggle against “socialist irrationality” and order and strongman image, thereby weakening the Turanism in Hungary dividing the former proponents into different camps.[10] The subsequent fate of the ideology was determined with the establishment of the communist regime in Hungary silencing the hopes for Turanism until the end of the Cold War.
After the fall of the communist regime in Hungary, voices against communism and globalization by the right and left respectively started to be heard more frequently in tandem with the increasing popularity of Turanism among nationalists. In the modern period, the firmer supporter and promoter of this ideology in political arena was the far-right Jobbik party, the discourse of which will be evaluated later on below. Moreover, it is fair to say that in Hungary the most popular demonstration of Turanism has become the Kurultaj festival, which is celebrated annually with the aim of preservation of ancient traditions. Presented as “tribal assembly of Hun-Turkic nations”, the Kurultaj hosts peoples of Turan ranging from Azerbaijanis, Avar, Kazakh, Turkish, Gagauz, and Tatar to Turkoman, Yakut, Mongolian, Uyghur, Hungarian and so on.[11] Special attention is given to celebrations of nomadic life, ancient martial arts, Shamanic music, etc. What is more, Turanist content also finds a place in music, especially within the genre dubbed as Hungarian “National Rock”. For example, the rock group Hungarica in its song “I am a Hungarian” demonstrates the position advocated by nationalists emphasizing Hun descent and disagreement with Finn-Ugric roots.[12] Besides, Attila the Hun figures prominently in various nationalist, far-right contents, who is perceived as a direct ancestor of modern Hungarians. The grand prince of the Hungarians, Árpád, who lived and ruled his tribes in the Carpathian region around the 13th century is assumed descendant of Attila by nationalists.[13] In this way, in search of a strong and glorious past, Turanists are making connections with historical figures portraying Hungarians as warrior people capable of ruling and conquering.[14] Overall, it can be said that Turanism has generally found a way into the mass culture in Hungary while being embraced mostly by nationalists.
Turanism as Jobbik’s Eastern turn
As pointed out before, Jobbik is a political party in Hungary founded in 2003 under the name of Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary. The party is often remembered for its far-right image and successes in the last nearly 15 years. Since 2014-2015, Jobbik has moderated its position and changed party policy in some important respects thus distancing from far-right rhetoric. With that in mind, until that time the past rhetoric and outlook helped the party to become successful in various elections. During this period, Jobbik’s pro-Eastern outlook dubbed as Neo-Turanism comprised an important part of party policy concerning issues such as foreign political and economic relations and cultural policy. Jobbik’s Turanism scope included peoples perceived as ethnically and linguistically close to Hungarians such as Turks of Turkey, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, Tatars, the aboriginal tribes of Siberia, and even the distant Mongols, Manchus, Koreans, and Japanese.[15] In tandem with that, Jobbik was demonstrating anti-EU, anti-liberal, anti-American stances with strong anti-Semitism, which were well incorporated into the framework of Neo-Turanism, thereby proposing a Eurasian option. For example, Csanád Szegedi, then deputy chairman of the party, was arguing for leaving the EU and forming a Turanian alliance with Central Asian states.[16] Additionally, Jobbik was holding the Euro-Atlantic community accountable for the economic hardships and difficult conditions like poverty, unemployment that emerged after the 2008 financial crisis in Hungary. According to then party leader Gabor Vona:
“Hungary stands desperately lonesome in the arena of world politics. Because of the problems we face in international politics, we are in dire need of close and supportive alliances… If we put aside the lies about our Finno-Ugric origin, and only profess that we are the descendants of Attila, we would suddenly find hundreds of millions ready to form a common basis for alliance… We come to realise that an alliance based and developed on the principles of Turanism instead of the Euro-Atlantic alliance would be more effective in serving the needs and interests of our nation.”[17]
As seen from the quotes, besides as an answer to the ethnocultural and identity questions, Jobbik’s leadership was trying to utilize Turanism for foreign policy as well. Feelings of lack of recognition in Europe led to the pro-Eastern outlook within the party. Contrasting the West’s disregard for Hungary with the natural family in the East, the alternative version of pro-Eastern discourse was presented by Jobbik. In 2011, Vona presented a new economic policy emphasizing closer cooperation with countries like Turkey, China, Iran and Russia due to their potential to end Hungary’s dependence on the EU and other Western financial institutions.[18] In this vein, Neo-Turanism also promised new markets outside the Euro-Atlanticist orbit further strengthening the pragmatic aspect and appeal of the ideology. In this respect, the party was devoting importance to building cooperation with the Eastern countries like Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and other Central Asian countries within the conception of Turanism. The inclusion of countries like Russia, China and Iran into Turan stemmed from realist and pragmatic calculations, which we will discuss this issue in subsequent sections.
In the international scene, Jobbik was also supporting countries recognized as Turanian. For example, supporting Turkish Cypriots against Greeks, Azerbaijanis against Armenians, reluctance to show any stance on the issue of the Armenian genocide were exemplary in this respect.[19] With this policy line, even religious differences did not prevent Jobbik from demonstrating such a position, which meant support for Muslim nations at the expense of Christian ones. For instance, the former member of Jobbik, Marton Gyongyosi, who was serving in the Hungarian Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Relations stated that “[Hungarians] have Asian ethnicity, this is genetics … the genetics are given, religion is a choice. … [It is] difficult to describe what ties me to a Kazakh, Uzbek, and/or to a Turk … It is about feelings.”[20] Considering the overall attitude towards Islam by far-right groups in Europe, such discourse of Jobbik was unique. On a question related to this policy outlook, Vona answered that:
“I said then that the real distinction is not between different religions, countries and cultures, but between communities attempting to preserve traditions and anti-traditional, global liberalism. If you look closely, you can see it is the Muslim world that still can best resist the monopolar world order dominated by the United States.” [21]
Stating the admiration to Islam clearly, Vona again hinting at Turanism as a way to bridge the differences among different religions:
“This is our common mission and the universal task of Turanism: to build a bridge between East and West, Muslim and Christian and struggle together for a better world. We must show that Christians and Muslims are not enemies but brothers. Perhaps none else than us Hungarians and Turks are able to do that; but we are, because we are connected by our common blood.” [22]
From the statements we can establish that positive and even, sympathetic attitude towards the Muslim world stemmed from two primary reasons. The first one was the mentioned admiration emanating from Islam’s traditionality and strength against influences from globalization and liberalism. Secondly, Islam’s inherent connection with Turkic states, which occupy a central position in the Turanist conception of Jobbik, was making it necessary to build healthy relationships with these countries. We can say that achieving a certain degree of legitimacy among the public within Turan required a softer and positive attitude towards Islam. As a force multiplier, the fact that immigration at that time had not caused major problems in Central and Eastern Europe provided a solid ground for such a pro-Muslim discourse.[23]
Moreover, Jobbik concerning the identity of Hungarians requested the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to research the origins of the Hungarian people to disconfirm the idea on Finn-Ugric roots.[24] Another demonstration of Neo-Turanism in Jobbik’s rhetoric was the grey wolf salutation in several instances used by Gabor Vona, which symbolizes the Turkic origins of a nation. This salute style is inspired by the Turkic mythology, which narrates that Turks were descended from a she-wolf in the Central Asian steppes.[25] [26] This symbol became prevalent after first used by Azerbaijani nationalists during the movements in the late 1980s and early 1990s and popularized in Turkey when nationalist groups and parties adopted and gave it an impetus in politics. Before being a symbol of Turkic nations, the gray wolf gained political status after popularized by ultranationalist groups in Turkey and even was banned in some countries such as Austria and France.[27] [28] The use of it by Vona Gabor indicates Turkish nationalism’s influence on his conception of Turan and the titular position of the Turkic element within it. It is no coincidence that Turanism in Turkey has always been inspired by Pan-Turkism, which to a great extent had an impact on Vona’s preferred discourse.
Neo-Eurasianism and Russia: restoring the imperial prestige without empire
As already pointed out, Eurasianism as an ideology or concept has had different variations depending on the period it was developed. For example, Eurasianism promoted in the 1920-1930s by the Russian émigré movement, also labeled as Classic Eurasianism, was more intellectual-oriented compared to the Neo-Eurasianist version and had a reactionary character meaning it was partially thought of as a counterweight to the Pan-Turkish movement emerged in the late Ottoman era. The reason of why this movement was perceived as a threat lies in the inherent idea of Pan-Turkism to liberate all Turkic peoples of the world, which also included Turks residing in Russia.[29] This character of the Eurasianist concept had also effects on Neo-Eurasianism as well as we will see later on. Nevertheless, what unites all Eurasian concepts is a belief in existence of a third continent, which is neither European nor Asian in both ethnocultural and historical senses. Eurasia as a territory requires to be ruled as empire Russians being the constitutive nation within it. Looking from that perspective, Eurasianism as an ideology portrays Russia as the natural hegemon over the so-called third continent.
When it comes to Neo-Eurasianism, it also includes the ideas of the classic variant mentioned above although it is intellectually nurtured more by European tradition than Russian Eurasianism. Neo-Eurasianism is often considered as another form of European “New Right” ideology as its major proponent Aleksandr Dugin formulated the concept mainly through influences from the Western geopolitical tradition and his engagement with European right intellectuals, etc.[30] [31] It is fair to say that he only used terminology and some basic ideas of the classic Eurasianists and even criticized them for being highly philosophical.[32] [33] Based on an imperial conception of Russia, Neo-Eurasianism is defined as “a form of a fascist ideology centered on the idea of revolutionizing the Russian society and building a totalitarian, Russia-dominated Eurasian Empire that would challenge and eventually defeat its eternal adversary represented by the United States and its Atlanticist allies.”[34] As seen, Neo-Eurasianism adopting the idea of Eurasia as a third continent places it against the US-dominated Atlanticist world who is trying to undermine traditions and cultures around the world. Geographically, there is no clear-cut answer to the precise location of the Eurasian continent and the reason for this can be to create a universal appeal for the ideology making it flexible since one of the aims of Neo-Eurasianists, especially Dugin, has been to export the ideology around the world: “Dugin’s “Eurasia” may also include various Asian countries and, curiously, even more remote parts of the world outside the Euro-Asiatic landmass, if they only adhere to – in Dugin’s interpretation of these vague concepts – tellurocratic or integral-traditionalist values.”[35] The far-reaching international ties of Dugin in Europe or Asia can be interpreted from this perspective.
Neo-Eurasianists have been trying to formulate a geopolitical vision for post-Soviet Russia who lost its imperial prestige and influence after the collapse of the USSR.[36] The idea that Russia can exist only as an empire occupies a major space in Neo-Eurasianist thinking. In essence of the ideology lies in the idea that the modern Russian Federation is “incomplete Russia” while territories of “the genuine Russia” incorporate borders of the Russian Empire and Soviet Russia.[37] To put it simply, Neo-Eurasianism envisages a future of Russia influencing and preserving hegemony over all Eurasian continent be it with imperial or other means.
To Dugin’s understanding, Neo-Eurasianism “is also a global revolutionary concept aiming to act as an ideological tool for uniting various forces against the United States and liberal democracy”.[38] The source of rejection towards such a unipolar world and contrast between Atlanticist and Eurasianist orders emanates from perceived threats for Russia’s security. Two primary threats from the US are shown: globalization and disintegration of Russia.[39] For instance, color revolutions or democratization processes in the post-Soviet region are perceived as attempts of the US to disintegrate Russia and have influence over the countries thought as part of Russia’s natural orbit.[40] On the other hand, globalization and liberal values are recognized as existential threats to Eurasian civilization and traditions. To combat against such threats Neo-Eurasianism is proposed as an ideology and policy vision: Russian foreign policy should be Eurasianist in order to restore the great power status lost since the 1990s. Eurasia as an umbrella term provides Russia a ground to exert influence over the countries once part of “historic Russia” and struggle against the US-led unipolar system. Dugin argues that in Europe Germany against the US and Great Britain, in Asia Japan against China, in the Muslim world Iran against Turkey constitute together anti-Western block while the Eurasian continent is destined to be under Russian domination.[41] To put it shortly, Neo-Eurasianism aimed at creating an enemy from the so-called Atlanticist world, which threatens the very existence of the Eurasian world and in this way, promoting an ideology to protect this world while preserving the multinational empire character of Russia.
Were Eurasianism and Turanism mutually inclusive: Practical Implications?
It is argued at the beginning of the essay that Eurasianism and Turanism once put forward by the far-right party Jobbik were incompatible ideologies and the coexistence requires the omission of or less focus on one of them. As we will see below that this fact has actually led to splits within the party especially on the issue of how to approach Russia with Turanist view. On the other hand, as mentioned, the Turanism of Jobbik was sometimes presented as another form of Eurasianism. Again I argued that this idea can be valid if we have in mind non-Russian versions of Eurasianism which was mainly formulated in Turkey and Central Asian countries and had Turkocentric and pro-Muslim character. Otherwise, Russocentric Eurasianisms, which also include Neo-Eurasianism, are incompatible with Turanism thereby disconfirming the idea of this ideology as Hungarian Eurasianism. Since Eurasianisms have had an inherently anti-Turkic position due to the potential threat to the integrity of Russia, moving on with both Turanism and Eurasianism was contradictory, at least ideologically.
To Gabor Vona and Márton Gyöngyösi’s understanding, Hungary has always been influenced by three major powers throughout history: Germany, Russia and Turkey. Thus, Hungarians in order to survive as a nation had to balance this triangle via alliances.[42] [43] It seems that the impact of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism at the beginning of the 20th century on the emergence of Turanism in Hungary and Turanists’ attempts to cooperate with Turkey were influential on Vona’s ideas as well. However, considering the 21st century’s realities, Vona preferred rapprochement with Russia and Turkey necessary leaving Germany aside probably for its position in the EU.[44] Russia was included in Jobbik’s geopolitics due to the great power status, influence over the Eastern region and enmity towards the Atlanticist order. In this way, Russia was placed within the Turanism concept in rhetoric although this choice was largely determined by pragmatic considerations as opposed to the inclusion of Turkey, Central Asian countries, etc. China also figured prominently in this framework due to the potential economic benefits of it.
Moreover, Vona met with Aleksandr Dugin and gave a lecture at the Lomonosov University in Russia openly declaring himself Eurasianist. He was also familiar with the works of Aleksandr Dugin saying, “the advantage of Eurasianism is that it allows for the preservation of the independence of the regions, and is based on the continental cooperation in contrast to the exploitation by the European Union”.[45] What is more, Vona published an article in the journal of the International Eurasian Movement criticizing liberalism, democracy, globalization as sources of evil.[46] It is clear that Jobbik was trying to promote Turanism and Eurasianism together and these were distinct not complementary lines in contrary to the idea that Turanism was Eurasianism in traditional sense. As explained above, the Turanism of Jobbik was Turkocentric and gave major importance to countries based on this ethnocultural sense. This coexistence of Turanism and Eurasianism comprised a poor duo and led to disagreements over the issue. Before, moving this point it would be appropriate to list overlaps and contradictions between them.
Neo-Eurasianism and Neo-Turanism were similar in a couple of senses. The main lines in this regard were anti-Atlanticist, anti-liberal, anti-globalization and conservatist approach. These ideological linkages somehow provided a common ground for both ideologies. However, there are fundamental contradictions regarding the position of Russia and the Turkic element within these ideologies. Starting with Neo-Eurasianism, like its predecessors, it also had an ambiguous stance towards Turkic and Muslim peoples.[47] Since the 1990s alongside Russian versions of Neo-Eurasianism, other variants of Eurasianisms were formed in Central Asian countries of Turkic origin. They gave pride to Turks within the Eurasian concept disregarding the Russian element considering it too European to be Eastern.[48] This in turn created tensions between Russian and non-Russian variants of the concept. Proponents of the non-Russian version argued that Neo-Eurasianism is an imperial project and exists with Russian nationalism under the disguise. On the other hand, the Russocentric camp has been generally reluctant to recognize the Turko-Muslim element and considered it periphery of the Eurasian ideology. The existence of such competition always constituted a fear of Russocentics to lose great power status once again and their rivals have been able to exploit this fear to assert themselves as a rather independent power.[49] In this situation, Russian Eurasianists had to recognize the Turko-Muslim element in order influence and benefit from the region more easily.[50] Dugin accepted the cultural autonomy as the only solution ignoring the sovereignty option and in parallel, criticizing the policy of perestroika and Boris Yeltsin’s initiation of negotiations within peoples of the Caucasus and Volga-Ural region. Just to repeat, in such a conflictual scene, Jobbik’s Turanism could only be interpreted as Eurasianist only in a non-Russian Turko-Muslim sense recognizing the inherent negative stance of it towards Russia. On the other hand, Aleksandr Dugin considered the concept of Turan in more geographical and old-historic senses rejecting the association always made between Turkic peoples and Turan.[51] [52] This attitude was contradictory to the conception of Turanism by Jobbik as well. Another divisive point was that Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism looked at Turkey as a rival considering it Muslim leader of the Western block which was opposite of Jobbik’s pro-Turkey direction.
As pointed out, such contradictory policy visions of Jobbik eventually led to divisions and deadlock among the party members. For example, the party member Bela Kovacs argued that the Russian element should be prioritized over the cooperation with Muslim Turanian nations.[53] Contrary to this, Marton Gyongyosi stated that for him Russia and Turanism were mutually exclusive and Russians always sensed the potential threat that could come from Hungarian Turanism.[54] From another perspective, cooperation with countries like Iran and China should also create a paradox for any Turanist in Hungary: considering the mistreatments towards the Azerbaijani minority in Iran and Uighurs in China, could Jobbik be ever Turanist for the sake of pragmatic policy and economic considerations?[55] Seeing the picture from this perspective, Jobbik’s gradual departure from Turanism and Gabor Vona’s statement that for now Turanism could serve as a long-term ideology and should be celebrated as a cultural notion in such circumstances seems logical.[56] This change or choice could be explained by Russia’s more assertive and planned approach in Europe which was developed gradually over time. Also, Jobbik has changed its party program since around 2014 moderating its position and distancing from its traditional far-right rhetoric and also Turanism. Two major factors led to such a departure. First, the migrant crisis and subsequent anti-migrant campaign of Victor Orban forced Jobbik to give up its pro-Muslim discourse.[57] Second, again Victor Orban observing the successes of Jobbik’s program adopted several components of it including the importance given to cooperation with Turkic or Turanian countries thereby leaving the party to seem unoriginal and “stealing” the voters of it.[58] Both factors hugely influenced the decision of Jobbik to reorient itself abandoning the once original ideological lines like Turanism.
Conclusion
Throughout the essay in order to explain the overlaps and contradictions between Turanism and Neo-Eurasianism brief reviews of both concepts were provided. After assessing the basic premises of them, their cohabitation experience in Jobbik’s discourse was analyzed. It is argued that Turkocentric and pro-Muslim Turanist point of view and Russocentric Eurasianism are inherently conflictual and their origins ] were influenced by enmity and threats between each other. The second claim was that Turanism as a geopolitical concept was not Jobbik’s version of Eurasianism and was a distinct ideology. It can only be considered as a Eurasianist concept if parallels are drawn with regard to non-Russian forms of the idea, not the ones developed in Russia. Exploring these contradictions, the essay looked at the disagreements within Jobbik regarding how to position towards Russia, which were largely influenced by the conflictual nature of Turanism and pro-Russian, Eurasianist view. Such a split in Jobbik confirmed the central claims of the essay and showed the impracticality of the firm coexistence of these ideologies.
[1] See for the debates on exclusion of Muslim nations from Eurasian concept, for example: Camus, Jean-Yves. (2015) A Long-Lasting Friendship: Alexander Dugin and the French Radical Right, in Marlene Laruelle (ed.), Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship (London: Lexington Books, 2015), p. 79-96
[2] See, for example: Balogh, Péter (2020). Clashing geopolitical self-images? The strange coexistence of Christian bulwark and Eurasianism (Turanism) in Hungary, Eurasian Geography and Economics, DOI:10.1080/15387216.2020.1779772
[3] Kowalczyk, Michał. (2017). Hungarian Turanism. From the Birth of the Ideology to Modernity – an Outline of the Problem. Historia i Polityka. 49. 10.12775/HiP.2017.011.
[4] Korkut, U. (2017). Resentment and reorganization: anti-western discourse and the making of Eurasianism in Hungary. Acta Slavica Iaponica , 38, 71-90.
[5] Emel Akçalı, Umut Korkut (2012) Geographical Metanarratives in East- Central Europe: Neo-Turanism in Hungary, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 53:5, 596-614, DOI: 10.2747/1539-7216.53.5.596
[6] Sridharan, Preetham. (2018). “Agglutinating” a Family: Friedrich Max Müller and the Development of the Turanian Language Family Theory in Nineteenth-Century European Linguistics and Other Human Sciences Dissertations and Theses. Paper 4341. https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.6234
[7] Balogh, Péter (2020). Clashing geopolitical self-images? The strange coexistence of Christian bulwark and Eurasianism (Turanism) in Hungary, Eurasian Geography and Economics, DOI:10.1080/15387216.2020.1779772
[8] Kowalczyk, Michał, Hungarian Turanism. From the Birth of the Ideology to Modernity
[9] Ibid
[10] Umut Korkut and Emel Akçalı, “Deciphering Eurasianism in Hungary: Narratives, Networks, and Lifestyles,” in Marlene Laurelle, ed., Relations between Russia and the Extreme Right Parties in Europe (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 175–192
[11] See for more information on Kurultaj festival http://kurultaj.hu/english/
[12] Ungváry, K. (2020). Turanism: the ‘new’ ideology of the far right | The Budapest Times. Retrieved 12 December 2020, from http://budapesttimes-archiv.bzt.hu/2012/02/05/turanism-the-new-ideology-of-the-far-right/
[13] D. Soon Kim, “The Rise of European Right Radicalism: the Case of Jobbik,” Communist and
Post-Communist Studies 49, no. 4 (2016): 345–57.
[14] Pieiller, Evelyne. (2016). Hungary looks to the past for its future. Retrieved 1 January 2021, from https://mondediplo.com/2016/11/10Hungary
[15] Ibid
[16] Ungváry, K., Turanism: the ‘new’ ideology of the far right
[17] Gabor Vona: Turanism Instead of Euro-Atlantic Alliance!. (2012). Retrieved 3 January 2021, from https://dagobertobellucci.wordpress.com/2012/01/23/gabor-vona-turanism-instead-of-euro-atlantic-alliance/
[18] Norbert Pap, Viktor Glied, Hungary’s Turn to the East: Jobbik and Islam p. 1044
[19] Ghosh, Palash. (2013). Strange Bedfellows: Hungarian Far-Right Jobbik Party Embraces Muslim Nations, Seeks ‘Eurasian’ Ideal Of Statehood. International Business Times. Retrieved 3 January 2021 from https://www.ibtimes.com/strange-bedfellows-hungarian-far-right-jobbik-party-embraces-muslim-nations-seeks-eurasian-ideal
[20] Umut Korkut and Emel Akçalı, Deciphering Eurasianism in Hungary, p.183
[21] The background of real conflict in the world. (2013). [Interview with Gabor Vona] Retrieved 3 January 2021, from https://www.jobbik.com/the_background_of_real_conflict_in_the_world
[22] Ghosh, Palash, Strange Bedfellows: Hungarian Far-Right Jobbik Party Embraces Muslim Nations, Seeks ‘Eurasian’ Ideal Of Statehood.
[23] Norbert Pap & Viktor Glied (2018) Hungary’s Turn to the East: Jobbik and Islam, Europe-Asia Studies, 70:7, 1036-1054, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2018.1464126
[24] D. Soon Kim, The Rise of European Right Radicalism: the Case of Jobbik
[25] Gregory A. Burris. (2007). The Other from Within: Pan-Turkist Mythmaking and the Expulsion of the Turkish Left. Middle Eastern Studies, 43(4), 611-624. Retrieved January 2, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284570
[26] Amberin, Zaman. (1999). Turkey’s Gray Wolves Nip at Heels of Power. Retrieved 2 January 2021, from https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-apr-20-mn-29194-story.html
[27] Keddie, P. (2021). France has banned the ‘Grey Wolves’ – but who are they?. Retrieved 2 January 2021, from https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/11/24/france-has-banned-the-grey-wolves-but-who-are-they
[28] Kiyagan, Askin. (2019) Austria: Ban on Turkish nationalist salute in practice. Retrieved 2 January 2021, from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/austria-ban-on-turkish-nationalist-salute-in-practice/1406731
[29] Mileski, T. (2015). Identifying the new Eurasian orientation in modern Russian geopolitical thought. Eastern Journal of European Studies, 6, 177-187.
[30] Umland, Andreas. (2018). Why Aleksandr Dugin’s “Neo-Eurasianism” Is not Eurasianist, New Eastern Europe Retrieved 4 January 2021, from https://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/06/08/aleksandr-dugins-neo-eurasianism-not-eurasianist/
[31] Shekhovtsov, Anton. (2015) Alexander Dugin and the West European New Right, 1989-1994”, in Marlene Laruelle (ed.), Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship (London: Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 35-54.
[32] Shekhovtsov, A., & Umland, A. (2009). Is Aleksandr Dugin a Traditionalist? “Neo-Eurasianism” and Perennial Philosophy. The Russian Review, 68(4), 662-678. Retrieved January 4, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20621114
[33] Laruelle, Marlène. (2006). Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Retrieved from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/aleksandr-dugin-russian-version-the-european-radical-right-2006
[34] Shekhovtsov, Anton. (2017). Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir. 10.4324/9781315560991. p. 43
[35] Umland, Andreas, Why Aleksandr Dugin’s “Neo-Eurasianism” Is not Eurasianist
[36] Laruelle, Marlène, Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?
[37] Torbakov, Igor. (2017). Neo-Ottomanism vs Neo-Eurasianism? Retrieved 4 January 2021, from https://www.ui.se/utrikesmagasinet/analyser/2017/januari/neo-ottomanism-vs-neo-eurasianism/
[38] Shekhovtsov, Anton, Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir, p. 43
[39] Shlapentokh, D. (2007). Dugin Eurasianism: A Window on the Minds of the Russian Elite or an Intellectual Ploy? Studies in East European Thought, 59(3), 215-236. Retrieved January 4, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40345272
[40] Shlapentokh, D., (2007). Dugin, Eurasianism and Central Asia. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40 (2), 143–157.
[41] Laruelle, Marlène, Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?, p. 7
[42] Why does Viktor Orbán keep voting for anti-Russia sanctions? (2017). Retrieved 13 December 2020, from https://www.jobbik.com/why_does_viktor_orban_keep_voting_for_anti_russia_sanctions
[43] Hungary – How the Formerly Eurasianist Jobbik Became a Russophobic Party. (2019). Retrieved 13 December 2020, from https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/hungary-how-formerly-eurasianist-jobbik-became-russophobic-party
[44] Ibid
[45] Shekhovtsov, Anton, Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir, p. 91
[46] Vona, Gábor. (2014). Some Thoughts on the Creation of Intellectual Eurasianism. Journal of Eurasian Affairs 2 (1): 13–16
[47] Laruelle, Marlène, Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? p. 7
[48] Laruelle, Marlène. (2008). Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Press p. 169
[49] Ibid
[50] Shlapentokh, D. Dugin, Eurasianism and Central Asia, p. 149
[51] Dugin, Alexander. (2018). Turan: The Key to Understanding the Russian Logos. Retrieved 7 January 2021, from https://eurasianist-archive.com/2018/09/07/turan-the-key-to-understanding-the-russian-logos/
[52] Dugin, Alexander (2019). NOOMAKHIA: The Logos of Turan – “Turan as an Idea”. Retrieved 7 January 2021, from https://eurasianist-archive.com/2019/09/09/alexander-dugin-noomakhia-the-logos-of-turan-turan-as-an-idea/
[53] Umut Korkut and Emel Akçalı, Deciphering Eurasianism in Hungary, p. 183
[54] Ibid p. 184
[55] Moreh, C. (2016). The Asianization of national fantasies in Hungary: A critical analysis of political discourse. International Journal of Cultural Studies, 19(3), 341–353. https://doi.org/10.1177/1367877915573781
[56] Umut Korkut and Emel Akçalı, Deciphering Eurasianism in Hungary, p. 183
[57] Norbert Pap, Viktor Glied, Hungary’s Turn to the East: Jobbik and Islam p. 1049
[58] Balogh, Péter, Clashing geopolitical self-images? The strange coexistence of Christian bulwark and Eurasianism (Turanism) in Hungary p. 16
