The Causes of Terrorism: Comparative Analysis of Kurdish and Azerbaijani Minorities in Iran

While terrorism is often perceived as a manifestation of grievances, it’s important to recognize that not all discriminated groups turn to violent means as a way to achieve their political goals. Take, for instance, the Kurds and Azerbaijanis, both minority groups in Iran whose cultural rights have been overlooked, and who lack an inclusive democratic platform to articulate their concerns. Despite these shared grievances, the methods employed by these ethnic minority groups to confront the existing political system differ significantly. While armed attacks by groups like Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê (PJAK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) have been carried out since the early 2000s in pursuit of self-determination rights, there is no similar presence of ethnic Azerbaijani nationalism resulting in violent acts in Iran. This paper seeks to address the question of why certain ethnic groups resort to terrorism while others with similar grievances do not. Through a comparative study of the Kurds and Azerbaijanis in Iran, the analysis will focus on existing theories on the causes of terrorism, aiming to identify key factors that differentiate the forms of resistance chosen by these groups in response to shared challenges.

Theory:

Definition of terrorism:

            Terrorism gained prominence as the term during the French Revolution, where it was adopted by the newly elected government as a strategy to pursue revolutionary objectives. Initially, terrorism was linked to the ideals of democracy and virtue. In the 19th century, revolutionary groups began employing terrorist actions against the government, aiming to “inform and educate the masses about their political goals,” as noted by Carlo Pisacane (quoted in Woodcock, 1977, 43). Up until the 1930s, primary targets of terrorism included military units, high-ranking state officials, and law enforcement.

While at the beginning, terrorism was explicitly mentioned as the strategy for political groups to achieve their goals, later and currently it was used only as a pejorative term. In contrast to the groups of 19^th and early 20^th century, modern organizations avoid the usage of word terrorism in their names and portrayed themselves as freedom fighter, self-defense movements or called their enemies as terrorist states while themselves as revolutionaries. The change of its meaning in last two centuries made it difficult to find precise definition of terrorism.

            However, the analysis of 109 various definitions of terrorism concluded that the words “political”, “violence” and “fear” are the most frequently used. Thus, in this paper, I will adopt the definition by Bruce Hoffman:

Terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, is fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence—or, equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim (2006, 4).

            According to the definition above, the violent acts organized by KDPI and PJAK can be considered inherently terroristic due to their usage of violence and threats of violence for the pursuit of power to achieve political rights for the Kurdish minority. It is worth mentioning that, terrorist acts committed by the members of the Kurdish and Azerbaijani minorities for any other political reasons rather than ethnic one is not within the scope of this research.

Causes of terrorism:

            Inequality and grievances driven from it is considered as one of the main roots of the discontent and its various radical political consequences such as riots, revolutions, and terrorism. Franc and Pavlovic defines inequality as ‘the objectively unequal or subjectively perceived unjust distribution of valued outcomes’ (2021, 1). While inequality can be multidimensional in its economic and socio-political forms, the recent quantitative analysis of 141 publications on the subject found that, terrorism is positively correlated with inequality only when it is experienced on social and political spheres (Franc and Pavlovic, 2021, 21).

The research by Qvortrup and Ljiphart stated that, the factors leading to terrorism consists of two conditions. Firstly, the specific communities may experience grievances such as ethnic, religious or any kind of discriminations against them by the majority and political elites. However, these grievances result in terrorism as ‘the last resort for people who cannot be represented through the legal political system’ (Qvortrup, and Ljiphart, 2013, 472). Using logistic regression of 36 democratic countries, they concluded that consensus democracies have the risk of fatal terrorist attacks six times less than majoritarian democracies. However, the research was highly criticized by Matthijs Bogaards from both statistical and theoretical points of view for its problematic coding of cases, and he claimed that, this model ‘can be seen as the simplified version of Crenshaw’s classic study of the causes of terrorism’ (Bogaards, 2020, 889), because it leaves out the permissive factors and precipitants.

Martha Crenshaw made a clear differentiation between preconditions and precipitants in the context of terrorism. The preconditions refer to the underlying factors that contribute to the emergence of terrorism over an extended period, whereas the precipitants refer to the immediate events that trigger a terrorist response. Moreover, the preconditions are comprised of enabling or permissive factors that facilitate terrorist activities, and circumstances that directly motivate and inspire terrorism.

One of the permissive factors of terrorism is modernization, because the changes in the arm industry, transportation and communication can provide better conditions for the terrorists to achieve their goals. While the modernization in transportation and communication can provide terrorist organizations with mobility and popularity, the development of arms industry can increase the fatality and possibility of violent attacks on elites or on public. Secondly, social ‘facilitation’ which refers to the historical tradition which can either sanction or support use of violence for political goals. Crenshaw gives an example of Provisional Irish Republican Army which was inspired by the traditional use of physical force in Irish society from 18^th century, and the legend of Michael Collins in early 20^th century (Crenshaw, 1983, 37). Finally, the inability or unwillingness of the governments to prevent allows terrorism to occur in the countries. This can result either from absence of adequate prevention by police and intelligence services, or high costs of disallowing terrorism.

The existence of the grievances by the identifiable minority (in the sense of power relations) group within larger society when they are discriminated, and lack of inclusive political system where they could have voiced their demands in peaceful ways are claimed to be the main motivators for terrorism, according to Crenshaw. However, their existence doesn’t always lead to the emergence of terrorist campaigns. ‘A precipitating event that immediately precedes outbreaks of terrorism’ is the last circumstance for it to occur (Crenshaw, 1983, 39).

Methodology

            In this research, the Method of Agreement (MoA), initially developed by John Stuart Mill, will be employed to identify the factors contributing to the emergence of terrorism. MoA involves analyzing two or more cases that share many similarities but yield different outcomes (Rohlfing, 2012, 105). The method aims to pinpoint independent variables preventing the achievement of the same dependent variable. In this study, terrorism serves as the dependent variable, while preconditions and precipitants, as stipulated in Crenshaw’s theory on the causes of terror, act as independent variables.

To uncover the reasons for differences in the dependent variable, this paper compares independent variables by examining the cases of Azerbaijanis and Kurds in Iran. Specifically, the circumstances for the emergence of terrorism for Kurds and Azerbaijanis will be compared through an analysis of levels of modernization, social facilitation, and the state’s unwillingness or inability to combat terrorism. Subsequently, socio-political inequalities experienced by both groups and the legal-institutional responses of the Iranian state will be discussed. Finally, potential or actual precipitating events leading to discontent among both minorities will be explored.

Ethnic minorities in Iran: Kurds and Azerbaijanis

While there is no official ethnic demographic census in Iran, the Azerbaijanis, the largest ethnic minority, are estimated to comprise 16 to 24 percent of the total population of 85 million Iranians (Gheissary, 2009, p. 300). They are dominant majority in the provinces of West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Zanjan and Ardabil, and slight majority in Hamadan and Qazvin provinces. Additionally, there is also large number of Azerbaijanis living in Tehran, Qum, and Karaj provinces. The most of the Iranian Azerbaijanis adhere to the Shia faith of Islam, similar to majority group, the Persians.

The Kurdish population is concentrated primarily in the western regions of the country, spanning the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and Ilam. Additionally, they constitute the second-largest minority in West Azerbaijan province. While the majority of Kurds adhere to Sunni Islam, the Kermanshah region is predominantly inhabited by followers of the Twelver (Shia) branch (van Bruinessen, 1991, 3).

Circumstances for Terrorism

Modernization:

            Iran is highly urbanized with its 74% of its population living in cities. The urban population in four provinces of the country with a dominant Azerbaijani majority, namely East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Zanjan, and Ardabil, have shown an overall increasing trend. The proportion of urban population to total population in these provinces is 71.68%, 65.42%, 67.25%, and 68.17% respectively. Similar patterns of urbanization are observed in provinces with a Kurdish majority, where Kermanshah, Ilam, and Kurdistan provinces have 75.22%, 68.13%, and 70.76% of their populations residing in urban areas. The migration of both Azerbaijani and Kurdish communities to major urban centers such as Tehran, Karaj, Qom, and Isfahan, further supports their high level of urbanization (Pilehvar, 2021, 7).

Based on the statistics from Internet World Statistics for 2018, Iran has a higher percentage of internet users at 69.1% compared to the world and Asian average, and a median mobile internet speed of 36.33 Mbit/s, ranking 61st out of 140 countries (Usage and Population Statistics for the Middle East, 2018). In addition, Iran is ranked 23rd in the world for the length of its roads, indicating that the country’s transportation infrastructure is better than the world average (“Roadways – Country Comparison”, 2021). Given the rate of urbanization and rankings for telecommunication and transport, Iran can be considered a modernized country.

Social Facilitation:

          According to Crenshaw, social facilitation is the ‘social myths, traditions, and habits permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom’ (2011, 37). Iranian Azerbaijan was the epicenter of the several armed revolutions against the central government in early 20^th century. Although there were claims for cultural rights of ethnic Azerbaijanis, the revolutions, in general, were all-Iranian and didn’t seek any secessionist goals (Shaffer, 2002, 44). However, demands for the political autonomy or independence increased after the independence of Russian (modern) Azerbaijan and Soviet political and military interference into Iran after Second World War. The program of the revolutionary government in 1945 declared that Azerbaijanis as the separate nation by its language, culture, and customs deserves to be granted political autonomy (Abrahamian, 1983, 400). Although this state existed for one year, many reforms for Azerbaijani language, culture, and literature were carried out. Azerbaijanis, most of whom are Shia Muslims, also actively participated in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, however, after Khomeini government followed the centralization policies, there were demonstrations in Tabriz (the biggest city in Iranian Azerbaijan) for creating more secular government and ensuring ethnic rights of the minority groups (Shaffer, 2000, 455). While there is a tradition of armed resistance by the Azerbaijanis against central government, use of terrorist tactics for the secessionist goals have not been observed.

The Kurdish separatist movement has its origins in the early 20th century, when the first tribal uprisings were led by Simko Shikak. The political struggle for self-governance began in 1943 with the establishment of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). In 1946, with Soviet support, the KDPI attempted to create the Republic of Mahabad, but lasted only for one year. Despite this setback, the KDPI persisted in its armed struggle during the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in over 30,000 Kurdish deaths during the 1979 rebellion and subsequent insurgency. Although the armed struggle of the KDPI ended in 1996, another armed Kurdish organization known as PJAK emerged in Iran in the early 2000s. This led to the Iran-PJAK conflict, which continued from 2004 to 2015. KDPI resumed its armed struggle in 2016 and the conflict is still ongoing in the Western Iran.

Unwillingness or inability of the state:

The Institute for Economics & Peace reports that Iran is ranked 21st among the countries most impacted by terrorism (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022). The country has been the target of both domestic and foreign groups with ethnic and religious motives. Iran’s counterterrorism apparatus includes four main organizations, namely the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), Artesh (the military), the law enforcement unit (NAJA), and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Although cooperation and competition between these organizations help Iran to develop its counterterrorism strategy, there are also some contradictions, disagreements, and overlap of the responsibilities (Malakoutikhah, 2020, 924). According to Tabatabai, individuals matter more than the institutions and it negatively affect national security decision making (2018, 196). In general, Iran has protected its population in the central provinces but struggles with combatting terrorist groups in border areas.

Enabler or permissive factors:

Despite their significant presence in the country, Azerbaijani people have been subjected to ethnic discrimination in Iran, particularly in the areas of language, education, and representation in government institutions.

One of the main areas of discrimination against Azerbaijanis in Iran is in language policy. Although the teaching of Azerbaijani language and literature is legally permitted, in practice, there have been reports of government repression of these efforts (AHRAZ, 2023). The lack of adequate translation services in courts is also a problem, leading to discrimination against Azerbaijani-speaking individuals (Suleimanov & Krauss, 2017).

Another area of concern for Azerbaijanis in Iran is their representation in government institutions. Azerbaijanis hold high positions of government due to their Shia denominational identity, and their representation in high-level administrative, religious, and military offices comprise 8% of the total 216 senior officials (Rasanah et al., 2017). It is still considered unfair, because their proportion to the total population is at least twice more than that

Iranian Kurds were active participants in the Iran Islamic Revolution which ended the monarchy in the country. However, the assimilationist policy of the central government resulted with the conflict in Iranian Kurdistan region. After 1985 when the Iranian government took full control of the Kurdish-inhabited regions, the cultural movements for the Kurdish language were banned as a threat to the integrity of the country (Sheyholislami, 2012, 30). Similar to Azerbaijanis, their right to education in the mother tongue is not only regretted, but also suppressed by the government.

Additionally, the half of the Kurds are Sunni Muslim and they cannot even run for the presidency like other non-Shia populations of the country according to Article 115 of the Constitution. Also, they are less represented than Shia minorities, among the political, economic, military, and clerical elites of the country (Rasanah et al., 2017).

Economic Intelligence Unite reports for 2022 that Iran is the 14^th least democratic country among 167 states in the World. Also, according to Minority Rights Group International, Iran is 14^th country in the world where ethnic minorities face repression and discrimination (2021).

Precipitants:

            There were many precipitating events in the history of Kurdish armed struggle in Iran. Firstly, the killing of the leader of the KDPI immediately in Vienna directly led to the clashes between Iranian army and Kurdish insurgents in 1989 and lasted till 1996. Secondly, when the Iranian police killed 10 demonstrators by firing on them in 2004, the PJAK conducted its first terror attack (Jamestown Foundation, 2006). Thirdly, in 2016, KDPI claimed that the reason for resuming armed struggle is Iran’s Nuclear Deal. KDPI leaders thought that this agreement would allow Iran to do what they want, because the main demand of the West from the IIR was to stop developing nuclear program in return of economic sanctions relief (Rudaw, 2016).

The most important precipitant in the modern history of Iranian Azerbaijanis could be in 2006, May 12 when the official media of the Iran Islamic Republic “Iran Newspaper” called the Azerbaijanis ‘cockroaches’ and presented 9 tactics of dealing with them (Asgharzadeh, 2017, 19). This cartoon was followed by the large demonstration in the cities of Iranian Azerbaijan. According to Annual Report of Amnesty International for 2007, “hundreds, if not thousands, were arrested and scores reportedly killed by the security forces”.

In general, triggering event that lead to violent or non-violent unrest among the members of both ethnic groups were present.

Discussion and Conclusion:

Similar independent variables for both Kurdish and Azerbaijani minority in Iran makes them as ideal case selection for the Mill’s method of MSSD. Table 1 demonstrates that most of the independent variables are same for both Azerbaijanis and Kurds in Iran. As an illustration, they both live in the modernized country that unable to maintain security near borderland regions and of which minorities are discriminated and aren’t represented in the political system. However, main difference is the absence of historical traditions of armed struggle for the ethnic motives among Azerbaijanis in Iran who were either active in the all-Iranian revolutions or participated in peaceful demonstrations for their cultural rights.

            This research shows that, the presence of violent historical tradition for ethnic cause is one of the reasons for existence of terrorist attacks by the Kurdish ethnic nationalist organizations. In other words, the lack of social facilitation avoids the discontent of the ethnic Azerbaijani movement to use force against authorities. However, the finding doesn’t also indicate that social facilitation is the leading to the emergence of violence without interaction with other independent variables. This study rejects the previous theories that focused on the roles of single factors or even combination of two or more other than social facilitation. In conclusion, one of the main factors providing opportunities for terrorism is social facilitation and absence of it hindered the emergence of terrorist campaign by Azerbaijanis for ethnic cause against the central government.

TABLE 1: Dependent and independent variables of Crenshaw’s model on causes of terrorism for Kurds and Azerbaijanis in Iran

            In general, the significance of social facilitation comes from the idea that grievances turn to violence when there is tradition to excuse it and habit to mobilize. However, it cannot explain everything alone since all tradition and habits can have starting points, and salience of political culture can be challenged by many internal and external factors. Despite its explanatory power, the Crenshaw’s model of causes should be supported by two other theories. First, the availability of financial sources for the terrorist actions should be considered as they have the power not only to maintain, but also to create traditions of political violence. Secondly, while speaking about social facilitation, the questions should be asked violence in the name of whom? Or while speaking about grievances, we have to remember the Crenshaw’s warning about the subjectivity of the notion of injustice. Thus, for the grievances to arise in the name of the minority ethnic or religious group, the boundaries between the groups should be salient.

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