It is for sure that the Second Karabakh War and as a result of it, the trilateral agreement signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia created a new security environment in the region opening new possibilities for the countries around it. For instance, the proposals on a new 3+3 platform composed of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Russia and Iran have already been put forward by leaders of Turkey and Iran, which would strengthen regional cooperation among the countries diminishing the prospects of another war.
That being said, another platform that would gain importance with the new political environment is the Turkic Council or officially, the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States. The cooperation among the Turkic-speaking countries became one of the important topics after the collapse of the USSR. In this direction, the Turkic Council was founded as a platform to bring those countries together for economic, political and cultural objectives. Although it was established to cooperate on the abovementioned sectors, activities of the organization have nearly been confined to only the cultural and non-political issues. The primary reasons for this ineffectiveness included the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkmenistan’s reluctance to cooperate, and the not-so-good relationship between Turkey and Uzbekistan.
However, today’s realities are so different from the past in a way that the effective functioning of the Turkic Council on political and economic cooperation does not seem so utopic. The mentioned barriers to the organization are fading away. First off, of course, the decisiveness of Turkey in this respect has been and will be of crucial importance. As a regional power, Turkey’s guidance and resolve are among the musts to make the organization effective. It is no coincidence that such a role of Turkey has been the primary driver in eliminating the barriers for the organization so far. Let us look at these barriers again.
The first problem concerning the issue was the existence of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and as a side effect of it, the blockade of Nakhchivan, the place where the founding document of the Turkic Council was signed, and the absence of land connection to the mainland. This region also constitutes the only land connection of Azerbaijan with Turkey. Therefore, restoration of the corridor between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan also meant Turkey’s direct access to Azerbaijan and thus, the whole of Central Asia bypassing Iran and Georgia. It goes without saying that before and during the Second Karabakh War Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan at both military and political levels hugely determined the victorious party sidelining the influence of Russia for a long period. The final declaration that put an end to the fighting after 44 days of operations included the clause, which stipulated restoration of economic and transport links between the enclave Nakhchivan and mainland Azerbaijan. Armenia guaranteed the safety of transport links between the remaining regions Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan ensuring the unhindered movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions. This corridor eliminated the problems concerning the long travel time, transportation costs and security for Azerbaijan while also strengthening the position of Turkey concerning its foreign policy towards the Central Asian region. This also meant new opportunities for the member states of the Turkic Council regarding further development of connectivity and cooperation in the economic sector as well.
The second barrier for the organization was the uncooperative stance of Turkmenistan and its dispute with Azerbaijan on the status of the undersea hydrocarbons field within the Caspian Sea. However, this long-standing disagreement was ended in 2021 with the preliminary agreement on the joint exploration of the field, which was symbolically named as the “Dostluq” (Friendship). Another move for integrating Turkmenistan into the “club” had been made just around one month before this agreement by the President of Turkey, R.T. Erdogan two days after he attended the Victory Parade in Baku. He stated in a video message:
“We follow the active involvement of Turkmenistan both in cooperation among the Central Asian countries and the dialogue process they perform with states and international organizations outside the region. By this means, I would like to stress once again that we wish Turkmenistan is included in the Turkic Council as soon as possible”.
Another problem for the active cooperation among Turkic states was the position of Uzbekistan that had been blurred since the foundation of the organization. However, in 2019 Uzbekistan finalized its joining process and became a full-fledged member of the Council for the first time. Therefore, as a result of the latest developments, apart from it being only a cultural platform for the members, the Council will be able to accelerate its efforts in interconnectivity and cooperation around economic, political and security spheres as well. The member states can also utilize this platform to formulate common strategies aiming at the mentioned areas.
Regarding this pragmatic aspect of the issue, the attempts by Ukraine to gain observer status in the organization are exemplary. Efforts of a non-Turkic country to gain a seat in the organization would indicate its growing importance in realist terms. Ukraine justifies this request with the Crimean Tatars who are Turkic people and calls itself “the heir of Turkish culture.” Of course, these moves are more than the ethnocultural closeness of Ukraine. Ukraine sees the Turkic Council as a platform to balance the threat from Russia and also neutralize the “same people” narrative of Russian President Vladimir Putin, which claims the common identity for Ukrainian and Russian people. The recent military cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey on sales of unmanned aerial vehicles further cements these links as well. To sum up all of these points, it is fair to say that all the complications regarding the effectiveness of the organization are fading away and favorable geopolitical and economic conditions are emerging. These points coupled with Turkey’s more assertive approach towards the Caucasus and Central Asia and the rising economic influence of China in these regions indicate the growing importance of cooperation among the countries of the Turkic Council. The coming period would yield productive undertakings for the member states in case of them utilizing this platform for more wide-ranging goals.
