Ziya Kazimzada and Tural Sultanli
This paper was written in May 2023.
Introduction and the history of eco-activism in Azerbaijan
The controversy between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh dates back to the 20th century, when the two nations fought against each other to control the region and impose their own rules in Nagorno-Karabakh. After the independence of the two countries in 1918, Armenia and Azerbaijan also brought this controversy to the international arena (Gzoyan, 2020), while the clashes continued among local people living there (Hovannisian, 1996). The international arena has recognised Azerbaijan as an independent state, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region within its jurisdiction [QM1] (Shirvanova, 2016). When Soviet rule was established in the Russian territories, tension between Moscow and Baku increased, leading to a final ultimatum from the Russian side to hand over the government to local communists residing in Baku (Hasanli, 2018). Receiving the rejection from the Azerbaijani side, the Russian Soviet government sparked local clashes again between local Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Azerbaijani government had to send the majority of its troops to protect the border with Russia to the region to put down the rebellion. Afterwards, using this opportunity, the Russian side invaded Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was created in 1923 by the decision of the central Kremlin rulers (Centre for Preventive Action, 2023). The tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan SSR continued for 60 years and sparked again in the second half of the 1980s when the new Russian partly liberal government led by Mikhail Gorbachev started the policy or practise of restructuring or reforming the economic and political systems of Russia and socialist countries within the USSR (Marcy, 1988).
Topkhana events started mass protests in Azerbaijan against Armenia and also led to anger toward USSR officials because they did not intervene in the issue and towards illegal actions by Armenians in Topkhana. After nearly 34 years, the second wave of eco-activist protests began in Azerbaijan in December stop, again against Armenia but now in a different political situation (Bayramli, 2022).
To understand the relations between regional actors and the motives beyond the eco-activist protests and their use by Azerbaijan as a policy tool, one should analyse the events that led to controversies in the region. Bearing this in mind, the next section will analyse the brief history of the Second Karabakh War and the current situation in the region.
Current situation in the region
The year 2020, when the world’s societies were dragged into the unknown, also meant that many countries benefited from this uncertainty. The increasing supervisory role of the state over society also caused a backlash and meant that many frozen issues were resolved. Under the influence of these paradoxical conditions, the frozen issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has been waiting to be resolved in a friendly atmosphere for 30 years, has begun to melt in the angry heat of the explosion of anger. The process that started with skirmishes along the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan and Armenia’s Tavush region[QM2] (Shafiyev et al., 2020) on July 12–15 turned into hot conflicts at the end of September after political polemics. With the liberation of some occupied regions, the Baku administration gained the upper hand in terms of morale and found great support from the majority of its citizens. This situation, which has been longed for and welcomed with great joy in the popular base for years, has been reinforced by Ilham Aliyev’s ability to address the popular public. The Yerevan administration, on the other hand, is going through a turbulent period in both domestic and foreign policy. Armenia, which did not get the reaction it hoped for from Russia, reached an impasse in domestic politics (both regional and military).
If we refer to the role of Turkey in the Caucasus, this situation appears as Samuel P. Huntington’s civilization identity. However, as Turkey expands its sphere of influence, it is imperative that it benefit from Azerbaijan’s status from time to time in order to protect its own interests, especially in the field of energy. Turkey’s attitude in the region is also mainly related to the validity of its words in Russia’s backyard and Iran’s attitudes. The establishment of the new status quo will multiply the winners, but the impact of a lasting political Turkey will take a long time. Russia, which is trying to establish a balance between both Azerbaijan and Armenia, cannot afford to lose either Azerbaijan or Armenia.
Iran, on the other hand, is interested in both the religious and ethnic aspects of the region. It also means addressing Iran’s concerns[QM3] [Z4] . In this respect, it is important that reconciliation in the current conjuncture be achieved not only between Azerbaijan and Armenia but also by resolving the concerns of the countries with conflicting interests in the region. Because in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan is the focus of the conflict of interests between regional powers, Even the smallest conflict can lead to instability in the region.
Under these circumstances, both parties reached a fragile agreement under Russian mediation on November 9. Russia’s peacekeeping operation has been deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh for a minimum of 5 years to monitor a secure pathway between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia via the Lachin Corridor. However, the implications of agreements would not sufficiently address the interests of both parties. In 2022, while Armenia blamed Azerbaijan for having operations near its borders, the Azerbaijani side claimed it was a response to Armenian provocations (Palivani, 2023). Moreover, eco-activism in the Lachin corridor created bottlenecks for peaceful negotiation between parties. However, government-supported eco-activism in the region has stopped with the installation of a border checkpoint on April 23 by Azerbaijan, which is not welcomed by Armenia.
To expand this section more and find out how the protests affected the relations of both countries with Russia and Iran, the next section will analyze which tactics the countries used against or in favour ofanalyseeir relations with the above-mentioned countries and will reveal facts to justify our main argument and research question.
How have the protests affected Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia and Iran?
Blame avoidance triangle of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia
Starting especially with the Russo-Ukrainian War and the unpredicted stalemate situation on the ground, the Russian peacekeeping force’s jurisdiction over the Lachin motorway has been demanded by Azerbaijani authorities. The requests were made in response to the unlawful movement of minerals from Azerbaijani territory temporarily under Russian forces’ observation to Armenia through the Lachin route (Mammadli, 2022). According to reports, between November 10 and November 14, eight Kamaz trucks and a Nissan Patrol SUV with the Armenian registration number 731-AB-61-ER travelled from the Azerbaijani city of Khankendi to Armenia (Calibre, 2022). Additionally, from November 16 to 18, the same cars were spotted travelling along the Lachin route from Armenia to Khankendi. According to operational data, these Kamaz trucks have been used to carry raw materials from the gold mines close to the hamlet of Gulyatagh in the former Aghdara (present Tartar) district of Azerbaijan, which is located in the area under the temporary control of the Russian troops (Mehdiyev, 2022). The materials were transported by the Base Metals firm, a unit of the Swiss-based Vallex Group firm, which during the occupation looted precious metals in the areas now occupied by Russian forces as well as in Kalbajar, Zangilan, and Aghdara.
Following the event, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources sent a team of specialists to the Lachin highway to keep an eye on the ground and urge that Russian soldiers halt illicit shipments across the route. On December 4, after lengthy negotiations between the parties at the Khankendi headquarters of the peacekeeping command, a deal was reached that would allow an Azerbaijani team of experts to look into and keep tabs on the environmental effects of illegal mineral extraction in Azerbaijani territory (The Azerbaijan State News Agency, 2022). However, ethnic Armenian residents of the regions of the Karabakh area temporarily under the control of the soldiers prevented the specialists from beginning the monitoring procedure last week. The ecological monitoring by the Azerbaijani specialists was halted since, in spite of the controversy, the peacekeepers did not take any precautionary steps to persuade Armenians to stop their unlawful participation.t
On December 11, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a note to Russia regarding peacekeepers (The Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan, 2022). Aykhan Hajizada, the head of the Press Service Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, said that the Azerbaijani side has repeatedly appealed to the command of the peacekeeping contingent to prevent the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Azerbaijani territories where the Russian peacekeeping contingent is temporarily stationed, as well as to eliminate the consequences of the negative impact on the environment. Finally, on December 12, some state-funded young people and members of a non-governmental organisation from Azerbaijan set up a tent on the Shusha-Lachin road and held a protest. They demanded the prevention of the exploitation of some useful deposits located in Karabakh.
As Azerbaijan continued to blame mostly Russia for its ineffective control of the region under peacekeeping jurisdiction, ignoring Armenia’s participation in the actions, Armenia also first started to blame Azerbaijan for blocking the Lachin road, the only corridor connecting Karabakh Armenians to Armenia, but then started to put the blame on the Russian side, trying to refrain from being the protector of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh. Since the capitulation of Armenia after the Second Karabakh War, the Armenian side has seemingly tried to avoid being involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, urging Azerbaijan to discuss controversial issues mostly with the de facto local authorities in the region. The Pashinyan government repeatedly stated that Armenia wants to sign a peace agreement and recognises Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory, but it also played word games, taking into account Armenia’s local laws regarding Nagorno-Karabakh that Azerbaijan hinted at and rejected.
To continue with Armenia’s rhetoric against Russia after the protests erupted, ten days following the demonstrations, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Karabakh is not fulfilling its obligation to control the Lachin corridor (Al Jazeera, 2022). “As a result of the illegal blockade, the humanitarian situation in Karabakh is extremely difficult,” he said. “The main point of the Russian peacekeepers’ presence [in Karabakh] is to prevent illegal actions and control the Lachin corridor,” the official added. Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded on the same day, “Russian peacekeepers are doing everything possible to ensure order and calm in the territories where they are deployed.” Regardless of Armenia’s condemning Azerbaijan for the blockade in its statements, Yerevan even urged Russia to initiate a discussion in the UN Security Council and raise the issue of giving the peacekeeping forces a mandate from the Security Council or sending an additional multinational contingent of peacekeeping forces to Nagorno-Karabakh because of its peacekeeping mission’s ineffectiveness. Pashinyan, using the blame avoidance tactic (Hansson, 2015) (Rajala, 2019) against Russia, also questioned its presence in the region by saying, “How does Russia assess the situation? What is its plan and roadmap for restoring movement along the Lachin corridor? Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are waiting for answers to these questions from Russia, which is also a permanent member of the UN Security Council” (Amartikian, 2022). Moreover, Pashinyan questioned the role of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh as he discussed a blockade of the breakaway region with President Vladimir Putin (The Moscow Times, 2022).
But Russia also did not stay salient after the repeated accusations from Yerevan against its peacekeeping mission and blamed Armenia for the breakdown of Azerbaijani peace talks as the Lachin protests continued for nearly a month. Moscow accused Armenia of bailing on peace talks and asked Yerevan to return to the negotiating table. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said: “It is difficult to assess Yerevan’s position when their official statements differ so significantly. If our Armenian partners are really interested in solving these problems, then instead of engaging in scholasticism, it is necessary to continue working together.” Moreover, these harsh statements came after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said: “Russia’s military presence in Armenia not only fails to guarantee its security, but it raises security threats for Armenia” (Al Jazeera, 2023). Moreover, in an interview with “Argumenti i Fakt” newspaper after the arrival of European observers to Armenia, Konstantin Zatulin, the Deputy Chairman of the Committee on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration, and Relations with Compatriots of the Russian State Duma, said that Armenia, which has improved its relations with the West, blamed the Nagorno-Karabakh problem on Russia. “At the same time, Russia continues to fully carry out the peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian leadership essentially threw the Karabakh problem onto Russia,” Konstantin Zatulin said (Затулин, 2022).
In line with Armenia, Azerbaijan also intensified its pressure on Russia and its peacekeeping mission in Karabakh, especially after Russia’s separatist war in Ukraine. When the global political arena witnessed Russia’s failure or, in the best case, stalemate in Ukraine, Azerbaijan also took advantage and increased its pressure on Russia to undermine its activities in the region, prevent its destructive role, and question the presence of a peacekeeping mission in the unrecognised republic. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan was already using every tool in its arsenal to undermine Russia’s activities and the Kremlin’s support for Armenia, especially the unrecognised republic. After the explicit failure of Moscow’s separatist policy and the war in Ukraine, Azerbaijan made harsh statements against Russia and played all its cards by using severe rhetoric that Baku has not used since that time to balance its relations. During this time, Azerbaijan sent notes of protest several times to the Russian side (Trend, 2023) and released statements slamming the illegal transfer of weapons to the separatist government. It also advanced in the still-occupied areas despite Russia’s negotiation offers and their military presence in the region (Anadolu Agency, 2023).
Azerbaijan no longer stayed quiet after Russia’s provocative actions and official statements, especially after the Russo-Ukrainian War, and even in October 2022, Azerbaijani State Television’s weekly programme “Hafta” was heavily critical of Russia and officially supported Ukraine. Rovshan Mammadov, chairman of Azerbaijan State Television and programme host, decided to respond to the “propaganda of some Russian presenters and broadcasters” against Azerbaijan. “Apparently, Russia and our colleagues wanted to hear these words from us. So here it goes. Today’s bombardment by Russia of Ukrainian territories inhabited by peaceful Ukrainian citizens is a violation of the law of war and a crime against humanity,” Mammadov said (AZTV, 2022). It should be noted that a few days ago, separatist Nagorno-Karabakh was presented as the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” in a broadcast on the Russian public television channel (Milli, 2022). Furthermore, the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry repeatedly accused Russia of transferring illegal weapons to the separatists in the region.
In September 2022, Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian billionaire of Armenian origin, decided to renounce his Russian citizenship and move to the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh. Ruben Vardanyan said he came to this decision knowing all the risks he might face. However, he was perceived by Baku as a Russian pawn in the region. As for Baku, Russia sent Vardanyan to the region to increase its leverage in the region. But Azerbaijan again did not stay quiet, and Ilham Aliyev, as well as the Defence Ministry, several times openly slammed Russia for the Vardanyan move and blamed the Kremlin for its destructive role in the region. For example, the Azerbaijani State Television constantly recorded videos named “Bringing people of Russian origin to Karabakh, Vardanyan attack”, “This is how AzTV exposed Russia’s Vardanyan plan”, and “The game will not end badly only for Vardanyan”.
In April 2023, despite refusal by the Russian side and pressure from the Kremlin, Azerbaijan established a border post on the border with Armenia at the beginning of the Lachin-Khankendi road (Azerbaijan State Border Service, 2023). On April 24, the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia stated that Russia is seriously concerned about the situation in the area of responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh, on the contact line of Armenian-Azerbaijani troops, as well as in the dialogue between official Baku and Yerevan (Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 2023). Indifference from the Azerbaijani side towards Russia’s demands and calls to withdraw from the checkpoint area shows Moscow’s declining power in the South Caucasus, especially after the Russo-Ukrainian War.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have the same tactic: to blame Russia for the problems in the region between them. The two countries are engaging more with Russia and attempting to put all their pressure on the Kremlin. On the one hand, Armenia tries to get rid of the Karabakh issue, as we can observe from Pashinyan’s speeches, and throws all responsibility into Russia’s hands. On the other side, trying not to officially communicate with de facto authorities in the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan avoids blame from Armenia and the international community by turning all heads to the Russian side by accusing them of the ineffectiveness of its peacekeeping mission in the region and showing all problems originating from this. As 2025 approaches, utilising the opportunity of Russia’s declining leverage in the region, especially after the failure in Ukraine, Azerbaijan tries to make all Russian troops in the region withdraw and consider the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict only as an internal issue. The destiny of these attempts and the process will be determined by the future of the Russo-Ukrainian War and Moscow’s abilities to influence South Caucasus countries, especially Armenia and Azerbaijan, taking into account that they are slowly moving towards the West.
The geopolitical stakes on the table: relations between Azerbaijan and Iran under the shadow of eco-activist protests
Despite the fact that Iran-Azerbaijan relations have historically been marked by tensions and turbulence on the international stage, recent events such as the Second Karabakh War, the Ukrainian crisis, ongoing and systematic protests in Iran, poor institutional coordination, a decline in the number of religious people, and a rise in the number of young people with moderate, democratic political views have brought about new realities that set the two countries apart. For the first time, both nations have publicly displayed their hands while ignoring the sensitivities that they had hitherto avoided. Eco-activist protests along the Lachin corridor also contributed negatively to Azerbaijan-Iran relations, as the latter side, fearing Azerbaijan’s growing political power and leverage not only in the South Caucasus but also in the whole Central Asia-Caucasus-Europe line, supported Armenia by stating that it would not accept any change in current border lines.
Iran thinks Baku has shifted the balance of power in the area and taken an overtly anti-Iranian stance by strengthening its relations and cooperation with Israel. Iran has warned Azerbaijan multiple times over the past two years, most notably by holding military exercises close to the country’s border. After an attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran at the beginning of 2023 (France-Presse, 2023) and virtually daily arrests of “Iranian spies in Azerbaijan” by Azerbaijani law enforcement (Hajiyeva, 2023), relations reached a new low.
Although tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan have always been high, the present situation has become even more complicated as a result of eco-activist protests along the Lachin corridor and Azerbaijan’s endeavours to increase its leverage in the South Caucasus. For Iran, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in favour of Azerbaijan will undermine its foreign policy aims and lead to growth in the separatist movement in the northern part of Iran, where ethnic Azerbaijanis are inhabited. Therefore, Iran tries to cope with Azerbaijan with harsh remarks, stating that it will not accept any border change in the region and delivering military and intelligence support to the de facto government in Nagorno-Karabakh. Two weeks before the protests started, details emerged about unknown Iranians who recently entered Azerbaijani territories temporarily monitored by the Russian peacekeepers. The information indicates that they were deployed to carry out terrorist training exercises and acts of sabotage for armed Armenian gangs that are still active in the Azerbaijani territory that the Russian peacekeepers are temporarily keeping an eye on. They are also thought to have been charged with educating the same criminal organisations on how to use weapons produced in Iran (Hajiyeva, 2022)
The role of the Russian troops in Azerbaijani territory has come under scrutiny once more in light of the illegitimate entry of Iranians into the Karabakh area. Under the watchful eyes of the peacekeepers, foreigners entered Azerbaijani land without authorization, and authentic Azerbaijani toponyms were changed in the Karabakh region. Iran’s support for the de facto government and statements condemning border change in the region further escalated already tense relations between Azerbaijan and Iran.
Conclusion
Throughout this article, we argued that weaponized ecoactivism in the region, coupled with ineffective Russian peacekeeping operations, instead of creating stable relations between parties, had a negative impact on both parties’ relations with each other. On the one hand, we pointed out that ecological issues have been widely politicised and have existed in Azerbaijani political rhetoric for a long time. On the other hand, we made a clear connection between the ineffective Russian peacekeeping operation and the Azerbaijani government supporting eco-activism on the Lachin Corridor, which contributes to the destabilisation of the region.
References:
Al Jazeera. (2022, December 22). Armenia: Russia’s peacekeepers failed mission in Nagorno-Karabakh. Conflict News | Al Jazeera. Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/22/armenia-russias-peacekeepers-failed-mission-in-nagorno-karabakh
Al Jazeera. (2023, January 12). Russia blames Armenia for breakdown of Azerbaijan peace talks. Politics News | Al Jazeera. Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/12/russia-blames-armenia-for-azerbaijan-peace-talks-breakdown
Amartikian. (2022, December 29). “it’s unacceptable for the Peacekeepers to be silent witnesses” – pashinyan. English Jamnews. Available at https://jam-news.net/pashinyan-on-the-mandate-of-russian-peacekeepers/
Anadolu Agency. (2023, March). Azerbaijan cries foul over Russian cover for ‘illegal’ armenian military movement. Anadolu Ajansı. Available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/azerbaijan-cries-foul-over-russian-cover-for-illegal-armenian-military-movement/2852600
ArmenPress. (2023, March 6). The final goal of United States is peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, says Louis Bono. armenpress.am. Available at https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1105698.html
Azerbaijan State Border Service. (2023). Dövlət Sərhəd Xidmətinin Mətbuat Mərkəzinin Məlumatı. Available at https://dsx.gov.az/news/1512
The Azerbaijan State News Agency. (2022, December 7). Monitoring Group, command of Russian peacekeeping contingent discuss illegal exploitation of Azerbaijan’s natural resources. AZERTAC. Available at https://azertag.az/en/xeber/Monitoring_group_command_of_Russian_peacekeeping_contingent_discuss_illegal_exploitation_of_Azerbaijans_natural_resources-2400593
AZTV. (2022). Rövşən Məmmədov | Müttəfiqdən erməni təəssübkeşliyi – Regionda hansı yeni ssenarilər oynanılır? broadcast.
Bayramli, N. (2022). Azerbaijani eco-activists, NGO members protest in Karabakh Region. Caspian News. Available at https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijani-eco-activists-ngo-members-protest-in-karabakh-region-2022-12-12-0/
Caliber. (2022, May 6). Золотой бизнес варданяна и генерала волкова в карабахе – эксклюзивные данные caliber.az. Золотой бизнес Варданяна и генерала Волкова в Карабахе – Эксклюзивные данные Caliber.Az. Available athttps://caliber.az/post/126907/
Center for Preventive Action. (2023). Nagorno-Karabakh conflict | global conflict tracker. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict
Fact Info. (2020). Ecological condition in Azerbaijan territories under occupation. Home. Available at http://www.fact-info.az/news?id=10843
The Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan. (2022, December 11). Azərbaycan Respublikasının Xarici İşlər Nazirliyinin Mətbuat xidməti idarəsinin rəisi Ayxan Hacızadə yerli media nümayəndələrinin sualını cavablandırır. AZƏRBAYCAN RESPUBLİKASI XARİCİ İŞLƏR NAZİRLİYİ. Available at https://www.mfa.gov.az/az/news/no57322
France-Presse, A. (2023, January 30). Azerbaijan Embassy in Iran suspends work after Deadly Attack. VOA. Available at https://www.voanews.com/a/azerbaijan-embassy-in-iran-suspends-work-after-deadly-attack-/6940602.html
Gzoyan, E. (2020, July 23). The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh in the League of Nations. The Armenian Weekly. Available at https://armenianweekly.com/2020/07/23/the-issue-of-nagorno-karabakh-in-the-league-of-nations/
Hajiyeva, G. (2022, December 1). Illegal entry of Iranians into Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region raises suspicions. Caspian News. Available at https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/illegal-entry-of-iranians-into-azerbaijans-karabakh-region-raises-suspicions-2022-12-1-0/
Hajiyeva, G. (2023, February 2). Azerbaijani police expose Iranian spy network in Azerbaijan. Caspian News. Available at https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijani-police-expose-iranian-spy-network-in-azerbaijan-2023-2-2-0/
Hansson, S. (2015). Discursive strategies of blame avoidance in government: A framework for analysis. Discourse & Society, 26(3), 297–322. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926514564736
Hasanli, J. (2018). The sovietization of Azerbaijan: The South Caucasus in the triangle of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, 1920-1922. University of Utah Press.
Hovannisian, R. G. (1996). The Republic of Armenia. Univ. of California Press.
Mammadli, N. (2022). Azerbaijan urges more effective work by Russian peacekeepers on Lachin Highway. Caspian News. Available at https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijan-urges-more-effective-work-by-russian-peacekeepers-on-lachin-highway-2022-12-5-28/
Marcy, S. (1988). Gorbachev’s response to the crisis over Nagorno-Karabakh. Perestroika: A marxist critique [Sam Marcy]: Article 13 (1990). Available at https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/marcy/perestroika/perehtml/13.htm
Mehdiyev, M. (2022, May 6). White doves not seen in Karabakh Skies despite two-year Russian peacekeeping – infertile mechanism for peace. White doves not seen in Karabakh skies despite two-year Russian peacekeeping – Infertile mechanism for peace. Available at https://caliber.az/en/post/130084/
Milli. (2022, October 21). Rusiya Televiziyasında Azərbaycana Qarşı təxribat – foto. Milli.Az. Available at https://news.milli.az/politics/1079698.html
The Moscow Times. (2022, December 27). Armenian leader questions Russian peacekeeping role in Karabakh. The Moscow Times. Available at https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/27/armenian-leader-questions-russian-peacekeeping-role-in-karabakh-a79814
Panahli, A. (1994). When A Tree Isn’t A Tree. Azerbaijan International.
Rajala, T. (2019). Blame avoidance strategies in governmental performance measurement. Financial Accountability & Management, 36(3), 278–299. https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12225
Rost, Y. (1990). Armenian Tragedy.
Shirvanova, T. (2016). The legal aspects of Nagorno Karabakh conflict during the Azerbaijan Peoples’ Republic Period. European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 6(1), 92. https://doi.org/10.26417/ejis.v6i1.p92-96
Trend. (2023, April 20). Azerbaijan sends note of protest to Russia. Trend.Az. Available at https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/3738386.html
Затулин, К. (2022, October 20). Граница дозволенного. Потеснят ли наших миротворцев в карабахе западные?AiF. Available at https://aif.ru/politics/world/granica_dozvolennogo_potesnyat_li_nashih_mirotvorcev_v_karabahe_zapadnye
Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. (2023). Заявление МИД России о ситуации в процессе армяно-азербайджанской нормализации. Retrieved from https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/1865114/
Shafiyev, F., & Huseynov, V. (2020). Peace Negotiations Cannot Be Held Forever. Insight Turkey, 22(4), 99-111.https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26981719.pdf
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22–49. https://doi.org/10.2307/20045621
Palivani, P. (2023). Russia as a mediator in international armed conflicts: the use of mediation and coercion as an instrument for Russian foreign policy.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, (2023). Press Release, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/05/04/pressrelease/11994
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, (2023). Press Release on the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia held Arlington, Virginia. https://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/no23923
European Union (2023), EU mission in Armenia, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/euma/eu-mission-armenia-euma_en?s=410283
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, (2023). Response by Aykhan Hajizada, MFA Spokesperson, to the question of the local media on the allegations against Azerbaijan made by Catherine Colonna, Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, during an interview with the public radio channel “France Inter”, https://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/no24323
