Introduction
Ever since Azerbaijan was divided between Russian and Iranian empires at the beginning of 19th century, Azerbaijanis living in Iran have faced many types of ethnic discrimination. In spite of the fact that there are around 20 million Azerbaijanis living in Iran, which makes them the largest minority there, they are still not able to be educated in their native language (Hassan, 2008). This issue of language is an important factor when analyzing the independence movement in Southern Azerbaijan because this is the only thing that makes them different from the larger Persian nation. On the other hand, the common denomination of Shiite and years of intermingling with Persians have reduced the whole essence of Azerbaijani ethnicity in Iran to a single language, Turkic. The term Turkic is used by the Iranian authorities/Persians to refer to the Azerbaijanis living in Southern Azerbaijan and we will use this classification whenever we refer to the language. However, this is not the only problem Azerbaijanis living there face everyday and on top of linguistic restrictions, Azerbaijani have also been culturally discriminated against and the media also makes fun of them very frequently (Jannatoglu, 2016). The important question is: How does banning a national language affect the independence movement in Southern Azerbaijan.
Three Dominant Theories
The answer to that question is not very straightforward as the current literature on the issue is too diverse with different opinions and viewpoints as to the correlation between language prohibition and the independence movement in Southern Azerbaijan. There are different opinions on the issue and while some historians claim that this banning will increase the national consciousness of Azerbaijanis in Iran in combination with other important national and international developments, some other historians claim that Azerbaijani identity is so tightly integrated with the Iranian identity that banning of the language is not enough to start a freedom movement in the country. We can categorize these different opinions into three broader clusters:
1. Those who claim that banning Turkic language and cultural discrimination will necessarily affect the freedom movement in Southern Azerbaijan by increasing the national consciousness and strengthening of national identity.
2. Second, there is a group of historians and researchers claiming that linguistics and other restrictions are not strong enough to start an independence movement and we need to analyze the banning of the national language in South Azerbaijan in the context of domestic and international developments.
3. Finally, there is a third group of researchers claiming that there is no distinct Azerbaijani identity in Iran and most Azerbaijani consider themselves part of the larger Iranian identity, and banning a language has not been able to start a freedom movement .
The ban on the language will increase national consciousness:
As mentioned above, the researchers who claim that the ban will increase national identity and collective consciousness give the example from earlier periods. Suleimanov (2011) states the injustice and discrimination imposed to the Azerbaijani in Iran have often been reflected in sports activities (Tabriz Traktur) and protests, which he calls sport separatism. He says that the main reasons behind these protests were the cultural and linguistic discrimination towards Azerbaijanis in general. Nasibli (1998) also mentions the linguistic awakening as one of the main driving forces behind increased national awakening in Southern Azerbaijan. This group of researchers also claim that historic language restrictions from the Iranian government have united Azerbaijanis and increased the national consciousness.
According to Ahmedoglu (2019), the driving force behind the emergence of the consciousness of Azerbaijani national identity in Iran was the Pahlavi regime’s repressive and exclusivist nationalist policies between 1921 and 1941. Nazila and Binesh (2010) say that state-sponsored discrimination against the Azerbaijanis living in Iran has been the reason behind mass protests, which itself has become a symbol of the national consciousness and identity of Azerbaijanis living in Iran.
The effects of linguistic restrictions should be analyzed in the context of domestic and international developments:
This is the second group which basically argues that linguistic restriction is only one part of the story and to learn the effect of the linguistic restrictions on the national identity and consciousness, we need to put it in a larger context like democratization in Iran, the creation of independent Azerbaijan state in the North and Turkish influence, relations between Iran and the West. Safizade (2013) states that although Azerbaijani has genuine and real concerns to complain about, the foreign states especially the US and Israel want to use the issue against Iran and weaken it. The same or very similar opinion is also expressed by Nasibli who states that (1998) the creation of an independent republic in the north symbolized the existence of Azerbaijanis as a unique and distinct ethnic identity. He also connects the issue of linguistic restrictions in Southern Azerbaijan with the lack of democratization in Iran . Some researchers put the linguistic restriction and ethnic identity awakening in the context of the war between the West and Iran or Iran and Turkey. Heradstveit (2009) claims that a possible war between Iran and the west will cause the disintegration of Iran and because Azerbaijanis have been under the repressive Iranian regime, as soon as they see weakness and war, they will attempt to join with the neighboring state of Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijanis are too integrated with Iranian society to be affected by linguistic restrictions:
This is the group of researchers who claim that most Azerbaijanis do not see any difference between being a Turkic and being an Iranian and if they are banned from speaking in Turkic, they will easily switch to Persian. The most obvious proof is that all these years of repression have not caused Turk to raise and go against the government (Hassan, 2008). Shaffer (2000) mentions that years of assimilation and integration between Azerbaijanis and Iranians have almost mixed the two up and most of the Azerbaijanis regard themselves as Muslim/Iranian rather than distinctively Turkic. Lack of national consciousness prevents the linguistic restrictions from exerting influence on the national identity (Khalili, 2010). Moreno (2019) even goes on to claim that Azerbaijanis in Iran are as distinct and unique as Galicians in Spain, who also classifies Azerbaijanis as a regional variety of large Iranian nation. In this group, one of the most commonly used assumptions is that even though linguistic restrictions have angered people, increasing awareness of national minorities especially after 2009 elections will lead to respect for Azerbaijani language and Azerbaijani culture (Eiling, 2015).
To conclude, the paper analyzed the current literature on the correlation between the prohibition on language and independence movement in South Azerbaijan. The paper tried to answer the question of whether banning a mother language affects the independence movements in South Azerbaijan. The historians and scholars do not have a common opinion about how language banning will affect the independence movement in South Azerbaijan. A comprehensive and critical analysis of the current literature allowed us to establish three trains of thought in this regard. First off, there is a group of scholars who say that linguistic restrictions coupled with cultural and other restrictions will finally lead to Azerbaijani people declaring their independence and separating from Iran . This type of thinking underlines the historical example of Pahlavi, Hiyabani , etc. In a similar line of reasoning, the second group of scholars puts the issue at a larger context and claims that linguistic restriction as such is not a strong factor to cause independence and for that, we need to analyze the democratization in Iran and relationship between Iran and the West . Opposing both of them are the third group of scholars who claim that Azerbaijani identity is not strong enough to be the basis for independence and therefore any linguistic restrictions or language ban will simply not be enough for the Azerbaijanis in Southern Azerbaijan to demand independence and join independent Azerbaijan. Although the current literature is somehow detailed and varied, what seems to be lacking in academia is a comprehensive analysis of how Azerbaijanis react to language prohibition at the political level. In other words, what is the level of political mobilization to achieve equal status for Turkic language in Iran seems to be unanswered in the current literature. Additionally, how the growing demand for education in mother tongue in Southern Azerbaijan plays into the national language ban has also been constantly ignored in academia. To understand the whole correlation between the ban and independence movement, we need to extend the boundaries of the current literature to include the political dynamism and mobilization around the issue and to put the growing demand for education in the mother tongue in the analytical context.
References:
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