South Azerbaijan and Iran After the Nuclear Agreement

South Azerbaijan and Iran After the Nuclear Agreement

As in all political and social movements, reaching a position demonstrates the strength of the movement and influences its results. After the northern part of Azerbaijan, i.e., North Azerbaijan, gained its independence, this movement, especially under the influence of Elchibey, turned the national issue in South Azerbaijan into a security matter. Looking at its roots, the national issue in South Azerbaijan emerged in response to the exploitative and chauvinistic policies of the Pahlavi period and concluded its first phase in 1945 with the Azerbaijan National Government. After this government was dismantled, the issue briefly reignited during the 1978 revolution but remained confined to literature, poetry, and writing until 1991. After North Azerbaijan gained independence, the national issue in South Azerbaijan transformed into a socio-political security issue.

The student movement, protests at Tehran and Tabriz universities against the occupation of Karabakh, gatherings at Babak Castle, various elections—particularly the 1995 parliamentary elections in Tabriz—were indicators of the existence of this issue. However, the emergence of the South Azerbaijan National Movement as a national issue within the country after the 1979 revolution was first seen during the 2005 presidential elections. Generally, the issues raised by presidential candidates aim to gain public support, but their mere mention indicates the issue’s existence and prevalence. If a demand is widely supported by the public, candidates express it to gain votes, leading to discussions on how to address it. Consequently, such a demand becomes an issue for the government. A demand must be considered a matter requiring resolution before it can be addressed. However, this does not mean that the government will fulfill the demand as desired. Along with many factors, the strength of the social movement advocating the demand is also decisive. As the movement gains strength, its role in resolving the issues it raises increases. The movement itself becomes a player in the matter, making its every step and stance even more significant. Since 2005, the national issue has been raised in all presidential elections. However, particularly during the 2009 Green Movement, the national movement positioned itself as an inactive or non-playing actor on a national level. Since then, it has not participated in Tehran-centered movements and has remained silent, leading to the overall silence of South Azerbaijan. One of the main reasons for the failure of the Green Movement was the non-participation of non-Persian nations, particularly the Turkish nation of South Azerbaijan. While this fact demonstrates the dominance of the national movement in Azerbaijan, it also paints a picture of hesitation. This hesitation and inactivity resulted in the national movement influencing events as a player, but its continued stance in later years occasionally allowed others to take over the political space, making Azerbaijan a spectator in many events. Thus, the continuation of a passive stance has turned the national movement into an active observer in domestic developments. In recent years, as economic protests have increased and quickly gained political significance, the national movement’s continued silence or indecisiveness has further reinforced this situation. This stance has led many, particularly the masses, to perceive the national movement as a purely social movement specific to Azerbaijan rather than a political one. In this article, I will share my thoughts on the causes and consequences of this situation and the potential path the national movement can take in the new era—after the nuclear agreement.

The Main Consequence of the Nuclear Agreement for Iran

Iran’s ruling authorities’ long-term behavior has proven that the regime’s unwavering principle in foreign policy is self-preservation, and the directive “حفظ نظام اوجب واجبات است” (translation: the preservation of the regime is the most obligatory duty) is its primary manifestation. Neither the constitutional article on “the protection of Muslims and the oppressed” nor any statements from government officials can override this principle. The slogan “Nuclear energy is our absolute right,” which conservatives (Usulgara) have occasionally used against reformists in foreign policy, can only be understood within the framework of internal political rivalry. Otherwise, the main issue is, “You must not agree; we must agree.” If during Khatami’s era, the reason for nuclear negotiations was to establish positive relations with the world, and if during Ahmadinejad’s era, continuing into Rouhani’s term, the reason for reaching an agreement was to prevent foreign military intervention, then in Raisi’s era, the primary issue is the economic crisis and its intolerable consequence—economic uprisings. In any case, the fundamental principle remains the same, and even those who claim to oppose agreements and negotiations for ideological reasons have ultimately agreed to them for the sake of preserving the regime.

As was evident before the last presidential elections, the government’s main issue in this term is preventing economic collapse. Sanctions were no longer just words written on paper. The large-scale protests of 2017, 2018, and 2019 [۱۳۹۶، ۱۳۹۷ و ۱۳۹۸] demonstrated that an enraged, mobilized public could bring down the regime at any moment, and neither security forces [law enforcement], nor nuclear infrastructure could stop this wave. According to government studies, the primary shared factor fueling public dissatisfaction is economic hardship. Families living below the poverty line now constitute at least one-third of the country’s population. Meat consumption has dropped by 40%, and dairy and fruit consumption has also declined. The prices of forty essential goods have increased by 100%. These figures are merely what has been officially disclosed in state media. Government circles are fully aware that if they fail to overcome the economic crisis, there will be no hope for the regime’s survival. Overcoming this crisis, however, is impossible as long as sanctions remain in place. Iran’s leadership, therefore, entered negotiations with this objective in mind, and even if it meant contradicting their previous rhetoric, they had to achieve results. Corruption in economic and administrative sectors has become so deeply entrenched that lifting sanctions would only provide the regime with a short-term breathing space. In short, the greatest benefit of the nuclear agreement for Iran’s regime is the temporary postponement of economic collapse, and its cost will be a decline in the regime’s authority both domestically and in the region. From the public’s perspective, economic dissatisfaction may subside temporarily, but the government’s self-created image of power, fear, invincibility, and control will never be the same as before.

Reasons for the Political Non-Recognition of the South Azerbaijan National Movement

As emphasized, the South Azerbaijan national movement is essentially a movement against internal colonialism. The Iranian-Persian government is well aware of this, and no amount of conservatism on our part can change it. Colonialism means the domination of one nation over another. Although the dominance of a superior nation manifests itself in language, religion, culture, ethnicity, and economic discrimination, its core foundation is political superiority. Framing the national issue as national oppression, racism, and ethnic discrimination is not the primary factor but rather a way of highlighting existing problems. This approach ultimately keeps the core issue intact. Colonialism is fundamentally a political issue, as it is about one nation’s political dominance over another. Therefore, a movement against colonialism and exploitation is, by its nature, a political movement. Of course, the political rule of a nation does not mean that individuals belonging to that nation must necessarily hold positions of power. In reality, appointing individuals from an oppressed nation to government posts is a method of neo-colonialism. This perspective means that the number of Turkish ministers or whether the president and other officials are Turkish is not the concern of the national movement. In line with the essence of the national movement, its primary demand is to achieve political status as a nation or to gain national sovereignty. The majority of the national movement, particularly its elite, leading forces, and organizations, are aware of this issue, and the slogan “Freedom, Justice, National Government” as well as the act of uniting under a single flag are clear indicators of this. Not only is this the national movement’s current common political slogan, but even its past internal conflicts reflect its core essence. The long-standing dispute between independence supporters and federalists shows that, in every case, nationalists aspire to national sovereignty, and this demand is undeniably political. Despite all these shared concepts, several reasons explain why the national movement is often portrayed as a non-political movement:

The general presence of a level of nationalism that is non-political and its widespread influence in South Azerbaijan.

Loving and preserving national identity and its elements is one aspect of nationalism. The nationalism of South Azerbaijan, which emerged among a nation that has been subjected to assimilation policies for over 90 years, oppressed, and alienated from itself, began precisely from this point. We did not yet know that our language could also be written, that we had our own music, that we had a great history, notable figures, and a deep culture… We had accepted everything imposed by the ruling nation, we tried to resemble them, we did not know that we were Turkish or Azerbaijani, we raised our children to speak the language imposed by the ruling nation, we took pride in Kurosh [Cyrus], Daiyush [Darius], and Iran-e Bastan [Ancient Iran]. Those who had not yet lost themselves and instinctively resisted Persianization quenched their thirst for identity when they discovered these issues, just as a parched heart finds relief in water, and they shared this realization with others. However, these fundamental matters seemed unusual to the people around them, who resisted such ideas. Thus, everyone who embraced nationalism had to struggle to convince their surroundings, and at the same time, the government opposed even these initial demands. The authorities reacted harshly to naming children in this language, writing birth certificates in Turkish [Azerbaijani Turkish], commemorating national figures, and so on. Expecting someone to fight for a right they have not even acknowledged as their own is meaningless. Thus, a process called national awakening began, but since the government did not yield its first defensive line, the struggle remained at the initial stage. Since the awakening movement lasted for many years, the number of people embracing Turkism increased, but the essence of the national movement was only defined in terms of national identity. Nationalists were portrayed as people who took pride in being Turkish, refused to speak Persian, supported Tractor football team, and were knowledgeable about Turkish history. This portrayal led the public to perceive nationalism as a non-political movement.

Conservatism and Self-Censorship

As our elders say, “One who has been bitten by a snake fears even the rustling of the reeds.” Our nation’s brave men have been stung again and again. While the general public may forget historical events, the scars and impact of those events persist for many years, becoming embedded in proverbs and narratives. Moreover, no matter how heroically the losing side fights, in the broader view, the only thing that matters is the outcome. Our brave people who rebelled against the oppression of the masses have been repeatedly arrested, tortured, hanged, shot, exiled, or forced to flee. Since they could not achieve a definitive result, they have not been recognized as heroes, nor has anyone stood behind them. Their families suffered hardships, and ultimately, their actions were labeled as emotional, inexperienced, or even irresponsible. They have been either forgotten or deliberately erased from memory. Today, how many young people in Acejbashar even know about Səfərxan Qəhrəmanian, one of the soldiers of our national government who continued the path of the Azerbaijan National Government, engaged in the first partisan war against the Shah’s regime, and was imprisoned in harsh conditions alongside the members of the Ayyub Kalantari group, which was executed in 1960 [1339]? They have been forgotten, but the lesson taught by the authorities in their name has been absorbed—it has entered our language and discourse. We have come to value being “wise” over being courageous. And being wise, for us, has meant being conservative, censoring ourselves, avoiding politics, and prioritizing our personal interests above all else. This is the system we live in, and this system has shaped every aspect of our lives. We have become nationalists, we have developed political ideologies, yet we have not abandoned conservatism. We have censored ourselves and tried to present our goals as non-political. The logic here is simple—if we introduce ourselves as non-political, it is impossible for society to recognize us as a political movement.

The Influence of Centralist Movements’ Chauvinist Policies

Iranian-Persian nationalism has entrenched itself in the country since the Pahlavi era by mobilizing all available resources. In this country, whether they are right-wing, Islamic, reformist, Usulgara [a term referring to Islamist fundamentalist groups], democrat, liberal, or even human rights activists, Persianism and Iranian nationalism are deeply embedded in their ideology. They view Iran as superior to all other countries in the region and consider Persian-speaking nations and regions superior to all other ethnic groups. They have internalized fabricated narratives about ancient Iran and perceive Iran as the ruler of all nations in the region. They regard many neighboring countries as lost Iranian territories, admire the grandeur of ancient Iran, and search for human rights within the blood-stained hands of Kurosh (Cyrus) and Dariyush (Darius). They see Iran as an eternal and unbreakable country, presenting the Persian language as its pride and identity. For this reason, they consider any national demand as a threat to the Persian language and the unity of Iran, opposing it at all costs. They ignore the independent national movements of non-Persian nations, especially those of the Turks, and attempt to claim any movement initiated by Turks as their own. In reality, any movement that claims to represent all of Iran serves as a tool for Persian dominance. Whether left-wing, right-wing, Islamist, feminist, class-based protests, or human rights campaigns, all of these movements function as a means to assimilate us and integrate us into Persian supremacy. Within these movements, Turks either ignore their national rights and become even more extreme Persian-Iranian nationalists than Persians themselves, or they defend their national rights and are labeled as Pan-Turkists and marginalized. These experiences have made the national movement cautious toward movements led by or initiated by Persians and centralist factions. Prominent figures and organizations within the South Azerbaijan National Movement view participation in such movements as a loss for Azerbaijan and its people’s support. At the same time, they do not see outright opposition to these movements—especially those rooted in economic grievances—as a correct approach either. As a result, in recent years, they have taken on the role of spectators in major political developments.

Colonial Psychology

One of the reasons South Azerbaijan is not recognized as a political player is colonialism. The most fundamental and crucial tool of a colonizer or exploiter to dominate a nation is to humiliate it and strip it of its self-confidence. A nation that loses trust in itself and its identity begins to believe that the ruling nation deserves to govern, that the ruling nation’s language deserves to be the official language, and that the idea of having its own independent state is entirely inconceivable. A thought that is unimaginable is not even heard; even if heard, it is not taken seriously and is quickly forgotten. Explanations and logical arguments do not work on someone who lacks confidence in themselves and their nation. Even if they are temporarily convinced, they will repeat the same questions years later. As a result, they fail to perceive the national movement as a political movement. However, one important factor remains—if an oppressed nation gains confidence through any kind of action, no argument or logic can ever make it surrender its rights again.

losed Political Arena and Repression

Considering Iran’s overall political environment and structure, the only viable path for the national movement is cultural struggle. However, a portion of the public chooses its representatives from the official political arena. Those outside this official space are seen as nonexistent. In Iran, this official political competition is not open to everyone or every group. Participation and influence in this field are strictly controlled. Even reformists, who are part of the government, cannot always enter this arena with their first-choice candidates. For the South Azerbaijan national movement, no political party has ever been permitted to form, and no candidate has represented Azerbaijan’s national political demands in elections. However, the influence of this official space is gradually diminishing, and fewer people are paying attention to these staged political games. In recent years, the shift of the political struggle toward unofficial platforms has become more evident. Iran’s centralist opposition is closely watching this transformation, looking for opportunities. While the regime has blocked the national movement’s access to the official political stage, it has taken an even harsher stance against it in the unofficial arena. The main reason for this is that, in a country where national oppression exists, nationalism is one of the most attractive forces. The authorities fully understand this appeal and have denied its existence for years. The Iranian government, fearing the potential magnetism of South Azerbaijan, has continuously worked to erase it from public discourse and visibility. To suppress the recognition of South Azerbaijan’s national political demands among the public, the regime has even targeted foreign media outlets. In the early years, it removed GünAz TV, which was broadcasting via Türksat, from that satellite. More recently, the government has also blocked ANT TV from gaining a platform. During the protests of 2019 (1398), while there were no large-scale demonstrations in South Azerbaijan, the regime preemptively arrested nationalists who intended to take to the streets—an action that can only be interpreted through this lens of suppression.

The Impact of Ethnic Issues and Tensions

One of the most prominent manifestations of internal colonialism is economic discrimination. Since the Pahlavi era, successive governments have implemented economic and security policies that discriminate against non-Persian and non-Shia regions, leading to demographic changes in several cities. In West Azerbaijan (Ostan-district), this demographic shift has been exacerbated in recent years by the influx of Kurdish migrants, who have increased their presence in these cities, laid claims to land ownership, and even constructed fabricated historical narratives, fueling tensions. On one hand, despite being a minority in these cities, Kurds in Iran have been more successful than Turks in preserving their identity, promoting nationalist ideologies in digital spaces, and organizing armed groups. On the other hand, historical events such as the Jiloluq and Simitko incidents over the past century have generated deep concern and anxiety among Turks. Nationalists, recognizing these legitimate concerns, have been raising this issue in elections for years. Even when elections were boycotted by the opposition and national organizations, some nationalists in West Azerbaijan participated solely to prevent Kurds from gaining political ground, casting their votes for government-backed candidates. As a result, the regime managed to secure more votes from both Kurds and Turks, consolidating its control over the situation.

Even some individuals have used the regime’s rhetoric in this process. However, the government neither prevents Azerbaijani Turks nor Kurds from engaging in this matter, and opposing Kurds has, at the very least in these regions, come to be recognized as a fundamental aspect of the national movement.

Consequences of the National Movement Being Recognized as Non-Political

The recognition of the South Azerbaijan national movement as a non-political movement has, under normal circumstances, contributed to its wider spread. In this country, people consider political movements and political involvement highly costly (i.e., not worthwhile). Years of experience have ingrained this perception in them. The phrase “Don’t get involved in politics; they will erase you overnight” is more widespread than any other idea about politics. For this reason, if the Azerbaijan national movement had been recognized as a political movement, fewer people would have joined it, promoted it, or openly worked for its cause. Many found courage in demanding certain rights—such as the ability to read and write in their native language, name their children in their mother tongue, support North Azerbaijan, and seek economic justice—by basing these requests on the regime’s own laws and rhetoric. This explains why, according to Ahed Javadi, the head of the East Azerbaijan Registration Office, over 40% of parents in East Azerbaijan wanted to give their newborns Turkish names. Tractor football club has become the most widely supported club in Azerbaijan. In the 2005 (1374) presidential elections, the least-known candidate, Mohsen Mehralizadeh, received the most votes in East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, and Ardabil provinces, despite lacking any significant support from political or military organizations. The fact that he endorsed a 15-point list of national demands and campaigned on them enabled him to secure these votes, even though he received the fewest votes nationwide. People openly wrote down their demands, collected signatures, and participated in campaign offices without fear. Those who voted for him did so without hesitation. While voting itself is a political act, since the government did not react harshly, people did not perceive this event as a political movement; instead, they saw it as simply engaging in a legal process. This is one of the advantages of the national movement being recognized as non-political under normal conditions. Of course, the reasons why the regime has allowed such activities to take place would require a separate and extensive discussion.

Under normal circumstances, the recognition of the national movement as non-political would lead to its limited spread among the public and a lack of supporters, but when the political atmosphere in the country heats up, when widespread dissatisfaction with the government emerges, and when general political-economic protests begin, this effect reverses entirely. No matter how much people identify themselves as non-political or perceive themselves that way, from a broader perspective, everyone has a political stance. People are either satisfied with the current situation and want it to continue, dissatisfied and seeking change while taking action, or dissatisfied but unwilling to act. Normally, the number of people actively trying to change the situation is very small, but when the legitimacy of the government is questioned and mass protests erupt, even those who do not directly participate in the movement choose a side among those who do. Politically, as more people gradually enter the scene, a massive wave forms. In such circumstances, movements recognized as non-political will, of course, not be among those chosen. This reality applies not only to those who previously did not acknowledge the national movement but also to those who normally support it. Even if they give their children Turkish names or are fans of the Tractor football team, they will still choose a specific political team when it comes to the political field. Just as they might have a favorite team in their neighborhood or village, in league games, they will pick from the teams available on the list. Although the Iranian national football team has not qualified for the World Cup for many years, many people still watch these matches and select their favorite teams. If a team plays well, has a good goal scorer, or represents a country that appears strong, it gains more supporters. The harsh truth is that political competition works in a similar way.

This section must conclude with the following points:

First, a movement does not necessarily have to be political in nature to be attractive; however, when the general public is dissatisfied and demands change, political goals become highly appealing.

Second, a number of non-political, legal, or social demands can also be perceived as political by the public during specific periods. However, it is not guaranteed that this will be repeated in the future. For example, when Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution was proposed by Chohragani during the 1995-1996 (1374) parliamentary elections, it was considered an appealing political demand, while in 2005-2006 (1384), when Mehralizadeh raised the same issue, it was viewed as a normal legal and legitimate request. By 2021-2022 (1400), this demand had lost its attractiveness altogether.

Third, a political goal does not necessarily mean the complete overthrow of the current regime. However, when the legitimacy of the regime is lost and public dissatisfaction is widespread, no movement that seeks to preserve the regime can be perceived by the people as a political movement. In 1997-1998 (1376), the reform movement led by Mohammad Khatami, which aimed to introduce reforms within the regime, was considered a political movement. However, as noted earlier, by 2019-2020 (1398), neither reformists nor conservatives were what the people were looking for; even if they entered the political scene, the general public no longer considered them relevant players.

Fourth, since the South Azerbaijan national movement is fundamentally a movement against internal exploitation, it is inherently political. However, due to the reasons mentioned, it is sometimes perceived as a non-political movement. This does not mean that the national-cultural efforts carried out by Azerbaijanis should be devalued or disrespected. Even though the government arrests South Azerbaijani national-political activists (scholars and theorists) while showing some tolerance toward cultural activities, this does not imply that it supports such efforts. It is simply a matter of prioritization—the government does not want Azerbaijani nationalism to exist at all, but if forced to choose, it prefers the non-political aspect over the political one.

South Azerbaijan National Movement After the Nuclear Agreement

With the lifting of economic sanctions following the nuclear agreement, the current economic crisis is expected to ease temporarily. Even if this crisis subsides for a while, it will serve as a lifeline for the suffocating regime. On the other hand, the maneuvering space for the opposition could shrink. As a result, the power struggle between the Iranian Islamic regime and the opposition will temporarily lose both its audience and participants. This new environment—this opportunity—could be crucial for the South Azerbaijan national movement. However, it must be emphasized that this situation may only be temporary. Corruption in the economy and administration has engulfed the entire country. Such corruption and moral decay will not allow for long-term development.

The opposition, particularly the monarchists, have attempted to mobilize the Iranian population against the government by exploiting the economic crisis and public discontent. Even though they failed to bring Azerbaijan onto the stage, they successfully positioned themselves as an alternative for the future. Although the number of Azerbaijanis who nostalgically remember the Pahlavi era is small, they still exist. Furthermore, whether Azerbaijanis support the monarchists or not, Raza Pahlavi is now seen as a potential future alternative for Iran, especially among the masses.

Three factors have contributed to this perception. First, widespread dissatisfaction with the current government and the subsequent loss of its legitimacy. Second, the Iranian opposition, particularly the monarchists, have taken advantage of this situation by leveraging their extensive media resources to promote themselves as an alternative. Third, the national movement has not been recognized by the people as a political player.

This situation is undesirable for South Azerbaijan. The South Azerbaijan national movement, with its potential as a political force and its status as the primary player in Azerbaijan, cannot accept such an outcome. Especially given its significant role as a strong socio-political force in the Karabakh issue, forcing the government to change its policies on Karabakh, the national movement must secure its rightful place and have a say in any current or future developments. To achieve this, it must seize the opportunity provided by the current environment, assert itself as it truly is, and present itself to the public in its real form. If the national movement focuses all its energy on its political goal—establishing a national government—it can mobilize the people of South Azerbaijan for this objective and become a decisive force in any present or future scenario. To accomplish this:

1 – Instead of scattered, numerous, and non-political goals, it is necessary to focus on a single political objective. National activists present so many different demands that sometimes even nationalists themselves cannot fully articulate what they want. Issues such as preventing the drying up of Lake Urmia, education in the mother tongue, Azerbaijan’s economy and the elimination of economic discrimination, the Kurdish issue in Urmia and West Azerbaijan and related election goals, the protection of Azerbaijan’s forests, the number of Azerbaijani ministers in the government, the removal of insults and denigrations against Turks on Iranian state television and other media, the establishment of a Turkish language institution, and the recognition of the Turkish language as an official language—all of these are demands that have been openly and officially raised within Iran. (Of course, slogans that arise from national emotions, with nationalist undertones but without direct demands, are also voiced at Azerbaijani gatherings, such as May Azerbaijan exist, and may those who do not want it go blind; Azerbaijan is awake, it supports its language; Haray Haray, I am a Turk; Azerbaijani girls are the stars of the skies; Azerbaijan is our homeland, Tractor is our wolf; Tabriz, Baku, Ankara, where are we, where are the Persians?; Long live Azerbaijan, death to the chauvinists; Russians, Persians, Armenians—enemies of all Turks). The regime has, at times, managed to deceive national movement supporters with such demands. Rouhani’s promises to restore Lake Urmia and establish a language institution were clear examples of this deception.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution (1357), Kurds set forth a political demand as their main objective and spread it among the people through a short slogan. This goal—“Democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan”—became the backbone of Kurdish nationalism, and most Kurds accepted it as the primary objective of their movement. Forty years later, they have not abandoned this goal or slogan. During the border movement and the reunification movement in North Azerbaijan, the main goal of the movement was Azerbaijan’s independence and unity, and the slogan “Azerbaijan must be united, with Tabriz as its capital” spread among the people. Many years later, the slogan “Freedom, Justice, National Government” has been embraced by national organizations as the embodiment of the national political demand. If this demand, goal, and slogan are common objectives, they must be widely disseminated and prioritized in all meetings, congresses, political statements, and personal internet platforms. This objective must be placed above all other secondary and minor goals. The answer to the question “What does the national movement or Azerbaijanis want?” should first and foremost be this demand.

2 – This goal must be presented openly and explicitly. Secret movements are ineffective. If this goal is to become the openly declared objective of the entire nation, it must be expressed without hesitation among the people; otherwise, it will remain confined within small groups. If those who advocate for a goal do not openly defend it, they are either deceiving the nation or deceiving themselves. The regime’s reactions so far indicate that it has not been fooled.

3 – If nationalists say, “A nation without a national government has nothing,” and if they believe that “Without a national government, the protection of a nation’s language and land is not guaranteed,” then the demand for a national government must be the basis and subject of all discussions, negotiations, and alliances. The demand for a national government is rooted in the right to self-determination and is not limited to the concept of an independent state but also includes federal systems. Today, many countries around the world are governed under such a system. Both the Iranian regime and the Persian opposition must recognize this demand. There should be no fear of accusations of separatism. They must understand that it is the continuation of exploitation and racism that creates the conditions for a nation’s separation and justifies it.

4 – Although nationalism is not a complete ideology like socialism or liberalism, it has merged with different ideologies at different times and places, forming various manifestations. Even though their economic perspectives differ, they propose solutions for resolving national issues and explain them through their respective ideologies. Just as Persians and Iranian nationalists are divided into leftist nationalism, liberal nationalism, and religious-nationalist factions, today in Azerbaijan, organizations aligned with nationalist positions also adopt ideologies such as liberal democracy and social democracy. Given the country’s current economic situation, the presence of these organizations and their theorists can play a crucial role in national mobilization. Additionally, those who do not adhere to any of these ideologies or who focus solely on the necessity of the national issue today must explain to the people the connection between the lack of a national government and the current economic disaster. Numerous articles have been written about the economic discrimination against Azerbaijan, but the most important aspect is outlining a concrete solution and objective for addressing daily issues such as inflation, unemployment, social corruption, and so on. In short, the national movement must support and align itself with all social, class-based, and economic protests and must nationalize these movements. Teachers, workers, women, and laborers must speak not as Persians but as Turks. While they may share common grievances with Persian teachers, workers, and women, their struggles are not identical. Their required remedies must also differ. Azerbaijani teachers should not merely repeat the demands of Persian teachers; they must articulate their own struggles as well. Azerbaijani teachers have different concerns that are unique to their profession and to their identity. If Persian teachers demand free education, Azerbaijani teachers must not only support that demand but also demand education in their mother tongue.

5 – Financial costs are crucial in cultural movements and struggles. The regime seeks to increase these costs to deter people from joining such movements. However, as the number of participants in these movements grows, these costs will decrease. On the night of January 20, 1990, the Russian-Soviet army entered Baku and opened fire on the people. Hundreds of people were injured or lost their lives that night, but the next day, over a million Azerbaijanis carried the bodies of the martyrs on their shoulders and bid them farewell. According to a Russian political analyst, the Soviet Union did not collapse in 1991; it collapsed on January 22, 1990, in Baku.

This burden is shared by all who take part in carrying it. If we do not leave our brave people alone under this burden, we will undoubtedly win.

1401/1/1 – 2022/3/21

[1] This article, authored by the well-known South Azerbaijani national activist Yürüş Mehrəlibəyli, was originally published on the Birlik.se portal on April 14, 2022. The original text was written in Arabic script and Azerbaijani Turkish and was transliterated into the Latin alphabet by Qulamhüseyn Məmmədov. During transliteration, the dates were adjusted to the Gregorian calendar, and some words were replaced with versions more commonly used in North Azerbaijan to ensure clarity. Care was taken to preserve the meaning and the fluency of the text without causing any distortion or alteration.

[2] That is, this burden is shared by everyone involved in carrying it and by all those who bear its weight.