


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Nationalism and its Futures

Edited by
Umut Özkirimli



Nationalism and its Futures

Also by Umut Özkırmlı

CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM

CONTESTED TERRAINS: A Comparative Study of Greek and Turkish
Nationalist Imaginaries (*with Spyros A. Sofos*)

THEORIES OF NATIONALISM: A Critical Introduction

Nationalism and its Futures

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
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1

Introduction

Umut Özkırmılı

Come writers and critics/Who prophesize with your pen
And keep your eyes wide/The chance won't come again
And don't speak too soon/For the wheel's still in spin
And there's no tellin' who/That it's namin'
For the loser now/Will be later to win
For the times they are a-changin'
Bob Dylan, 1964

Times were definitely a-changin' in the early 1990s.¹ The general mood, at least in the capital of the world's only remaining super-power, was one of optimism and triumphalism. There was no dearth of writers and critics prophesizing. One of them, a deputy director of the State Department's policy planning staff and former analyst at the RAND Corporation, had even proclaimed 'the end of history'. For him, what we were witnessing was not 'just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history ... but the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government' (Fukuyama 1989: 4; see also Fukuyama 1992, 2001; Achenbach 2001).

Yet all this talk of 'the end of history' was no more than florid rhetoric for those caught up in the wave of ethnic and nationalist conflicts that swamped much of the world at roughly the same time. For these people, there was nothing but 'despair, nausea, and horror'. Their ordeal was eloquently articulated by the Croatian actress Mira Furlan, herself the victim of a merciless propaganda campaign waged

against her in Croatia for performing in an international theatre festival in Belgrade. 'I played in those performances', wrote Furlan in an open letter to her co-citizens, 'for those anguished people who were not "Serbs", but human beings, human beings like me, human beings who recoil before this monstrous Grand Guignol farce in which dead heads are flying':

To whom am I addressing this letter? Who will read it?... Everyone is so caught up by the great cause that small personal fates are not important any more ... I am sorry, my system of values is different. For me there have always existed, and always will exist, only human beings, individual people, and those human beings (God, how few of them there are!) will always be excepted from generalizations of any kind, regardless of events, however catastrophic. I, unfortunately, shall never be able to 'hate all Serbs', nor even understand what that means.²

The story of Mira Furlan is a familiar one, at least for those not confined to the secluded offices of Washington think tanks. Nationalism continues to be one of the major actors of the social and political landscape, and a central part of the fabric of our everyday lives. Yet it plays only a limited role in the scenarios concocted by the prophets of a 'post-historical' world. Nationalism, Fukuyama argues, cannot be an ideological competitor to liberal democracy because it does not offer a comprehensive agenda for socio-economic organization. As such, it is compatible with doctrines and ideologies that do offer such agendas. In any case, Fukuyama hastens to add, nationalism is on the rise in regions such as Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union where peoples have long been denied their national identities. Within the world's oldest and most secure nationalities, nationalism has been domesticated and made compatible with universal recognition, much like religion three or four centuries earlier (Fukuyama 1989, 1992).

Naivety? Complacency? Or blatant Eurocentrism? Finding the appropriate term to describe Fukuyama's account is more difficult than exposing its shallowness. First, only movements with a particular socio-economic agenda qualify as ideologies for Fukuyama. This enables him to claim that there have only been two major challenges to liberalism in the twentieth century, those of fascism and

communism. This, however, is a very limited, if not reductionist, interpretation which downplays the political and cultural elements of ideologies. Nationalism does have a political and cultural agenda of its own: it envisages a particular world order, one organized according to the principle of national self-determination, where individual units, that is nation-states, should possess as much political, cultural, and yes, economic, autonomy as possible. Second, although it is true that nationalism usually mixes with other ideologies, including liberalism, it leaves its mark on the resulting amalgam. In other words, liberalism is one thing, nationalist liberalism is quite another. This has several policy implications on a number of vital policy issues, domestic or international, ranging from immigration and citizenship laws to foreign aid. Finally, the claim that nationalism has been domesticated within the world's oldest and most secure nationalities is hard to square with the realities on the ground. Some of the fiercest struggles for recognition take place in the West, including such countries as Britain, Canada, Belgium and Spain – a rather obvious point to be sure, for which ample evidence can be found in newspaper headlines, not to mention the burgeoning literature on multiculturalism and minority rights.

Yet Fukuyama (1989) is not the only one predicting the growing 'Common Marketization' of international relations and 'the ineluctable spread of Western consumerist culture'. 'The crisis of the nation-state' is one of the most worn-out clichés of the last decade, and the future of nationalism appears to many to be more uncertain than ever under the twin pressures of globalization and identity politics.

The aim of the present volume is to explore the challenges posed by and to nationalism at the turn of a new millennium. Each chapter will engage with a different challenge, on a different level of analysis (international or state-level). Some of the questions that will be addressed in the book are:

- What is national homogenization? What were the actual practices designed to create national unity? Have the conditions which gave nationalism such an appalling reputation changed? What are the different options of belonging today? Will national homogenization continue to be the norm of world politics or will other, possibly more benign, models of integration emerge?

- Is there a difference between nationalism and ethnic politics? What are the pitfalls of the dominant view of modernity which is based on ethical universalism? What are the alternatives to the politics of homogeneity?
- What is the record of nationalism with regard to human rights? What are the major obstacles to a compatibility between nationalism and universal principles? Is there a way of overcoming these obstacles?
- What are the implications of the processes of globalization for nationalism? Can we talk of a 'crisis of the nation-state'? Are there any indications that the nation is being superseded by other forms of collective identification? Will interstate conflicts be replaced by a clash of civilizations?
- Is cosmopolitanism an alternative to nationalism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of 'actually existing' cosmopolitanism? What is the nature of the relationship between cosmopolitanism and local democracy? How can cosmopolitan democracy flourish?
- What does 'belonging' mean? What are the alternative narratives of belonging to that of the nation-state? Is it possible to formulate a model of belonging that encompasses both identity and citizenship?

Let me now briefly elaborate on the general themes around which the following chapters revolve and outline the main arguments.³

National unity and homogenization

Nationalism is about homogenization, suggests John A. Hall, reminding us of Gellner's famous definition of nationalism as 'a political doctrine which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent' (1983: 1). Not surprisingly, geopolitical realities were a far cry from this ideal and the history of nationalism has been an endless drive to create that perfect fit between nationality and politics. The strategies followed by nationalizing states varied, ranging from voluntary assimilation to the more vicious practices of ethnic cleansing, population transfer and genocide.

According to Hall, the maximal point of national homogenization was reached in Europe, with the adoption of more vicious practices from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. There were various

reasons for that. The first was the problem of nationalities. Unification, when it took place over a long period, was more voluntary and benign, as in the case of England which had a centralized polity from 1066. But the great European land empires of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans, the Romanovs and the Habsburgs, were not that lucky. They were the latecomers, and when they tried to rationalize their possessions, they ran into the problem of nationalities who were able to protect themselves as they had already codified their languages and established their own educational systems. The other reason was the need for geopolitical autonomy. This in turn required territorial aggrandizement, hence the link between nationalism and imperialism. Combined, these factors made nationalism aggressive and expansionist.

Now, however, times have changed. Europe's security dilemma is solved and the link between nationalism and imperialism is broken. Today it is possible to distinguish between four options of belonging. The first two, that is ethnic and civic nationalism, are not particularly attractive, claims Hall, as they can be quite intolerant of diversity. The third option, or civil nationalism, which Hall defines as 'the acceptance of diverse positions and cultures', is more promising. But that diversity should be limited by a consensus on shared values. If groups have rights over individuals, this would lead to 'social caging', the fourth option, and become repulsive.

Are there any hopes for the future? Yes, says Hall, and this hope rests 'on the possibility that the developing world...will build on their institutional accomplishments so as not to imitate those who blithely consider themselves advanced'.

Partha Chatterjee picks up where Hall stops and explores homogeneity in the context of the postcolonial world. His main target is the distinction Benedict Anderson developed in his recent book, *The Spectre of Comparisons* (1998). In this book, Anderson identifies two kinds of seriality: the 'unbound seriality' of the everyday universals of modern social thought, such as nations, citizens, intellectuals and so on, and the 'bound seriality' of governmentality, 'the finite totals of enumerable classes of population produced by the modern census and electoral systems'. Anderson uses this distinction, Chatterjee notes, to make an argument about the goodness of nationalism and the nastiness of ethnic politics, believing that the two arise on different sites and mobilize on different sentiments. According to Chatterjee, what underlies this

attempt is a particular – standardized – conception of politics, politics inhabiting the empty homogeneous time of modernity.

Yet this view of politics and modernity is mistaken, because it is one-sided, says Chatterjee. ‘Empty homogeneous time is the utopian time of capital’, it is not located anywhere in real space. Modern life, by contrast, is heterogeneous, unevenly dense. Chatterjee cites examples from the postcolonial world to support his argument. There, one could find ‘industrial capitalists delaying the closing of a business deal because they had not yet had word from their respective astrologers, or industrial workers who would not touch a new machine until it had been consecrated with appropriate religious rites’. These examples do not attest to the co-presence of several times, the time of the modern and the premodern, but to the heterogeneity of modern life, as these ‘other’ times are the products of the encounter with modernity itself.

In such a context, Chatterjee argues, the call for universalism – or a nationalism not contaminated by ethnic politics – is often a mask covering the perpetuation of real inequalities. The politics of democratic nationhood can only offer a means for achieving equality by ensuring adequate representation for the underprivileged groups. A strategic politics of groups, classes and ethnicities is thus inevitable. Such a politics of heterogeneity can never claim to yield a general formula valid for all peoples at all times. Its solutions are bound to be contextual, historically specific and thus provisional. But this is the only way forward, at least for the postcolonial theorist, who is born ‘only when the mythical time-space of epic modernity has been lost forever’.

Nationalism, universalism and human rights

Fred Halliday takes a quite different approach to the thorny issue of universalism and focuses on the ways in which universal rights conflict with forms of particularism, notably nationalism. He identifies three main obstacles to a compatibility between nationalism and human rights. The first two, sovereignty and culture, do not pose a serious threat to human rights. It is generally agreed that gross violations of human rights forfeit a state’s claim to exclusive control over the fate of its citizens. In any case, it is increasingly difficult to talk of domestic processes without international repercussions, and some go so far as to argue that the outer limits of sovereignty have already been reached. As for culture, a modicum of respect for cultural

differences will go a long way towards resolving the tension between nationalism and universally held principles. Moreover, we should not forget that culture is not a given, but a site of diversity and change, that there is not much difference between cultures on many key issues (all peoples accept the right to self-determination, for instance) and that the main arguments about rights are not about culture anyway (the critique of universality is often based on a view of the structural inequality in the world system, not on claims that the peoples in question are exempt from universal jurisdiction).

The third obstacle, that of particularism, is much more problematic according to Halliday. At the heart of nationalism lies a contradiction with regard to rights. Nationalism rests upon the assertion of a universal right, namely the right to self-determination, but it has been and remains deeply hostile to the universality of rights. He identifies four areas where this contradiction can be observed: self-determination, laws of war, terrorism and solidarity. In each case, what we see is the assertion of a particular right by nationalist movements, coupled with the denial of that right to others. A graphic illustration of this point is the recent anti-terrorist measures undertaken by the Bush administration, 'The Patriot Act'. According to Halliday, the appeal to patriotism, 'a necessarily partisan and emotional principle', obscures two important issues: first, it absolves the USA and American citizens from any reflection on the past actions of their own states, including support for terrorist groups; secondly, it implicitly exempts the state and its armed forces from respect for universal principles. Patriotism, he argues, is not the first, but the last place to start in legitimating a campaign which may be valid in itself.

In short, nationalism may be compatible with universal principles, alongside other desirable goals, such as democracy, identity, community and international order, but only if a priority of values is established, or if nationalism knows its place. Unfortunately, Halliday concludes, the record of nationalism over the past century does not leave too much room for hope.

Nationalism, globalization and the clash of civilizations

John Hutchinson engages with two influential *fin de siècle* scenarios in his essay, namely the globalization perspective and Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis which was given a new

lease of life after the events of 11 September 2001. Both perspectives forecast the imminent demise of nations as relevant political actors but, Hutchinson argues, they are seriously vitiated by their lack of a long-range historical perspective.

Hutchinson singles out three fundamental problems with the radical version of the globalization perspective. First, globalization is not a modern revolutionary development but a recurring and evolutionary process, with roots, according to some estimates, as far back as the second millennium B.C. Second, globalization should not be equated with Westernization or universalization. Globalization always flows from particular centres and the rise of the 'West' is only the latest of a series of recurring jumps in global power. Third, globalization cannot be defined as a unitary and secular process as globalizing institutions include missionary religions, empires, migrations and long-distance trade as much as secular sciences, technologies and ideologies.

All this should make us reconsider the causal relationship between globalization and nations, argues Hutchinson. If globalization has been in process for a millennia or more, then claims that nations will be supplanted do not make much sense. More importantly, the dynamic and variegated nature of globalization may well produce differentiation, rather than homogenization. At this point, Hutchinson cites four factors that may stimulate ethnic differentiation: the emergence of universalistic scriptural religions, imperial expansions, interstate warfare and the development of long-distance trade. A longer historical perspective, then, will reveal that globalization has gone hand-in-hand with the articulation and crystallization of ethnic and national differences.

The clash of civilizations thesis, on the other hand, does not fare better. There are several obvious criticisms one can make of this thesis, Hutchinson argues. First, the most ferocious conflicts occurred within the European world of Latin Christianity which Huntington defines as a single civilization and not with Muslim, Confucian or Orthodox Christian civilizations. Second, the real enemy for most modern religious movements is 'within', since in most cases what they wish is to morally regenerate a traditional culture that is being eroded by alien cosmopolitan values. And third, the recent religious revivals should not be seen as the domain of 'backward', non-Western countries: religion has been one of the sources of national identity

for many avowedly secular states such as Holland and France, and it remains a powerful force in many contemporary 'Western' societies, including the USA, Italy, Ireland and Greece.

The current religious revival, Hutchinson concludes, does not offer a serious threat to the contemporary system of nation-states. In many cases, religion becomes ethnicized and much of the current revival is directed against the alleged inauthenticity of secular nationalism. Nation-states continue to be the major actors of world politics and new threats will only intensify nationalism in many parts of the world.

Nationalism and its alternatives

The last two essays of this volume explore some of the alternatives to nationalism. Craig Calhoun begins his critique of 'actually existing' cosmopolitanism by noting the rhetorical advantages of being a 'citizen of the world' in Western academic circles. This image is reinforced by the ubiquity of cosmopolitan diversity (or what he calls 'consumerist cosmopolitanism') in the world's major cities. One can eat Chinese food everywhere now, just like one can buy Kentucky Fried Chicken in Beijing. Yet food, tourism, music, literature and clothes are easy faces of cosmopolitanism and they tell us nothing about the spread of democracy or human rights on a global scale.

There are two fundamental problems with the dominant ways in which cosmopolitanism is conceptualized, according to Calhoun. The first concerns cosmopolitanism's relationship to democracy. Contemporary cosmopolitan theory, with its roots in seventeenth and eighteenth-century rationalism, is deeply suspicious of the local and the traditional, notably religion and ethnicity. This attitude is further reinforced by the spectre of 'bad nationalism' and by a particular construction of ethnicity as the reactionary 'other' to globalization. This, however, makes cosmopolitanism an elite perspective on the world and an agent of the institutional order of power relations and capital.

The second problem with cosmopolitanism relates to the issue of social solidarity. One of the virtues of cosmopolitanism is to challenge the logic of nationalism which holds that the nation has a primacy over any other possible groupings; but it conceptualizes the alternative 'too abstractly and vaguely'. This is dangerous, argues

Calhoun, as an 'attenuated cosmopolitanism is likely to leave us lacking the old sources of solidarity without adequate new ones'.

Is there a chance of salvaging cosmopolitan democracy? Calhoun's answer is affirmative, provided that cosmopolitans revise their theories in two ways. First, they should admit that 'immanent struggle for a better world always builds on particular social and cultural bases'. In other words, the construction of viable local communities may be equally central in solving the problems of the nation. Thus cosmopolitans must come to terms with tradition, community, ethnicity, religion and above all nationalism. Second, they should accept that both local community and nationalism have developed remarkable capacities for binding people to each other. 'Cosmopolitan democracy cannot flourish without a comparable basis in social solidarity'. Citizenship, Calhoun notes, must be more than an abstraction. It must be embedded in the practices of everyday life and able to make demands. After all, 'the view from the frequent traveler lounges does not provide an adequate sense of how people in very different circumstances can feel, gain voice and realize their individual and collective projects'.

In the last essay of this volume, Nira Yuval-Davis focuses on the contemporary notion of belonging, with the aim of deconstructing the hegemonic discourses of nationalist politics of belonging 'in which people, territories and states are constructed as immutably connected and the nation is a "natural" extension of one's family to which one should be prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice oneself'.

Yuval-Davis lays special emphasis on the affective dimension of belonging in her essay – belonging not just as being, but also as longing, or yearning – and stresses the differential positionings from which belongings are imagined, in terms of gender, class, stage in the life cycle, and so on. Another crucial intervening factor is the fact that people tend to belong to more than one collectivity and polity. For Yuval-Davis, an examination of the hierarchy and dynamics of power between these collectivities is crucial for a better understanding of belonging.

Yuval-Davis is critical of the dominant versions of identity politics as they do not differentiate between elements of identification and participation in the construction of belonging. She argues that citizenship signifies the participatory dimension of belonging whereas identification relates to the more emotive, affective dimension.

What we need, she claims, is a politics of belonging that encompasses both dimensions.

There are three candidates for such a politics of belonging. The first is Otto Bauer's attempt to revise the conventional principle of national self-determination in terms of what he called 'the personality principle', whereby the members of each national group will govern themselves, no matter where they are located. The second candidate is the discourse of 'indigenusness' with its emphasis on rights and recognition. The aboriginal perception, for instance, that 'they belong to the land', rather than that 'the land belongs to them', may lead to an alternative, non-exclusive, mode of ownership and sovereignty, similar to Bauer's personality principle.

Yuval-Davis is more ambivalent about the third candidate, namely the politics of diaspora. She notes the extent to which the literature on diasporas is characterized by binary, naturalized and essentialist ideas about kinship, nature and territory. Diasporas, she argues, are much more heterogeneous than is generally assumed. Moreover, many theories of diasporas do not take into account the effects diaspora yearning can have on the homeland. Following Anderson she claims that diasporic politics is often reckless politics without accountability and due democratic processes. Yet the development of transport and communicative technologies has intensified the contact between diasporas and homelands. This may lead to new possibilities of getting together and have a positive impact on the discourses of belonging.

Yuval-Davis concludes her essay by highlighting the extent to which belonging is 'multiplex and multi-layered, continuous and shifting, dynamic and attached'. The task ahead of us is to explore the ways of developing a form of political participation 'in which differential belongings and positionings are acknowledged in a non-exclusionary way'.

Concluding remarks

It is customary to end the Introduction to an edited volume by identifying a common theme, or a shared ground, that unites all contributions. This Introduction will be an exception, because it is not the presence of a single thread that runs through all the contributions that gives this volume its value, but the overlapping of 'differing threads, intersecting, entwined, one taking up where another breaks

off, all of them posed in effective tensions with one another to form a composite body' (the image of a rope is of course Wittgenstein's; for the particular interpretation adopted here see Geertz 2000). The contributors come from a variety of disciplines, ranging from history to political theory, from sociology to international relations, and espouse different theoretical and normative perspectives. Not surprisingly, their views on a number of important issues diverge.

Take the nature of nationalism. For John A. Hall, nationalism is like the libido, 'essentially labile, characteristically absorbing the flavours of the historical forces with which it interacts'. In an analogous way, Partha Chatterjee stresses 'the ambivalence of the nation as a narrative strategy as well as an apparatus of power'. Craig Calhoun concurs with Hall and Chatterjee with regard to the discursive nature of nationalism, but argues that it is not easily abandoned even if its myths, contents and excesses are debunked. John Hutchinson, on the other hand, accuses what he calls 'modernist interpretations' of downplaying the extent to which states have been shaped by older ethnic identities. For him, nationalism derives much of its power 'from its capacity to overcome contingency by finding "solutions" based on a past believed to be authentic'.

The authors also disagree on the issue of the model of belonging best suited to the needs of the twenty-first century, and the related issue of the tension between universalism and particularism. Chatterjee and Calhoun, for instance, are both critical of ethical universalism, a heritage of Enlightenment thinking, and advocate a politics of heterogeneity which recognizes the needs of various groups and a form of cosmopolitanism more in peace with local democracy and traditional sources of solidarity respectively. By contrast, Halliday remains unabashedly universalist and calls for a hierarchy of values where universal rights will have pride of place. For Hall, the best option seems to be a civil form of nationalism which recognizes diversity, for Yuval-Davis a politics of belonging which will encompass the dimensions of citizenship and identification.

Yet, despite their disagreements on these and a host of other issues, all contributors admit, implicitly or explicitly, that nations and nationalism are not on the verge of extinction. Given this, the challenge for us is to explore ways of reducing, if not eradicating, the pain and suffering nationalism has caused in the past century. This book steers clear from the trap of intellectual complacency and takes

up this challenge. 'Regardless of whether we will be living in one, or five, or fifty states', writes Mira Furlan,

let us not forget the people, each individual, regardless of which side of this Wall of ours the person happens to be on. We were born here by accident, we are this or that by accident, so there must be more than that, mustn't there?⁴

Notes

- 1 I am grateful to Atsuko Ichijo, Ayhan Kaya and Spyros A. Sofos for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
- 2 These quotations are from 'A Letter to My Co-Citizens', originally published in *Danas*, Zagreb, 5 November 1991 and *Politika*, Belgrade, 10 November 1991, reproduced in The Mira Furlan Information Station, www.geocities.com/~mfinfoystation/miraltr.htm.
- 3 All the quotations in the following four sections are from the essays in this volume, unless otherwise stated.
- 4 'A Letter to My Co-Citizens', www.geocities.com/~mfinfoystation/miraltr.htm.

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2

Conditions for National Homogenizers

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This chapter is an exercise in insubordination. Rather than discussing nationalism in the twenty-first century, I concentrate on the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. There are two reasons for this. One is that my knowledge base, such as it is, lies within this period. Differently put, I am reluctant to predict the future until I have better understood the past. The second reason is perhaps more meritorious. To discuss homogeneity may be a useful background to some of the points made elsewhere in this volume about the possibility of greater social heterogeneity. Differently put, some historical understanding at the start may be useful if it explains from whence we have come – as an aid to evaluating assertions about our future options. As will be revealed, I am skeptical of claims now being made for social heterogeneity.

Hence it is all the more important for me to stress a preliminary theoretical point, best expressed by saying that Sigmund Freud's contribution to nationalist studies has been sadly neglected. What is in question here is not *Moses and Monotheism*, interesting as is its discussion of Jewish cultural uniqueness. What matters much more is the analogy that can be drawn between the nature of the libido and that of nationalism. The libido is famously promiscuous and perverse, sticky and mobile, prone to gain character from the elements to which it attaches itself. Nationalism is just like that, essentially labile, characteristically absorbing the flavours of the historical forces

with which it interacts. Nationalism has, to adapt Sartre, existences rather than any single essence. The point being made can usefully be underscored. Nationalism does change, as will be seen from the analysis proposed here. So any skepticism about the putative increase in heterogeneity should not be ascribed to the author holding any completely essentialist view. Differently put, to admit that change is of the essence of nationalism does not mean that every claim about mutation in this protean force is necessarily veridical. But these are merely warning notes: a good deal more theoretical work will need to be done in the conclusion.

The argument proceeds in four straightforward steps. I begin by outlining what is meant by the concept of national homogenization. An attempt is then made to outline at least some of the conditions allowing national homogenization to become so very powerful and prominent between roughly 1890 and 1945. The third section insists that times 'have' changed. More specifically the tone of nationalism in the advanced world has become moderate, even shamefaced – which is not, it should be stressed immediately, to endorse the popular view that the nation-state has somehow lost its salience as the political form for the modern world. The final section will offer some comments about the world outside Europe. These are tentative, limited and exploratory. Nonetheless, these comments can serve to illustrate, by means of sheer contrast, the nature of the European experience.

What is homogenization?

There is nothing complex about the notion of national homogenization. The definition of nationalism which suggests that each nation should have its own state – and, quite as much, that each state should have its own nation – implies a complete fit between nationality and politics, an absolute correspondence that suggests the notion of homogeneity (the definition and the ideas of this paragraph come from Gellner 1983). It takes but a moment's thought to realize that such correspondence has not generally characterized the historical record. Rulers of most pre-modern societies did not share the norms of those over whom they exercised authority – and, typically, there were several sets of norms, given the presence of many and varied ethnic groups within most territories. Hence we must talk about homogenization, that is, the actual nationalizing practices

designed to create that perfect fit between nation and state. Accordingly, we need to examine ways in which social differences were obliterated so as to fit people into a common mould. An initial way to get at the matter – with an alternative being proposed in the conclusion – is to imagine a continuum between voluntary practices on the one hand, and very nasty and vicious practices on the other. Let me examine four points along this scale, leaving it to the reader to fit different historical cases within its parameters.

The softer end of the scale is neatly exemplified by the figures of David Hume and Adam Smith, the two great theorists of modernity, of empiricism and of capitalism, who lived and wrote in eighteenth-century Edinburgh. These thinkers characteristically did not think of themselves as Scottish, habitually preferring to refer to themselves as North Britons. They lived in a semi-peripheral zone, and wanted to be part of the action – that is, they looked south of the border at a growing economy and what they felt to be a more civilized world, and sought entry within it. The Scottish education system, then and now, gave such considerable cultural capital that it was possible for Scots to do well within a larger political system. Although there were attempts to block their entry, these basically failed, as can be seen in a myriad of ways – from the leadership of the Labour Party, past and present, to the railways and bridges constructed by Scottish engineers throughout the empire. This relatively easy voluntary assimilation should not lead one into thinking that everything about Britain was liberal. To the contrary, the British state was exceptionally vicious when handling the tribes of the Scottish Highlands after they had provided a military threat in 1745. Nonetheless, the predominant tone of the British experience was liberal: once the Highlands had been subdued, for example, employment for their military capabilities was found within the established forces of the realm.

Somewhat further along the scale stands the complex case of the United States. On the one hand, there are decidedly vicious elements of American history that are all too easily forgotten. First, the United States was created by means of powerful acts, usually directed from below, of cleansing. The ethnic cleansing of the native population has been terribly neglected, perhaps because it was laced with genocidal tendencies. Equally forgotten is the political cleansing that followed secession and revolution. A significant section of the elite – in absolute numerical terms greater than those guillotined during the

French Revolution, and from a smaller population at that – that had supported the Crown was forced to leave (Palmer 1959: 188–202). Canada thereby gained an element of that anti-Americanism which comprises the key part of its national identity. Second, the United States remained unitary only as the result of a very brutal civil war. The Constitution had of course recognized the different interests of the slave-owning southern states, but the division between North and South grew in the early years of the republic. The works of John Calhoun amount to a myth of hierarchy on the basis of which a new nation might have been formed. War destroyed that diversity, with Lincoln trying at the end of the conflict to create unity by means of such new institutions as Thanksgiving. Of course, the South did not lose its cultural autonomy simply as the result of defeat in war, maintaining a key hold on federal politics well into the 1930s. Nonetheless, over time the South has lost its uniqueness, especially in recent years as the result of political change and of population and industrial transfers from North to South. Third, another alternative vision, that of socialism, was defeated in brutal fashion, as is apparent once we note the very large number of deaths in labor disputes in nineteenth-century America (Mann 1993: chapter 18).

On the other hand, the rosier and milder face of American homogeneity can be seen at work in ethnic relations. A warning should be issued before describing what is a remarkable American achievement. Everything that will be said excludes Afro-Americans, whose position inside the United States remains heavily marked by racial discrimination. The hideousness of what is involved can be seen in the desire of the vast majority of Afro-Americans 'to get in', with great bitterness being shown by middle-class blacks who make it economically only to find that integration does not exist in the suburbs to which they move (Hall and Lindholm 1999: chapter 10). But for the majority of Americans, ethnic identity is now – as Mary Waters' superb *Ethnic Options* (1990) makes clear – a choice rather than a destiny imposed from outside. Rates of intermarriage are extremely high, not least for the first generation of Cuban-Americans in Florida, more than 50 per cent of whom marry outside their own group.¹ Ethnic identity has little real content. It is permissible to graduate from kindergarten wearing a sari as long as one does not believe in caste – that is, as long as one is American. There are severe limits to difference because homogenizing forces remain so strong.

A central facet of modern European history, namely the practices of ethnic cleansing and population transfer, marks a point much further along the scale – that is, a point that brings us instantly closer to social viciousness. Cleansing has a long history in Europe. Religious cleansing began with that of the Jews from fifteenth-century Spain, continued with that of the Huguenots from seventeenth-century France, and peaked with the expulsion of perhaps five million Muslims from the Balkans in the years before 1914. Ethnic cleansing *per se* began to be practiced quite generally at the end of the nineteenth century, peaking amid the fog of the two world wars – with the expulsion of Germans from Central Europe in 1945 involving particularly large numbers. This is a world which we know all too well, for its images have been placed on our television screens as the result of the Balkan wars of the last decade.

The extremity of viciousness in the scale is of course reached in genocide, the extirpation of difference through mass murder. Fortunately, there have been relatively few examples of full-scale genocide, although the pattern that began with the Turkish treatment of Armenians and which is forever associated with the Holocaust in fact reached its greatest moment of intensity only recently, in Kampuchea and in Rwanda.² This too has been so present on our television screens as to need no further explication.

A first consideration to be stressed about this scale is simple and factual. European history has been the process of national homogenization. At the beginning of the century, perhaps 65 million people lived under alien rule; that is, their states were not led by people co-cultural with themselves. By 1919, this figure had fallen by nearly two-thirds. Today, there are very few countries in all of the advanced world as a whole – Canada, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Spain – which are genuinely multinational, with most of those being, it has to be noted, far from models of social, economic and political stability (Mann 1999). Further, cleansing has been accomplished before our very eyes in the Balkans. Bluntly, this is what European history has been about – making wholly appropriate Mazower's choice of *The Dark Continent* (1998) as the title for his history of twentieth-century Europe.

For this reason, I still believe that the most considerable theorist of nationalism remains Ernest Gellner. This is less because of the way he explained nationalism than because this hideous factual history was

absolutely at the center of his vision. He could do no other; his life was given shape by the forces of homogenization. He grew up in Kafka's world of mixed German–Czech–Jewish cultures, bilingual, secular but with a Jewish background. Interwar Prague was made still more remarkable by the presence of a Ukrainian university, and by the entry of scholars such as Einstein, Jakobson and Carnap. He fled aged thirteen only after the Nazis had entered the city, and returned in 1945, after one side of his family had been killed in the Holocaust, to witness the brutal expulsion of the Germans. Convinced that Russian hegemony was inevitable, he became an émigré – only to return again in 1990 in time to see the Czech majority finally get rid of the Slovaks. In the end, the Czech Republic became, as his theory predicted, monotone and unitary. It is important to note that he hated this change, finding the country boring. There was little relation between his descriptive sociology of nationalism and his personal likes and prescriptions.

The maximal point of national homogenization

Softer processes of assimilation to singular standards had taken place, not least for those of Jewish background, since the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, it makes sense to try to understand the maximal point of national homogenization – by which I mean the sudden and general adoption of the more vicious practices described from the end of the nineteenth century. Three factors are considered in turn. It is not claimed that these give a full account, rather that no account can be complete without including them.

The first consideration is that of the difference between two types of nation-building projects in European history. The contrast is that between the sociology of state before nation and that in which nation comes before state. Let me try to spell out the difference.

It is perfectly proper to suggest that England had a centralized polity from 1066. There was a single parliament as conquest had made feudalism centralized, and to this was added an exchequer and, somewhat later, a system of common law. Within this world there was a slow process of homogenization. I do not easily read Chaucer but I understand Shakespeare without any trouble at all – which is to say that a measure of linguistic unification had taken place by the end of the sixteenth century. Such unification took place over a long

period, as varied elites found it in their interest to gain the services of the state ruling over them. Care should be taken not to exaggerate. Of course, much of what has been said applies most strongly only to England. Great Britain was a composite affair, with the politics of Ireland resembling those of the world to which we now turn.

The great European land empires of the end of the nineteenth century – those of the Ottomans, the Romanovs and the Habsburgs – were utterly composite, the creation of marriages in which varied territories had different linguistic and administrative systems. States often sought to rationalize their possessions, particularly through linguistic policies, but in a sense their attempt to do so came too late. Nations were able to protect themselves, for they were able to codify their own languages, and to create their own educational systems. This is the classic world of national awakening. This was a movement from below, one element of which – namely the fact that social inequality combined with cultural distinctiveness could encourage secession – stood at the center of Gellner's theory of nationalism. As it happens, his account seems to me incomplete; but that critical point is best made after considering the second explanatory factor. Still, the basic generalization – that when state building occurred late it ran into the problem of nationalities – is certainly correct.

The second factor can be highlighted by reference to Max Weber, the sociologist of the sociologists. His nickname when young among those who knew him well was 'Polish Max'. His first research had been on the Polish laborers on the agricultural estates of East Germany. He warned obsessively that the presence of such aliens represented a threat to the unity of the nation: it might make sense in economic terms, but it would weaken the fabric of a great power. This sort of view – insisting that the seeming homogeneity of Britain had to be copied so as to increase state strength – was the common currency of the time. It is easy to see why. Armed forces would surely be more efficient, as would civil life, if a single language dominated one's complete territory. Further, the removal of difference might allow the sinews of the state to be strengthened by means of an increase in fiscal extraction. Most generally, social energies might be released if all were part of a single project. It should be noted that there were very different options open to the various empires of the time. The British made a distinction between white Greater Britain and the darker colonies. Russia hoped that a nation-state would

emerge, but realized that this depended upon the Ukrainians seeing themselves as but 'little Russians' – for without them there simply would not be enough Russian 'ethnics' to build a nation-state. There certainly were not enough Germans to create a nation-state in Austria, while the Ottoman sphere for some time saw a conflict between those who wanted to recreate the empire as Muslim and others who wished to create a new Turkish nation-state.

This is the appropriate moment to comment on the central weakness of Gellner's account. His definition of nationalism binds together the notion of nation and secession; that is, it implies that every national awakening is bound to lead to the creation of a new state. But this was not necessarily so. The awakening of the nations did not – and does not – always mean that every nation sought its own state. Most Slavs were scared, most obviously in 1848, of establishing a series of small states, likely to be so much at odds with one other as to be non-viable, since the resulting power vacuum would almost certainly suck in either Russia or Germany – as indeed happened. Far better would be a liberal Austro-Hungary, that is, a constitutional monarchy, which would respect the historic liberties of the national communities, allowing them linguistic and cultural rights. It is sometimes argued that Masaryk only made up his mind to opt for secession in 1916 when a final imperial plan came out showing that the empire was not going to become liberal.

A similar point can be made about the Ukraine. It was not really necessary for the empire to be so repressive to the Ukrainians. The greatest enemies of the Ukrainians were the Poles – who were distrusted quite as much by the Tsar. Common cause could have been made, and this would anyway have been wise given that the cultural revival of Ukrainian in Austrian Galicia probably meant that the extirpation of Ukrainian culture was impossible. The point being implied here is a simple one. Of course, socio-economic factors, the combination of social inequality with a cultural marker, can undermine social stability. Still, politicized national consciousness – that is, the move from cultural awareness to the demand for a state of one's own – resulted most of all from the behavior of the state with which the nations interacted. Where there was no voice, there was no loyalty – making exit eventually an attractive and rational option. We can adapt a famous image of Gellner's and say: Ruritania is created by the illiberalism of Megalomanias (for the key concepts in

this paragraph see Hirschman 1978; for the more political view of nationalism see Hall 1998 and Lieven 2000). The general point being made can usefully be underscored. Gellner's socio-economic account needs, at the least, to be complemented by an appreciation of political factors.

As always, central to politics is the nature of geopolitical relations. In this period such relations were visceral and intense, thereby politicizing nationalism still more. For the third general factor, again brought to mind by Max Weber, is one which very clearly demonstrates the way in which nationalism can be influenced by a particular political context. Weber was famously a 'fleet professor', a member of the Naval League. This biographical detail is mentioned as a symbol of the more general fact that in this period nationalism was associated with imperialism. To be a strong nation-state meant that you needed to have – or, rather more precisely, it was believed that you needed to have – your own secure sources of supply for minerals and food as well as your own markets. Geopolitical autonomy meant, to put the matter differently, that a premium was placed on territorial aggrandizement. There is a famous book written at the time by a friend of Max Weber's, Werner Sombart, suggesting that Germany had a geopolitical choice between heroism and trading (Sombart 1915). The trading option was a real one, given that Germany was prospering within the terms of the established international order – with its economy, for instance, overtaking that of Great Britain in 1913. But Sombart's – and Weber's – preference was for heroism, for Germany to seek to control its destiny in an absolute sense, not least since German 'Kultur' had so much to offer the world. We must recognize and try to understand the rationality behind this position, even though it is not that of our own age. It is worth noting in this connection that if Weber had been privy to the plans of the British Imperial War Cabinet to blockade Germany so as to starve it to death, he would surely have been confirmed in his desire for territory (Offer 1990). The intensity of geopolitical struggle made nationalism aggressive and expansionist.

As it happens, these three factors did not cause the outbreak of war in 1914. The outbreak of hostilities was rather the result of more traditional geopolitical miscalculations. Still, once war had broken out these conditions – the nationalities question, the political drive for national unity, and the link between nationalism and

imperialism – made the war exceptionally vicious (*cf.* Kaiser 1990). And without further ado, I will claim that the sheer scale of the First World War led to the Second World War – for a whole series of reasons, including the destruction of social institutions and the presence of disillusioned soldiers drawn to paramilitary activity. The intensity of this great single great conflict exacerbated the variables on which emphasis has been placed. War multiplied fear, and created a fog within which massive ethnic cleansing and genocide took place. No wonder that nationalism gained such an appalling reputation.

Limits to self-satisfaction

It is of course vital to determine whether the world has changed. Gellner felt that his theory of nationalism was general and universal. Could it be, however, that he theorized a particular historical moment? Might it not be the case that a measure of moral development has occurred, with nationalism no longer being the force whose dangers we have seen to be so great? Necessarily ambivalent answers must be given to questions such as these.

The crucial background condition was changed completely. Europe's security dilemma was solved. The arrival of the United States, partly asked to stay by Europeans afraid of themselves as much as of the Russians, meant that with security questions resolved economic recovery could be especially striking. Differently put, NATO was a necessary condition allowing Germany at last to abandon heroism in favour of trading. But the framework of the alliance was complemented by changes within Europe itself. The European Union derives from an earlier agreement about coal and steel. What that agreement testifies to is a measure of genius on the part of French bureaucrats. Having suffered geopolitical disaster three times within a single lifetime, key members of the French elite in effect realized that, since Germany could not be beaten, it was better to seek control through a positive embrace. Differently put, France and Germany agreed to give up their capacity to autonomously produce their own weapons. Interdependence resulted from a geopolitical deal (Milward 1992; Anderson 1997; Moravcsik 1998).

Nationalism changes a great deal in this new context. Crucially, the link between nationalism and imperialism is broken. Two elements are worth distinguishing. First, European states in this period

gave up their empires and, against all expectations, entered into the most spectacular period of economic growth in their history. There are not many people who believe that Putin's desire to retain Chechnya is a reliable route by means of which Russia will become wealthy. The recipe for the wealth of nation-states seems to be that of down-sizing territorially, if need be, so as to enter into trading relations of sufficient intensity as to move one's economy up the product cycle. This is an enormous change there. Equally importantly, second, is the fact that many of the new nationalisms – notably those of the Catalans, Scots and Quebecois – have no desire to protect themselves from the market. Very much to the contrary, such nationalisms are often confident that they can best prosper within the larger market once freed from the constricting embrace of the larger polities within which they find themselves. This is modern, free-trade nationalism.

It is important to issue a warning at this point. The points that have been made should not be misinterpreted as lending support to the notion that globalization is undermining the power of the nation-state. Many points can be made against this vastly overstated view (Hall 2000), at least two of which do need to be emphasized here. First, an increase in market exchange – less global than Northern – rests, as we have seen, upon geopolitical calculations. Nation-states have not disappeared: rather, they have learnt that the attempt to be total power containers led to disaster, and that modesty has led to success. In politics, as in architecture, less seems to be more. Secondly, national homogenization has not ceased. Much of the talk about diversity has as a background the blunt fact that ethnic cleansing has in fact largely taken place in this world. Liberal tolerance is easy once there is little actually to tolerate. More generally, the talk about diversity misses key features of modern societies, as can be seen particularly clearly if we return to the case of the United States. On one hand, there remains a good deal of compulsion within the United States. There is no possibility of the United States becoming a multinational society. No one wants a second civil war of visceral intensity. All evidence shows that Americans are overwhelmingly opposed to the idea that Spanish should be recognized as a second official language. The toughness of American civic nationalism is well expressed in the quip used in a Texas gubernatorial election some years ago: 'If English was good enough for Jesus Christ, it is

good enough for Texas.' This is surely one element ensuring that Spanish is being lost as a second language as fast as was the case for the languages of other immigrant groups in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the point about the talk of difference – the point that we noted earlier had been so well emphasized by Waters – is that it is so very common. It is as if everyone has a right to an ethnicity, as long as it is without much content – as is in fact the case, as the high rates of intermarriage so clearly demonstrate. Besides that, of course, stand the great homogenizing pressures of Hollywood and of consumerism. The United States is more united now than it ever was in the past.

Beyond Europe

Most general sociological schemes have at their core the notion of the less developed seeking to catch up with the more advanced. This applied within Europe, with both nationalism and industrialization, and probably socialism, being best seen as late development strategies (for an interpretation of socialism in this light see Szporluk 1988). It is all too easy to imagine that this logic will apply to what is after all best known as the less developed world. The result can only be appalling, as noted, if nationalizing homogenization becomes the norm for the world's polities.

Remarkably, there are grounds for hope that this may not generally be the case: the non-European world may manage its affairs better, by invention rather than by imitation. The clearest and most important example is that of the way in which linguistic diversity has not led to nationalist secessions in India. David Laitin (1992) has argued that this is best explained by the 'three plus or minus one' linguistic repertoire available to – and in fact often possessed by – Indians. The three is reached in the following manner. One official all-India language is Hindi; a second is English. The reason for this dual situation is that Nehru's attempt to linguistically homogenize the newly independent nation failed because of the resistance encountered among his own civil servants – whose cultural capital very largely lay in their mastery of a world language. The third language necessary is that of one's state – that is, of one's province. It is possible to subtract a language if one's state is Hindi-speaking, but necessary to add a language if one is a minority in a non-Hindi-speaking province. There can be

no doubt about the diversity of life within India, yet – incredibly to European eyes – the situation is rather stable, a sort of Austro-Hungary that works. None of this is to say that Indian life is without tension. It may yet be the case, for instance, that religious division will tear India apart – although there are reasons to doubt this. Still, what has been achieved does allow hope.

This sort of linguistic repertoire is as present in much of Africa. Since the future of that continent is often seen in wholly negative light, it makes sense at least to note two further factors that may constrain national homogenizers. One is simply the presence of a large number of ethnic groups, perhaps 120 in Tanzania alone, none of which is near demographic dominance. In these circumstances, politics tend to be formed of multiethnic coalitions, none of which dares play the ethnic card. Secondly, Africa has by and large seen little sustained interstate war since decolonization, for all that it has been plagued by low intensity internal strife – and by more recent resource-driven conflicts. A negative side of the absence of sustained geopolitical conflict has been relative failure in state-building – so much so, indeed, that there is not much discussion of ‘failed states’ in Africa (Herbst 2000). But there is another, more positive side to the picture. One factor that intensified ethnic cleansing in Europe was competing claims to a single piece of territory.³ Near-absolute endorsement of the principle of non-intervention has meant that this factor has by and large been missing in Africa. Of course, none of this is to say, once again, that sweetness and light can be guaranteed. The darkest alternative is of course represented by the genocide in Rwanda. Further, it looks likely that the war in Congo-Zaire will do nothing but harm – neither state nor nation-building, merely reliable destruction.

Since so much reliance has been placed on Laitin’s analysis, it is worth looking at his more recent analysis of the erstwhile Soviet sphere (Laitin 1999). By and large, the optimism found in the developing world (that is, the demonstration that many nations can share political space) is abandoned when dealing with the Baltics. All that the beached Russian diaspora can hope in those countries is genuine civic nationalism – that is, the creation of a homogeneous monolingual society in which the desire to join is accepted. The rather different situation in Kazakhstan seems no more likely to lead to diversity. Perhaps, Laitin argues, the Ukraine will do better. One

can hope, but one must also fear given the debilitating failure to undertake political and economic reform.

Conclusion

The theoretical claims of this chapter can be spelt out much more clearly by consideration of the celebrated notions of civic and ethnic nationalism, not least as this suggests a schema differentiating options of belonging. It should be clearly said at the start that we should not accept everything that is implied in the formula ethnic/bad, civic/good. For one thing, there is nothing necessarily terrible about loyalty to one's ethnic group – and this sentiment in fact underlies the supposedly civic nationalism of the French. For another, civic nationalism is not necessarily nice: its injunction can be 'join us or else'. This was certainly true of the early United States, and it is equally true of the way in which Paris treated La Vendée during the early years of the Revolution. Differently put, civic nationalism may be as resolutely homogenizing as is ethnic nationalism. This suggests the following scheme:

Ethnic

(Non-)Liberal Caging Civic

Civil

Moving clockwise around this circle allows a series of theoretical points to be made.

Ethnic nationalism is indeed repulsive when it is underwritten by relativist philosophies that insist that one should literally think with one's blood. Much less horrible is the combination of ethnic and civic nationalisms represented by France – that is, a world in which one is taken in or allowed in as long as one absorbs the culture of the dominant ethnic group. Civic nationalism becomes more liberal when it moves towards the pole of civility, best defined in terms of the acceptance of diverse positions or cultures. Whether this move is, so to speak, sociologically real can be measured by asking two questions. First, is the identity to which one is asked to accede relatively thin; that is, does it have at its core political loyalty rather than a collective memory of an ethnic group? Second, are rates of intermarriage high? Differently put, is the claim that one can belong whatever one's background in fact borne out by the facts? All this is obvious. Less so,

perhaps, is a tension that lies at the heart of multiculturalism. In the interests of clarity, matters can be put bluntly. Multiculturalism properly understood 'is' civil nationalism, the recognition of diversity. But that diversity is – needs to be, should be – limited by a consensus on shared values. Difference is acceptable only so long as group identities are voluntary; that is, insofar as identities can be changed according to individual desire. What is at issue is neatly encapsulated when we turn to the notion of caging.⁴ If multiculturalism means that groups have rights over individuals – if, for example, the leaders of a group have the power to decide to whom young girls should be married – then it becomes repulsive. Such multiculturalism might seem liberal in tolerating difference, but it is in fact the illiberalism of misguided liberalism, diminishing life chances by allowing social caging. Such a position is of course relativist, and it is related to ethnic nationalism in presuming that one must think with one's group. Importantly, the link to ethnic nationalism may be very close indeed. If there are no universal standards, and ethnic groups are held to be in permanent competition, then it is possible, perhaps likely, that one group will seek to dominate another.

These are ideal typical positions. But I have joined 'at the descriptive level' that powerful stream of modern social theory suggesting that some positions have greater viability than others. A series of thinkers, interestingly all liberal, have insisted that homogeneity, whether ethnic or civic, is a 'must' if a society is to function effectively. John Stuart Mill (1862: chapter 16) made this claim when speaking about the workings of democracy, insisting that the nationalities question had to be solved in order for democracy to be viable. The great contemporary theorist of democracy Robert Dahl (1977) has reiterated this idea. The background notion here is straightforward. Human beings cannot take too much conflict, cannot put themselves on the line at all times and in every way. For disagreement to be productive in the way admired by liberalism, it must be contained – that is, it must take place within a frame of common belonging. Very much the same insight underlies David Miller's (1995) view that national homogeneity is a precondition for generous welfare regimes. This is correct: the generosity of Scandinavian countries rests on the willingness to give to people exactly like oneself. But the great theorist of the need for social homogeneity was of course Gellner. As it happens, the explanation he offered for this ever

more insistently – that of the necessity of homogeneity so that industrial society can function properly – is rather question begging (for a series of critical reviews on this point see most of the essays in Hall 1998). I have preferred a more political account as an explanation for the maximal period of national homogenization. But the visceral experience underlying his image of political space moving from the world of Kokoschka to that of Modigliani – that is, from a world in which peoples were intermingled to one in which national homogeneity was established – does have very great truth to it (Gellner 1983).

It is as well to be clear about what is implied here. Nationalism has no essence, in that modes of integration can vary so much – from the voluntary to the forced, from ethnic to civic, and from imperialistically inclined to enraptured by free trade. Still, my argument does suggest that homogeneity is what nationalism is about, and it is essentialist in that sense. This point can be made differently. Civil nationalism – that is, cultural diversity within a shared commitment to minimal liberal political norms – seems to me ‘at the prescriptive’ level utterly desirable. But it has been hard to achieve. Europe has little room for self-congratulation in this regard: most countries were cleansed; Belgium, Canada and the United Kingdom do badly, while Switzerland is highly idiosyncratic – leaving only Spain as an exemplar of civil nationalism. The miserable record of Europe relates in part to the intensity of its geopolitical conflicts, in part to the potential for singular groups to dominate whole territories. Such hope as we can realistically allow ourselves rests on the possibility that countries of the developing world – thankfully less engaged in interstate war and often lacking dominant or potentially dominant ethnicities – will build on their institutional accomplishments so as not to imitate those who so blithely consider themselves advanced.

Notes

- 1 I rely here on the research of Elizabeth Arias of the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
- 2 I have benefited enormously from reading at a late stage a manuscript by Michael Mann on ethnic cleansing. This powerful analysis is exceptionally rich, and I have not as yet absorbed its full implications for the argument made here.
- 3 Mann argues this in his manuscript on ethnic cleansing.
- 4 The notion of ‘caging’ is of course that of Michael Mann. It is variously used in the first two volumes of his *The Sources of Social Power* (1986, 1993).

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3

The Nation in Heterogeneous Time

Partha Chatterjee

I

Benedict Anderson, in his now classic *Imagined Communities* (1983), has made famous the argument that the nation lives in homogeneous empty time.¹ In this, he was, in fact, following a dominant strand in modern historical thinking that imagines the social space of modernity as distributed in homogeneous empty time. A Marxist could call this the time of capital. Anderson explicitly adopts the formulation from Walter Benjamin and uses it to brilliant effect to show the material possibilities of large anonymous socialities being formed by the simultaneous experience of reading the daily newspaper or following the private lives of popular fictional characters. It is the same simultaneity experienced in homogeneous empty time that allows us to speak of the reality of such categories of political economy as prices, wages, markets, and so on. Empty homogeneous time is the time of capital. Within its domain, capital allows for no resistance to its free movement. When it encounters an impediment, it thinks it has encountered another time – something out of pre-capital, something that belongs to the pre-modern. Such resistances to capital (or to modernity) are therefore understood as coming out of humanity's past, something people should have left behind but somehow haven't. But by imagining capital (or modernity) as an attribute of time itself, this view succeeds not only in branding the resistances to it as archaic and backward, but also in securing for capital and modernity their ultimate triumph, regardless of what some

people may believe or hope, because after all, as everyone knows, time does not stand still.

In his recent book *The Spectre of Comparisons* (1998), Anderson has followed up his analysis in *Imagined Communities* by distinguishing between nationalism and the politics of ethnicity. He does this by identifying two kinds of seriality that are produced by the modern imaginings of community. One is the unbound seriality of the everyday universals of modern social thought: nations, citizens, revolutionaries, bureaucrats, workers, intellectuals, and so on. The other is the bound seriality of governmentality: the finite totals of enumerable classes of population produced by the modern census and the modern electoral systems. Unbound serialities are typically imagined and narrated by means of the classic instruments of print-capitalism, namely, the newspaper and the novel. They afford the opportunity for individuals to imagine themselves as members of larger than face-to-face solidarities, of choosing to act on behalf of those solidarities, of transcending by an act of political imagination the limits imposed by traditional practices. Unbound serialities are potentially liberating. Bound serialities, by contrast, can operate only with integers. This implies that for each category of classification, any individual can count only as one or zero, never as a fraction, which in turn means that all partial or mixed affiliations to a category are ruled out. One can only be black or not black, Muslim or not Muslim, tribal or not tribal, never only partially or contextually so. Bound serialities, Anderson suggests, are constricting and perhaps inherently conflictual: they produce the tools of ethnic politics.

Anderson uses this distinction between bound and unbound serialities to make his argument about the residual goodness of nationalism and the unrelieved nastiness of ethnic politics. Clearly, he is keen to preserve what is genuinely ethical and noble in the universalist critical thought characteristic of the Enlightenment. Faced with the indubitable facts of historical conflict and change, the aspiration here is to affirm an ethical universal that does not deny the variability of human wants and values, or cast them aside as unworthy or ephemeral, but rather encompasses and integrates them as the real historical ground on which that ethical universal must be established. Much philosophical blood was spilt in the nineteenth century over the question of whether there was an idealist and a materialist version of this aspiration and, if so, which was the more

truthful. Few take those debates seriously any more. But as the sciences and technologies of governmentality spread their tentacles throughout the populated world in the twentieth century, the critical philosophical mind has been torn by the question of ethical universalism and cultural relativism. The growing strength of anticolonial nationalist politics in the middle decades of that century contributed greatly to the recognition of this problem, even though the very successes of nationalism may also have led to the chimerical hope that the cultural conflicts were merely the superficial signs of the production of a richer, more universal, modernity. Decolonization, however, was soon followed by the crisis of the third-world state, and the culture wars became identified with chauvinism, ethnic hatred and cynically manipulative and corrupt regimes. To all intents and purposes, nationalism became incurably contaminated by ethnic politics.

Ben Anderson is one in a dwindling group of thinkers who have refused to accept this diagnosis. He continues to believe that the politics of nationalism and that of ethnicity arise on different sites, grow on different nutriments, travel through different networks, mobilize on different sentiments, and fight for different causes. But unlike many in the Western academy, he has refused to soothe the liberal bad conscience with the balm of multiculturalism. He has also remained an outspoken critic of the hard-headed developmentalist of the 'realist' school whose recipes for third-world countries flow out of a cynical double standard that says 'ethics for us, economics for them'. Anderson closes *The Spectre of Comparisons* with an evocative listing of some of the ideals and affective moments of nationalism and remarks: 'There is something of value in all this – strange as it may seem ... Each in a different but related way shows why, no matter what crimes a nation's government commits and its passing citizenry endorses, My Country is ultimately Good. In these straitened millennial times, can such Goodness be profitably discarded?' (1998: 368) Idealist? I think the question is quite meaningless, especially since we know that Anderson, more than anyone else in recent years, has inspired the study of those material instruments of literary and cultural production that made possible the imagining of modern political communities in virtually every region of the world. Romantic? Perhaps, but then much that is good and noble in modern social thinking has been propelled by romantic impulses. Utopian? Yes. And there lies, I think, a major theoretical and political

problem, which is also the chief source of my disagreement with Anderson.

I believe Anderson, in the tradition of much progressive historicist thinking in the twentieth century, sees the politics of universalism as something that belongs to the very character of the time in which we now live. It is futile to participate in, or sympathize with, or even give credence to efforts to resist its sway. In his recent book, Dipesh Chakrabarty has drawn our attention to a remark made by E.P. Thompson, a Marxist historian who was justifiably celebrated for his anti-reductionist view of historical agency. In a famous essay on time and work-discipline in the era of industrial capitalism, Thompson spoke of the inevitability of workers everywhere having to shed their pre-capitalist work habits: 'Without time-discipline we could not have the insistent energies of industrial man; and whether this discipline comes in the form of Methodism, or of Stalinism, or of nationalism, it will come to the developing world' (cited in Chakrabarty 2000). Similarly, Ben Anderson speaks of 'the remarkable planetary spread, not merely of nationalism, but of a profoundly standardized conception of politics, in part by reflecting on the everyday practices, rooted in industrial material civilization, that have displaced the cosmos to make way for the world' (1998: 29). Such a conception of politics requires an understanding of the world as 'one', so that a common activity called politics can be seen to be going on 'everywhere'. Politics, in this sense, inhabits the empty homogeneous time of modernity.

I disagree. I believe this view of modernity, or indeed of capital, is mistaken because it is one-sided. It looks at only one dimension of the time-space of modern life. People can only imagine themselves in empty homogeneous time; they do not live in it. Empty homogeneous time is the utopian time of capital. It linearly connects past, present and future, creating the possibility for all of those historicist imaginings of identity, nationhood, progress, and so on, that Anderson along with others have made familiar to us. But empty homogeneous time is not located anywhere in real space – it is utopian. The real space of modern life consists of heterotopia – my debt to Michel Foucault should be obvious (1998: 175–85). Time here is heterogeneous, unevenly dense. Here, even industrial workers do not all internalize the work-discipline of capitalism, and more curiously, even when they do, they do not do so in the same way. Politics

here does not mean the same thing to all people. To ignore this is, I believe, to discard the real for the utopian.

Homi Bhabha, describing the location of the nation in temporality, pointed out a few years ago how the narrative of the nation tended to be split into a double time: in one, the people were an object of national pedagogy because they were always in the making, in a process of historical progress, not yet fully developed to fulfil the nation's destiny, but in the other, the unity of the people, their permanent identification with the nation, had to be continually signified, repeated and performed. Bhabha (1990) also showed how Anderson, in borrowing Walter Benjamin's notion of the homogeneous empty time of the nation's narrative, entirely failed to notice the profound ambivalence that becomes inescapable when one tries to tell the story of the fullness of the nation's life. I will attempt in this chapter to illustrate some of the instances of this ambivalence and argue that they are an inevitable aspect of modern politics itself; to disavow them is either wishful piety or an endorsement of the existing structure of dominance within the nation.

It is possible to cite many examples from the postcolonial world that suggest the presence of a dense and heterogeneous time. In those places, one could show industrial capitalists delaying the closing of a business deal because they hadn't yet had word from their respective astrologers, or industrial workers who would not touch a new machine until it had been consecrated with appropriate religious rites, or voters who would set fire to themselves to mourn the defeat of their favourite leader, or ministers who openly boast of having secured more jobs for people from their own clan and having kept the others out. To call this the co-presence of several times – the time of the modern and the times of the pre-modern – is only to endorse the utopianism of Western modernity. Much recent ethnographic work has established that these 'other' times are not mere survivals of a pre-modern past: they are new products of the encounter with modernity itself. One must therefore call it the heterogeneous time of modernity. And to push my polemical point a little further, I will add that the postcolonial world outside Western Europe and North America actually constitutes 'most' of the populated modern world.

Let me discuss in some detail an example of the continuing tension between the utopian dimension of the homogeneous time of

capital and the real space constituted by the heterogeneous time of governmentality and the effects produced by this tension on efforts to narrativize the nation.

II

B.R. Ambedkar (1891–1956) is famous as the foremost political leader in the twentieth century of India's downtrodden Dalit peoples – the former untouchable castes. In this role, he has been both celebrated and vilified for having strenuously fought for the separate political representation of the Dalits, for preferential reservation or affirmative action in their favour in education and government employment, and for constructing their distinct cultural identity going as far as conversion to another religion – Buddhism. At the same time, Ambedkar is also famous as the principal architect of the Indian constitution, a staunch advocate of the interventionist modernizing state and of the legal protection of the modern virtues of equal citizenship and secularism. Seldom has the tension between utopian homogeneity and real heterogeneity been played out more dramatically than in the intellectual and political career of B.R. Ambedkar.

I do not propose to give here a full intellectual biography of Ambedkar, which is a task I am not competent to carry out but on which, I believe, the definitive work still remains to be done. What I will do instead is focus on certain moments in that biography to highlight the contradictions posed for a modern politics by the rival demands of universal citizenship on the one hand and the protection of particularist rights on the other. My task will be to show that there is no available historical narrative of the nation that can resolve those contradictions.

Ambedkar was an unalloyed modernist. He believed in science, history, rationality, secularism and above all in the modern state as the site for the actualization of human reason. But as an intellectual of the Dalit peoples he could not but confront the question: what is the reason for the unique form of social inequality practised within the so-called caste system of India? Being a modernist, he rejected all answers that relied on a faith in mythical religion or the sanctity of the scriptures. He wanted an answer that would stand the tests of science. One such answer commonly given in the early twentieth century was sociological: the caste system, it was said, was the particular

form taken in India of the universal principle of the division of labour. Ambedkar submitted this answer to the scrutiny of reason and concluded that, as a system of division of labour, the caste system was utterly irrational, inefficient and a hindrance to the advancement of social production and general prosperity. If a rational principle of division of labour was desired, the caste system should be the first to go (Ambedkar 1936: 47–9).

Another answer that was both respectable and fashionable in the early twentieth century was based on the identification, by the examination of physical features, linguistic affinities and kinship patterns, of racial types. Ambedkar took this evidence seriously, evaluated it at great length in his books *Who Were the Shudras?* (1946) and *The Untouchables* (1948), and came to the unambiguous conclusion that whatever differences there might be of racial types in India, they were distributed regionally and not by caste. That is to say, the upper and lower castes in the social hierarchy of any region of India belonged to the same racial type. As he once put it in a lecture that was never delivered because the upper-caste organizers, on reading an advance copy, chose to cancel the conference rather than have Ambedkar preside over it:

To hold that distinctions of Castes are really distinctions of race and to treat different Castes as though they were so many different races is a gross perversion of facts...The Brahmin of the Punjab is racially of the same stock as the Chamar of the Punjab and the Brahmin of Madras is of the same race as the Pariah of Madras. Caste System does not demarcate racial division...Caste System is a social division of people of the same race. (Ambedkar 1936: 50)

Interestingly, Ambedkar was not questioning the scientific claims of anthropometry or even of eugenics which still enjoyed considerable intellectual prestige. His claim was that biological knowledge proved that caste distinctions were not based on racial distinctions:

An immense lot of non-sense is talked about heredity and eugenics in defence of the Caste System. Few would object to the Caste System if it was in accord with the basic principle of eugenics because few can object to the improvement of the race by

judicious mating. But one fails to understand how the Caste System secures judicious mating. (*Ibid.*)

He then goes on to show that since the rule of endogamy operates on sub-castes, each sub-caste, of which there were more than a hundred in any regional caste system, would have to be regarded as a pure racial group, which was absurd. It would also leave unexplained why eugenics should prohibit not only marriage with other castes but also dining with other castes (*ibid.*: 50–1). In other words, Ambedkar's argument was that the science of race, using the rational methods of science, could not provide a rational explanation for the caste system. The claim is important because, as Gail Omvedt has pointed out, Ambedkar was here explicitly moving away from racial ideas, such as the division between Aryan and Dravidian peoples, that had become dominant in the Non-Brahmin movements in much of western and southern India (1994: 244–7). Ambedkar was rejecting a narrative that was based on an original racial split between dominant and oppressed castes.

Ambedkar proposed instead a historical narrative of the origins of untouchability. The Shudras, the lowest in the four-fold hierarchy among the Indo-Aryan people, were, he argued, originally part of the warrior caste. There was a long feud between the Shudra kings and the Brahmins in which the latter 'were subjected to many tyrannies and indignities'. Later, when the Brahmins became politically dominant, they satisfied their hatred by imposing ritual degradations on the Shudras and relegating them to the same status as the non-Aryan peoples. Thus, the hierarchical division of caste was produced not by natural or racial or economic reasons but through a political history of conflict (this is the argument in Ambedkar 1946).

But this still does not explain the origin of the untouchables groups who are altogether outside the caste hierarchy. To explain this, Ambedkar considers the historical stage of the transition from nomadic-pastoral society to that of settled cultivation. When different groups among the Indo-Aryan peoples began to form settled villages, they were faced with the problem of defending their settlements against the marauding nomads. They turned to the 'broken men' – those scattered groups of nomadic tribesmen who had been defeated in battle and separated from their original communities. The arrangement was mutually convenient: the

villagers needed people to protect them, the broken men needed a means of livelihood. The latter were invited to live outside the village boundaries and guard the village; in return, they were assured of sustenance. But, of course, they lived their own lives in their own ways, outside the social and moral order of the settled village communities. They were separate, but not in any way degraded. That happened much later, when the Brahmins, in their historic struggle against Buddhism, resolved to adopt vegetarianism, and especially the avoidance of beef-eating, as the most potent and morally superior sign of purity. Ambedkar marshalled all sorts of evidence to claim that this could not have happened before the fourth century A.D. The broken men, however, were too poor to forsake the consumption of dead cows, not only for the meat but also for the numerous other uses of the skins and bones in which knowledge, as former pastoralists, they were highly proficient. To this day, argued Ambedkar, they lived outside the village, ate beef, dealt in hides and leather, made things out of cowskins, but of course were treated as untouchables by caste Hindus. But untouchability did not go back to times immemorial; it had a definite history that could be scientifically established to be no longer than about 1500 years (Ambedkar 1948).

It is not necessary for us here to judge the plausibility of Ambedkar's theory of the origin of untouchability, except to say that at least as far as the rise of vegetarianism as a sign of Brahminical purity is concerned, the French sociologist Louis Dumont, a leading modern theorist of the caste system and no subscriber to the Ambedkarist ideology, has connected it explicitly to the reaction to Buddhism (1970: 194). What is more interesting for our purposes is the narrative structure suggested by Ambedkar's historical theory of caste. There was, in the beginning, a state of equality between the Brahmins, the Shudras and the untouchables. The Shudras belonged to the warrior caste and the untouchables were nomadic tribesmen. This equality, moreover, was not in some mythological state of nature but at a definite historical moment in which all Indo-Aryan tribes were nomadic pastoralists. Then came the stage of settled agriculture and the reaction, in the form of Buddhism, to the sacrificial religion of the Vedic tribes. This was followed by the conflict between the Brahmins and the Buddhists, leading to the political defeat of Buddhism, the degradation of the Shudras and the relegation of the beef-eating 'broken men' into untouchability.

The modern struggle for the abolition of caste was thus a quest for a return to that primary equality that was the original historical condition of the nation. The utopian search for homogeneity is thus made historical. It is, as we know, a familiar historicist narrative of modern nationalism.

To show how this narrative is disrupted by the heterogeneous time of colonial governmentality, let me turn to the fiction of nationalism.

III

One of the greatest modernist novels about Indian nationalism is *Dhorai charit manas* (vol. 1, 1949; vol. 2, 1951) by the Bengali writer Satinath Bhaduri (1906–65) (Ghosh and Acharya 1973). The novel is deliberately constructed to fit the form of the *Ramcharitmanas*, the retelling in Hindi by the sixteenth-century saint-poet Tulsidas (1532–1623) of the epic story of Rama, the mythical king who, through his exemplary life and conduct, is supposed to have created the most perfect kingdom on earth. Tulsidas's Ramayana is perhaps the most widely known literary work in the vast Hindi-speaking regions of India, providing an everyday language of moral discourse that cuts across caste, class and sectarian divides. It is also said to have been the most powerful vehicle for the generalization of Brahminical cultural values in northern India. The distinctness of Satinath Bhaduri's modernist retelling of the epic is that its hero, Dhorai, is from one of the backward castes.

Dhorai is a Tatma from northern Bihar (the district is Purnea, but Satinath gives it the fictional name Jirania). It is not an agriculturist group, specializing instead in the thatching of roofs and the digging of wells. When Dhorai is a child, his father dies, and when his mother wants to remarry, she leaves him in the charge of Bauka Bawa, the village holy man. Dhorai grows up going from door to door, accompanying the sadhu with his begging bowl, singing songs, mostly about the legendary king Rama and his perfect kingdom. The mental world of Dhorai is steeped in mythic time. He never goes to school but knows that those who can read the Ramayana are men of great merit and social authority. His elders – those around him – know of the government, of course, and know of the courts and the police, and some in the neighbourhood who worked in the gardens and kitchens of the officials could even tell you when the district

magistrate was displeased with the chairman of the district board, or when the new kitchenmaid was spending a little too much time in the evenings in the police officer's bungalow. But their general strategy of survival, perfected over generations of experience, is to stay away from entanglements with government and its procedures. Once, following a feud, the residents of the neighbouring hamlet of Dhangars set fire to Bauka Bawa's hut. The police investigate and Dhorai, the sole eyewitness, is asked to describe what he has seen. As he is about to speak, he notices Bauka Bawa's eyes. 'Don't talk', the Bawa seems to say. 'This is the police, they'll go away in an hour. The Dhangars are our neighbours, we'll have to live with them.' Dhorai understands and tells the police that he had seen nothing and did not know who had set fire to their house.

One day, Dhorai, along with others in the village, hear of Gandhi Bawa who, it was said, was a bigger holy man than their own Bauka Bawa or indeed any Bawa they had known, because he was almost as big as Lord Rama himself. Gandhi Bawa, they heard, ate neither meat nor fish, had never married and roamed around completely naked. Even the Bengali schoolmaster, the most learned man in the area, had become Gandhi Bawa's follower. Soon there is excitement in the village when it is found that an image of Gandhi Bawa appears on a pumpkin. With great festivity, the miraculous pumpkin is installed in the village temple and offerings are made to the greatest holy man in the country. Gandhi Bawa, the Tatmas agreed, was a great soul indeed because even the Muslims promised to stop eating meat and onions, and the village shaman, whom no one had ever seen sober, vowed henceforth to drink only the lightest toddy and to stay away completely from hemp and opium. Some time later, a few villagers went all the way to the district town to see Gandhi Bawa himself, and came back with their enthusiasm somewhat deflated. The huge crowds had prevented them from seeing the great man from close up but what they had seen was incongruous. Gandhi Bawa, they reported, like the fancy lawyers and teachers in town, wore spectacles! Who had ever seen a holy man wear spectacles? One or two even whispered if the man might not, after all, be a fake.

Satinath Bhaduri's intricately crafted account of Dhorai's upbringing among the Tatmas in the early decades of the twentieth century could be easily read as a faithful ethnography of colonial governance and the nationalist movement in northern India. We know, for

instance, from Shahid Amin's studies how the stature and authority of Mahatma Gandhi was constructed among India's peasantry through stories of his miraculous powers and rumours about the fate of his followers and detractors, or how the Congress programme and the objectives of the movement were themselves transmitted in the countryside in the language of myth and popular religion (Amin 1984, 1995). If Gandhi and the movements he led in the 1920s and 1930s were a set of common events that connected the lives of millions of people in both the cities and the villages of India, they did not constitute a common experience. Rather, even as they participated in what historians describe as the same great events, their own understandings of those events were narrated in very different languages and inhabited very different life-worlds. The nation, even if it was being constituted through such events, existed only in heterogeneous time.

Of course, it might be objected that the nation is indeed an abstraction, that it is, to use the phrase that Ben Anderson has made famous, only 'an imagined community' and that, therefore, this ideal and empty construct, floating as it were in homogeneous time, can be given a varied content by diverse groups of people, all of whom, remaining different in their concrete locations, can nevertheless become elements in the unbound seriality of national citizens. Without doubt, this is the dream of all nationalists. Satinath Bhaduri, who was himself a leading functionary in the Congress organization in Purnea district, shared the dream. He was acutely aware of the narrowness and particularism of the everyday lives of his characters. They were yet to become national citizens. But he was hopeful of change. He saw that even the lowly Tatmas and Dhangars were stirring. His hero Dhorai leads the Tatmas into defying the local Brahmins and wearing the sacred thread themselves – in a process, occurring all over India at this time, that the sociologist M.N. Srinivas (1966) describes as Sanskritization, but which the historian David Hardiman (1987) has shown to be marked by a bitterly contested and often violent struggle over elite domination and subaltern resistance. The intricate caste and communal grid of governmental classifications is never absent from Satinath's narrative. But in a deliberate allusion to the life-story of the legendary Prince Rama, Satinath throws his hero Dhorai into a cruel conspiracy hatched against him by his kinsmen. He suspects his wife of having a liaison with a

Christian man from the Dhangar hamlet. He leaves the village, goes into exile and resumes his life in another village, among other communities. Dhorai is uprooted from the narrowness of his home and thrown into the world. The new metalled roadway, along which motorcars and trucks now whizz past ponderous bullock-carts, opens up his imagination:

Where does this road begin? Where does it end? [Dhorai] doesn't know. Perhaps no one knows. Some of the carts are loaded with maize, others bring plaintiffs to the district court, still others carry patients to the hospital. In his mind, Dhorai sees shadows that suggest to him something of the vastness of the country. (Bhaduri 1973: 70)

The nation is coming into shape. Satinath sends his hero off on an epic journey towards the promised goal – not of kingdom, because this is no longer the mythical age of Rama, but of citizenship.

IV

Ambedkar's dream of equal citizenship also had to contend with the fact of governmental classifications. As early as 1920, he had posed the problem of representation faced by untouchables in India: 'The right of representation and the right to hold office under the state are the two most important rights that make up citizenship. But the untouchability of the untouchables puts these rights far beyond their reach... they [the untouchables] can be represented by the untouchables alone'. The general representation of all citizens would not serve the special requirements of the untouchables, because given the prejudices and entrenched practices among the dominant castes, there was no reason to expect that the latter would use the law to emancipate the untouchables: '...a legislature composed of high caste men will not pass a law removing untouchability, sanctioning intermarriages, removing the ban on the use of public streets, public temples, public schools... This is not because they cannot, but chiefly because they will not' (cited in Omwedd 1994: 146).

But there were several ways in which the special needs of representation of the untouchables could be secured, and many of these had been tried out in colonial India. One was the protection by

colonial officials of the interests of the lower castes against the politically dominant upper castes or the nomination by the colonial government of distinguished men from the untouchable groups to serve as their representatives. Another way was to reserve a certain number of seats in the legislature only for candidates from the lower castes. Yet another was to have separate electorates of lower-caste voters who could elect their own representatives. In the immensely complicated world of late-colonial constitutional politics in India, all of these methods, with innumerable variations, were debated and tried out. Besides, caste was not the only contentious issue of ethnic representation; the even more divisive issue of religious minorities became inextricably tied up with the politics of citizenship in late colonial India.

Ambedkar clearly ruled out one of these methods of special representation – protection by the colonial regime. In 1930, when the Congress declared independence or Swaraj as its political goal, Ambedkar declared at a conference of the depressed classes:

...the bureaucratic form of Government in India should be replaced by a Government which will be a Government of the people, by the people and for the people... We feel that nobody can remove our grievances as well as we can, and we cannot remove them unless we get political power in our own hands. No share of this political power can evidently come to us so long as the British government remains as it is. It is only in a Swaraj constitution that we stand any chance of getting the political power in our own hands, without which we cannot bring salvation to our people ... We know that political power is passing from the British into the hands of those who wield such tremendous economic, social and religious sway over our existence. We are willing that it may happen, though the idea of Swaraj recalls to the mind of many the tyrannies, oppressions and injustices practiced upon us in the past (Cited in Omwedd 1994: 168–9)

The dilemma is clearly posed here. The colonial government, for all its homilies about the need to uplift those oppressed by the religious tyranny of traditional Hinduism, could only look after the untouchables as its subjects. It could never give them citizenship. Only under an independent national constitution was citizenship conceivable

for the untouchables. Yet, if independence meant the rule of the upper castes, how could the untouchables expect equal citizenship and the end of the social tyranny from which they had suffered for centuries? Ambedkar's position was clear: the untouchables must support national independence, in the full knowledge that it would lead to the political dominance of the upper castes, but they must press on with the struggle for equality within the framework of the new constitution.

In 1932, the method of achieving equal citizenship for the untouchables became the issue in a dramatic stand-off between Ambedkar and Gandhi. In the course of negotiations between the British government and Indian political leaders on constitutional reforms, Ambedkar, representing the so-called depressed classes, had argued that they must be allowed to constitute a separate electorate and elect their own representatives to the central and provincial legislatures. The Congress, which had by this time conceded a similar demand for separate electorates for the Muslims, refused to accept that the untouchables were a community separate from the Hindus and was prepared instead to have reserved seats for them to be elected by the general electorate. Ambedkar clarified that he would be prepared to accept this formula if there was any hope that the British would grant universal adult suffrage to all Indians. But since the suffrage was severely limited by property and education qualifications, the depressed castes, dispersed as a thin minority within the general population and, unlike the Muslim minority, lacking any significant territorial concentrations, were unlikely to have any influence at all over the elections. The only way to ensure that the legislature contained at least some who were the true representatives of the untouchables was to allow them to be elected by a separate electorate of the depressed classes.

Gandhi reacted fiercely to Ambedkar's suggestion that upper-caste Congress leaders could never properly represent the untouchables, calling it 'the unkindest cut of all'. Indulging in a rather un-mahatma-like boasting, he declared:

I claim myself in my own person to represent the vast mass of the Untouchables. Here I speak not merely on behalf of the Congress, but I speak on my own behalf, and I claim that I would get, if there was a referendum of the Untouchables, their vote, and that I would top the poll.

He insisted that unlike the question of the religious minorities, the issue of untouchability was a matter internal to Hinduism and had to be resolved within it.

I do not mind Untouchables, if they so desire, being converted to Islam or Christianity. I should tolerate that, but I cannot possibly tolerate what is in store for Hinduism if there are two divisions set forth in the villages. Those who speak of the political rights of Untouchables do not know their India, do not know how Indian society is today constructed, and therefore I want to say with all the emphasis that I can command that if I was the only person to resist this thing I would resist it with my life.

True to his word, Gandhi threatened to go on a fast rather than concede the demand for separate electorates for the depressed classes. Put under enormous pressure, Ambedkar conceded and, after negotiations, signed with Gandhi what is known as the Poona Pact by which the Dalits were given a substantial number of reserved seats but within the Hindu electorate (for accounts of the Poona Pact and the relevant citations, see Kumar 1987; Omwedt 1994: 161–89). As it happened, this remained the basic form for the representation of the former untouchable castes in the constitution of independent India, but of course, by this time the country had been divided into two sovereign nation-states.

The problem of national homogeneity and minority citizenship was posed and temporarily resolved in India in the early 1930s; but the form of the resolution is instructive. It graphically illustrates that ambivalence of the nation as a narrative strategy as well as an apparatus of power which, as Homi Bhabha (1990) has pointed out, 'produces a continual slippage into analogous, even metonymic, categories, like the people, minorities, or "cultural difference" that continually overlap in the act of writing the nation'. Ambedkar, as we have seen, had no quarrel with the idea of the homogeneous nation as a pedagogical category – the nation as progress, the nation in the process of becoming – except that he would have insisted with Gandhi and the other Congress leaders that it was not just the ignorant masses that needed training in proper citizenship but the upper-caste elites as well who had still not accepted that democratic equality was incompatible with caste inequality. But Ambedkar

refused to join Gandhi in performing that homogeneity in constitutional negotiations over citizenship. The untouchables, he insisted, were a minority within the nation and needed special representation in the political body. On the other hand, Gandhi and the Congress, while asserting that the nation was one and indivisible, had already conceded that the Muslims were a minority within the nation. The untouchables? They represented a problem internal to Hinduism. Imperceptibly, the homogeneity of India slides into the homogeneity of the Hindus. The removal of untouchability remains a pedagogical task, to be accomplished by social reform, if necessary by law, but caste inequality among the Hindus is not to be performed before the British rulers or the Muslim minority. Homogeneity breaks down on one plane only to be reasserted on another. Heterogeneity, unstopplable at one point, is forcibly suppressed at another.

In the meantime, our fictional hero Dhorai continues, in the 1930s, to receive his education in nationalism. Loosed from his moorings, he drifts to another village and starts life afresh among the Koeri, a backward caste of sharecroppers and labourers. Dhorai begins to learn the realities of peasant life – of Rajput landlords and Koeri adhiars and Santal labourers, of growing paddy and jute and tobacco and maize, of moneylenders and traders. In January 1934, Bihar is ripped apart by the most violent earthquake in its recorded history. Government officers come to survey the damage; so do the nationalist volunteers from the Congress. For more than a year, the Koeris hear vaguely that they are going to be given ‘relief’. And then they are told that the survey had found that the Koeri huts, being made of mud walls and thatched roofs, had been easily repaired by the Koeris themselves, but the brick houses of the Rajput landlords had suffered severe damage. The report had recommended, therefore, that the bulk of the relief should be given to the Rajputs.

Thus begins a new chapter in Dhorai’s education – his discovery that the Bengali lawyers and Rajput landlords were fast becoming the principal followers of the Mahatma. But even as the old exploiters become the new messengers of Swaraj, the mystique of the Mahatma remains untarnished. One day, a volunteer arrives in the village with letters from the Mahatma. He tells the Koeris that they in turn must send a letter each to the Mahatma. No, no, they don’t have to pay for the postage stamp. All they have to do is walk up to the officer who would give them a letter which they must put in Mahatmaji’s

postbox – the white one, remember, not the coloured ones. This was called the ‘vote’. The volunteer instructs Dhorai: ‘Your name is Dhorai Koeri, your father is Kirtu Koeri. Remember to say that to the officer. Your father is Kirtu Koeri.’ Dhorai does as he is told.

Inside the voting booth, Dhorai stood with folded hands in front of the white box and dropped the letter into it. Praise to Mahatmaji, praise to the Congress volunteer, they had given Dhorai the little role of the squirrel in the great task of building the kingdom of Rama. But his heart broke with sorrow – if only he could write, he would have written the letter himself to the Mahatma. Just imagine, all these people writing letters to the Mahatma, from one end of the country to the other, all together, at the same time. Tatmatuli, Jirania, ... Dhorai, ... the volunteer, ... they all wanted the same thing. They had all sent the same letter to the Mahatma. The government, the officers, the police, the landlords, ... all were against them. They belonged to many different castes, and yet they had come so close ... They were linked as though by a spider’s web; the fibre was so thin that if you tried to grab it, it would break. Indeed, you couldn’t always tell if it was there or not. When it swayed gently in the breeze, or the morning dewdrops clung to it, or when a sudden ray of the sun fell on it, you saw it, and even then only for a moment. This was the land of Ramji over which his avatar Mahatmaji was weaving his thin web ... ‘Hey, what are you doing inside the booth?’ The officer’s voice broke his reverie. Dhorai came out quickly. (Bhaduri 1973: 222–3)

The vote is the great anonymous performance of citizenship, which is why it probably did not matter too much that Dhorai’s introduction to this ritual was through an act of impersonation. But it only concealed the question of who represents whom within the nation. Although the Koeris voted faithfully for the Mahatma, they were dismayed to find that the Rajput landlord with whom they had fought for years was elected chairman of the district board with support from the Congress. Mahatmaji’s men, they heard, were now ministers in the government, but when a new road was built, sure enough, it went right past the Rajput houses.

But Dhorai bought himself a copy of the Ramayana. One day, he promised himself, he would learn to read it. The passage to the kingdom of Rama, however, was suddenly disrupted when news arrived that the Mahatma had been arrested by the British. This was the final struggle, the Mahatma had announced. Every true follower of Mahatmaji must now join his army. Yes, the army; they must act against the tyrants, not wait to be arrested. Dhorai is mobilized into the Quit India movement of 1942. This was a war unlike any other; it was, the volunteers said, a revolution. Together, they stormed the police station, setting fire to it. By the morning, the district magistrate, the police superintendent, and all senior officers had fled. Victory to Mahatmaji, victory to the revolution! The district had won Swaraj, they were free.

It didn't last long. Weeks later, the troops moved in, with trucks and guns. Along with the volunteers, Dhorai left for the forests. He was now a wanted man, a rebel. But they were all wanted men – they were Mahatmaji's soldiers. There was a strange equality among them in the forest. They had dropped their original names and called each other Gandhi, Jawahar, Patel, Azad – they were so many anonymous replicas of the representatives of the nation. Except they had been driven away from its everyday life. Sometime later, the word came that the British had won the war with the Germans and the Japanese, the Congress leaders were about to be released and all revolutionaries must surrender. Surrender? And be tried and jailed? Who knows, may be even hanged? Dhorai's unit resolves not to surrender.

V

On the national stage, the Muslim League resolved in March 1940 that any constitutional plan for devolution of power in India must include an arrangement by which geographically contiguous areas with Muslim majorities could be grouped into independent states, autonomous and sovereign. This became known as the Pakistan resolution. The Congress opposed the plan. A few months later, in December 1940, Ambedkar wrote a long book entitled *Pakistan or Partition of India* (1945) in which he discussed in detail the pros and cons of the proposal. It is a book that is, surprisingly, seldom mentioned, even today when there is such a great Ambedkar revival

(except by such exemplars of politically sanctioned ignorance and prejudice as Shourie 1997). Apart from the fact that it shows his superb skills as a political analyst and a truly astonishing prescience, I think it is a text in which Ambedkar grappled most productively with the two-fold demand on his politics – one, to further the struggle for universal and equal citizenship within the nation, and two, to secure special representation for the depressed castes in the body politic.

The book is almost Socratic in its dialogical structure, presenting first, in the strongest possible terms, the Muslim case for Pakistan, and then the Hindu case against Pakistan, and then considering the alternatives available to the Muslims and the Hindus if there were no partition. What is striking is the way in which Ambedkar, as the unstated representative of the untouchables, adopts a position of perfect neutrality in the debate, with no stake at all in how the matter is resolved – he belongs neither to the Muslim nor to the Hindu side. All he is concerned with is to judge the rival arguments and recommend what seems to him the most realistic solution. But, of course, this is only a narrative strategy. We know that Ambedkar did have a great stake in the question: the most important issue for him was whether or not partition would be better for the untouchables of India. The significance of *Pakistan or Partition of India* is that Ambedkar is judging here the utopian claims of nationhood in the concrete terms of realist politics.

After dissecting the arguments of both sides, Ambedkar comes to the conclusion that, on balance, partition would be better for both Muslims and Hindus. The clinching arguments come when he considers the alternative to partition: how was a united and independent India, free from British rule, likely to be governed? Given the hostility of Muslims to the idea of a single central government, inevitably dominated by the Hindu majority, it was certain that if there were no partition, India would have to live with a weak central government, with most powers devolved to the provinces. It would be 'an anaemic and sickly state'. The animosities and mutual suspicions would remain: 'burying Pakistan is not the same thing as burying the ghost of Pakistan' (Ambedkar 1945: vii). Moreover, there was the question of the armed forces of independent India. In a long chapter, Ambedkar goes straight to the heart of colonial governance and discusses the communal composition of the British Indian army, a subject on which there was a virtual conspiracy of silence. He points out that almost

60 per cent of the Indian army consisted of men from the Punjab, the North-West Frontier and Kashmir, and of them more than half were Muslims. Would a weak central government, regarded with suspicion by the Muslim population, command the loyalty of these troops? On the other hand, should the new government attempt to change the communal composition of the army, would that be accepted without protest by the Muslims of the north-west? (*ibid.*: 55–87).

Judged positively, the new state of Pakistan would be a homogeneous state. The boundaries of Punjab and Bengal could be redrawn to form relatively homogeneous Muslim and Hindu regions to be integrated with Pakistan and India, respectively. Long before anyone had demanded the partition of the two provinces, Ambedkar foresaw that the Hindus and Sikhs would not agree to live in a country specifically created for Muslims and would want to join India. For the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, where the Hindu population was thinly distributed, the only realistic solution was an officially supervised transfer of population, as had happened in Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. The India or Hindustan that would be created would be composite, not homogeneous. But the minority question could then be handled more reasonably. 'To me, it seems that if Pakistan does not solve the communal problem within Hindustan, it substantially reduces its proportion and makes it of minor significance and much easier of peaceful solution' (*ibid.*: 105).

And then, in a string of brilliant moves of realpolitik logic, Ambedkar shows that only in united India, in which more than a third of the population is Muslim, could Hindu dominance be a serious threat. In such a state, the Muslims, fearing the tyranny of the majority, would organize themselves into a Muslim party such as the Muslim League, provoking in turn the rise of Hindu parties calling for Hindu Raj. Following partition, the Muslims in Hindustan would be a small and widely scattered minority. They would inevitably join this or that political party, pursuing different social and economic programmes. Similarly, there would be little ground left for a party like the Hindu Mahasabha which would wither away. And as for the lower orders of Hindu society, they would make common cause with the Muslim minority to fight the Hindu high castes for their rights of citizenship and social dignity (*ibid.*: 352–8).

Once again, we need not spend time here trying to assess the intrinsic merits of Ambedkar's arguments for and against the

partition of India, although in the discursive context of the early 1940s they are remarkably perspicacious. What I have tried to emphasize is the ground on which he lays his arguments. He is fully aware of the value of universal and equal citizenship and wholly endorses the ethical significance of unbound serialities. On the other hand, he realizes that the slogan of universality is often a mask to cover the perpetuation of real inequalities. The politics of democratic nationhood offers a means for achieving a more substantive equality, but only by ensuring adequate representation for the underprivileged groups within the body politic. A strategic politics of groups, classes, communities, ethnicities – bound serialities of all sorts – is thus inevitable. Homogeneity is not thereby forsaken; on the contrary, in specific contexts, it can often supply the clue to a strategic solution, such as partition, to a problem of intractable heterogeneity. On the other hand, unlike the utopian claims of universalist nationalism, the politics of heterogeneity can never claim to yield a general formula for all peoples at all times: its solutions are always strategic, contextual, historically specific and, inevitably, provisional.

Let me then finally return to Anderson's distinction between nationalism and the politics of ethnicity. He agrees that the 'bound serialities' of governmentality can create a sense of community, which is precisely what the politics of ethnic identity feeds on. But this sense of community, Anderson thinks, is illusory. In these real and imagined censuses, 'thanks to capitalism, state machineries and mathematics, integral bodies become identical, and thus serially aggregable as phantom communities' (Anderson 1998: 44). By contrast, the 'unbound serialities' of nationalism do not, one presumes, need to turn the free individual members of the national community into integers. It can imagine the nation as having existed in identical form from the dawn of historical time to the present without requiring a census-like verification of its identity. It can also experience the simultaneity of the imagined collective life of the nation without imposing rigid and arbitrary criteria of membership. Can such 'unbound serialities' exist anywhere except in utopian space?

To endorse these 'unbound serialities' while rejecting the 'bound' ones is, in fact, to imagine nationalism without modern governmentality. What modern politics can we have that has no truck with capitalism, state machineries or mathematics? The historical

moment Anderson seems keen to preserve is the mythical moment when classical nationalism merges with modernity. I believe it is no longer productive to reassert the utopian politics of classical nationalism. Or rather, I do not believe it is an option that is available for a theorist from the postcolonial world. Such a theorist must chart a course that steers away from global cosmopolitanism on the one hand and ethnic chauvinism on the other. It means necessarily to dirty one's hands in the complicated business of the politics of governmentality. The asymmetries produced and legitimized by the universalisms of modern nationalism have not left room for any ethically neat choice here. For the postcolonial theorist, like the postcolonial novelist, is born only when the mythical time-space of epic modernity has been lost for ever. Let me end by describing the fate of our fictional hero Dhorai.

Living in the forests with his band of fugitive rebels, Dhorai is brought face to face with the limits to his dreams of equality and freedom. It is not the bound serialities of caste and community that prove illusory, but rather the promise of equal citizenship. The harshness of fugitive life scrapes the veneer off the shell of comradeship and the old hierarchies reappear. Suspicion, intrigue, revenge and recrimination become the ruling sentiments. Dhorai's copy of the Ramayana lies tied up in its bundle, unopened, unread. In the middle of all this, a young boy joins the band. He is a Christian Dhangar, he says, from the hamlet next to Tatmatuli. Dhorai feels a strange bond with the boy. Might he be, he imagines, the son he has never seen? Dhorai looks after the boy and asks him many questions. The more he talks to him, the more he is convinced that this indeed is his son. The boy falls ill, and Dhorai decides to take him to his mother. As he approaches Tatmatuli, he can hardly control his excitement. Was this going to be the epic denouement of the latter-day untouchable Rama? Was he going to be united with his banished wife and son? The mother appears, takes her son in, comes out again and invites the kind stranger to sit down. She talks about her son, about her dead husband. Dhorai listens to her. She is someone else, not his wife. The boy is someone else, not his son. Dhorai makes polite conversation for a few minutes and then goes, we don't know where. But he leaves behind his bundle, along with the copy of the Ramayana for which he has no further need. Dhorai has lost for ever his promised place in prophetic time.

Or has he? Following independence, B.R. Ambedkar became chairman of the drafting committee of the Indian constitution and later the minister of law. In these capacities, he was instrumental in putting together one of the most progressive democratic constitutions in the world, guaranteeing the fundamental rights of freedom and equality irrespective of religion or caste and at the same providing for special representation in the legislatures for the formerly untouchable castes (for the story of the legal provision of opportunities for the depressed castes in independent India, see Galanter 1984). But changing the law was one thing; changing social practices was another matter. Frustrated by the ineffectiveness of the state in putting an end to caste discrimination in Hindu society, Ambedkar decided in 1956 to convert to Buddhism. It was an act of separatism, to be sure, but at the same time, it was also, as Ambedkar pointed out, affiliating with a religion that was far more universalist than Hinduism in its endorsement of social equality (for a recent discussion on Ambedkar's conversion, see Viswanathan 1998: 211–39). Ambedkar died only a few weeks after his conversion, only to be reborn some twenty years later as the prophet of Dalit liberation. That is his status today – a source of both realist wisdom and emancipatory dreams for India's oppressed castes.

At a recent meeting in an Indian research institute, after a distinguished panel of academics and policymakers had bemoaned the decline of universalist ideals and moral values in national life, a Dalit activist from the audience asked why it was the case that liberal and leftist intellectuals were so pessimistic about where history was moving at the turn of the millennium. As far as he could see, the latter half of the twentieth century had been the brightest period in the entire history of the Dalits, since they had got rid of the worst forms of untouchability, mobilized themselves politically as a community, and were now making strategic alliances with other oppressed groups in order to get a share of governmental power. All this could happen because the conditions of mass democracy had thrown open the bastions of caste privilege to attack from the representatives of oppressed groups organized into electoral majorities. The panelists were silenced by this impassioned intervention. I came away persuaded once more that it is morally illegitimate to uphold the universalist ideals of nationalism without simultaneously demanding that the politics spawned by governmentality be recognized as an

equally legitimate part of the real time-space of the modern political life of the nation. Without it, governmental technologies will continue to proliferate and serve, much as they did in the colonial era, as manipulable instruments of class rule in a global capitalist order. By seeking to find real ethical spaces for their operation in heterogeneous time, the incipient resistances to that order may succeed in inventing new terms of political justice.

Note

- 1 This paper was written in 2001 when I was Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin. I have discussed it at meetings in London, Istanbul and Calcutta. I am grateful to all those who commented on earlier drafts.

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4

Universality and Rights: the Challenges to Nationalism

Fred Halliday

Introduction

It is conventional in much current discussion to approach the question of human rights and nationalism by questioning the assumptions underlying human rights.¹ In this chapter I would like to do the opposite, to interrogate nationalism in the light of the assumptions of universality and reason that underpin the modern conception of rights, individual and group. In essence what I want to suggest is that it is time, after two centuries of nationalism, and of the prospect of many more decades when this ideology will hold sway, to conduct an assessment of the record of nationalism, in effect an audit, in the light of general rights criteria. Such a broad form of audit has been conducted with regard to other forms of collective human endeavour – war on the one hand, democracy on the other. Nationalism recognizes no higher authority than the nation and the claims of those who are said to speak for the nation. But that is nationalism's problem, not ours. Our challenge is to place on record, in a necessarily imperfect but unyielding way, what the record of nationalism has been with regard to rights and to identify where elements of complementarity, and also of contradiction, may lie. Nationalism need not, and should not, be exempt from such an assessment. Hence the title of my paper, the 'challenges to nationalism' rather than the modish challenges of nationalism, with regard to human rights.

Sovereignty and culture

This argument involves a choice as to the starting point of such an assessment. In much of contemporary discussion there is, rightly, examination of the ways in which a claim to universal rights conflicts with forms of particularism. Within international relations this revolves around the question of sovereignty, the right of states to order their internal affairs as they see fit provided they do not threaten others or, in the language of the UN, 'threaten international peace and security'. Much discussion in the 1990s revolved around this question, the argument for universality moving between, or encompassing, two broad claims: one that some forms of violation of rights within a state are of such enormity that the state forfeits its claim to exclusive control, that it (in the honoured phrase) 'shocks the conscience of mankind'; the other argument has been that it is no longer possible, or decreasingly so, to talk of domestic processes that are without international repercussions – much of the argument for recent interventions has claimed this, for example, that Kosovo produces refugees, that Afghanistan generates terrorists and drugs. This argument allows for no easy resolution and it may be that the outer limits of sovereignty have been reached. Others would claim that it was only alive as a universal principle for a brief period between the end of colonialism, which was a massive, internationally sanctioned violation of sovereignty, and the 1990s, in other words as a function of the Cold War. Yalta, not Westphalia, was the founding moment of sovereignty.

The other issue, debated within international relations, and in political theory, anthropology and sociology is that of what is termed culture, that different peoples have different practices, that others, the hypostatized 'we', should respect this and this is a necessary qualification, and in legal terms reservation, as far as human rights codes and enforcement are concerned. At its mildest, this involves a respect of cultural difference, provided it does not involve gross sovereignty-challenging violation of human rights. At its less mild, it involves a robust denial that all peoples can be incorporated into a rights regime, 'cannibalism for the cannibals' as it has been termed. This is a serious and necessary issue, but I would question how far it affects the international relations of rights and indeed how far it is the main obstacle, historically or today, to a reconciliation of nationalism with

human rights. I would argue this qualification for four reasons, all of which are well known. First, culture is in many cases not a given, a set of timeless and universally held principles within a society, but an idiom and a site of diversity, as well as of change: what is presented as the unitary, and timeless, culture of a people or religion may now be so. There is diversity, and change, and it is up to each generation, and each member of that community, to interpret the culture, as they speak the language. Second, when it comes to modern times, there is on many key issues no difference between cultures: the right that lies at the centre of nationalism, the principle of self-determination, is held by all peoples, religions and states. Similarly, views as to the equality of peoples, the need for a just international economic system, a right to development, now the need to protect the environment are propounded universally: indeed much of the third-world, non-hegemonic critique of the west is not that it is thrusting inappropriate principles onto them, but that it is failing to live up to its own proclaimed, universal, standards. Third, in international relations the main arguments about rights are not about culture: some states do introduce reservations, for example, about women, or children, but the main authority for resistance to external pressure, or internal demands, is not the claim that 'we' are different, but rather that those pressing for changes have other, hostile, agenda, that they are a product of imperialism and domination. In other words, the critique of universality is based on a view of the structural inequality in the world system, not on claims that the peoples in question are somehow exempt from universal jurisdiction. Finally, the argument about culture has, in much academic writing, an apologetic, or even evasive, form; I would cite as an example of this the work of John Rawls, on a 'law of peoples'. Rawls calls for a liberal acceptance of difference on a global scale, and posits the existence of peoples who are not governed by liberal principles but who meet certain minimal criteria for being 'well-ordered'. Universal principles should not be imposed on them. But this model is deeply flawed: it assumes unitary cultures, where none exists; it posits an ideal type of society for which there are almost no real world examples – perhaps Singapore on a good day; it is wholly innocent of a sociology of values, be this in terms of who within that society determines and enforces the interpretation of culture, and in terms of how the values, indeed the state and community concerned, are themselves formed and

sustained by international factors. It of course provides no answer, other than robust interventionism, to the challenge of states that are not well-ordered of which there would appear to be some few dozen in the world of today.

Particularism

At the core of nationalism lies a contradiction with regard to rights: nationalism rests upon the assertion of a right, and a right deemed to be universal, namely the right of nations to self-determination, and, with this, a set of subordinate claims about territory, sovereignty *vis-à-vis* other states, and the obligation of members of that nation to it; yet nationalism, while asserting a right and claim universality, has been and remains deeply hostile to rights. My argument here is, in essence, that it is this tension, or contradiction, as much as and possibly more than the issues of sovereignty and culture, which besets the relation of nationalism to human rights. We need to recognize that over its two centuries, and stretching into the future, nationalism is profoundly hostile to the universality of rights, and it is this hostility that an audit will bring out. Rather than engage in general, and necessarily inconclusive, discussion of this, I would like to focus on four areas where this contradiction may be examined.

Self-determination

The basis of nationalism is the principle of self-determination: this need not necessarily mean independence, but could involve various forms of autonomy, federalism, protection of minority rights or even equality within a general provision for citizenship. This principle is deemed to be the basis of international peace and security, is inscribed in the UN Charter and in Article 1 of both the ICPPR and the ICESCR. The problem is that this right operates without any legal or internationally recognized criteria: it is not justifiable, and in practice has been resolved on an ad hoc basis.

There are, moreover, several practical problems with it that go to the heart of nationalism's uses and misuses of universality and to the record of nationalism these two centuries past. One such problem is that the claim to self-determination rests as nationalism ordains on a claim to history, and where territory is concerned to prior title. If divine sanction can be brought in, all the better. Yet even the

smallest dose of modernism, or historiographic and legal scepticism, would show that the history, and supposedly historical titles, used to justify claims to self-determination are bogus. Modernism would indeed suggest that we take the world as it is, that whatever peoples of sufficient weight and noise who show up should be given states, but it does so on an ad hoc basis, not by accepting the history, title and usually expansionist territorial claims associated with nationalism.

The basis on which a right is recognized within a modernist perspective is, therefore, in contrast to the kinds of historic right claimed by nationalism. Indeed the more intense the nationalist claim, the less reason or defensible legal claim there is. The supreme conflict revolves around a right much proclaimed by nationalism but, to my knowledge, without any legal, or moral, basis at all, a 'birthright'. In the canon of normative claims this must have a special place. So must claims based on invocation of the divine: God, or gods, do not have legal or constitutional status under international law, yet they have come to be used as authority in the adjudication of territorial disputes. They have also been used to invest places of alleged sacred character with special national significance. Modernism can, and should, have short shrift with this: the divine is a projection, indeed an invention, of the human, and should be subject to human control.

The most serious problem with the right to self-determination is however something that is inherent, not necessarily but recurrently, within nationalism, namely its selective application. This, not imprecision of criteria, or cultural difference as to the interpretation of rights, has been the central problem over the past century. What we see in conflict after conflict is the declamatory assertion of one right coupled with the denial of that right to others. The right itself is not denied, indeed it is celebrated, with much historical, expansionist and emotional baggage. But when it comes to the other people, their nationality is suspect. To take three obvious examples: Northern Ireland, former Yugoslavia, and the Palestine-Israel conflict. In each case the argument is not about territory as such, or about the applicability of the modernist principle of self-determination, but about whether the 'others' are really a nation at all. Thus for Catholic nationalists the Protestants are colonizers, fascists, British agents, when not 'souters', Catholics who converted to Protestantism at times of famine in order to get fed. For Protestants the Catholic minority are treasonable, agents of a foreign power (the Irish

Republic, when not the Vatican) and without legitimate national rights. In former Yugoslavia Serbs and Croats, colluding when not killing each other, deny the right of either Bosnians or Kosovo Albanians to self-determination, just as the Greeks long denied the same to the Macedonians. In the Arab-Israeli context arguments long dormant have now been revived as to the illegitimacy of one or other ethnic group: the Israelis are just foreign colonizers, or a religious minority, or all, down to the last child, agents of a fascist power. The Palestinians have no right to self-determination because they are just Arabs, with lots of other places to go, or Syrians, or plain inhuman terrorists. I repeat: this denial of the rights of others is not logically part of the principle of self-determination, it is a recurrent part of its proclamation and application.

Laws of war

This contradictory relation to human rights, at once proclamation and denial, is evident in a second area of rights, that of the laws of war. Here the record of nationalism is one, over many decades, of the most bloodthirsty, cruel, and vindictive behaviour and of partisan, manipulative use of these principles when charges of violation of the rules of war are made. Far too much time is devoted to using the rules of war as an instrument of conflict, too little to holding all parties, irrespective of their affiliation, responsible before the principles themselves. Humanitarian principles relating to the conduct of war, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocols of 1977, the Genocide Convention and a range of agreements relating to the use of particular weapons may not be part of the core principles of human rights as they have evolved since the Second World War, but they are taken to be part of the broader code, not only because they relate to principles of conduct by states and opposition movements alike, but because they rest in large measure on conceptions of rights, be they of combatants or civilians.

Here as much as in regard to self-determination problems arise, but they are not primarily a function of culture. This is so in the obvious sense that all states, whatever their culture are bound by these conventions, and all have, in modern times, committed acts that, in the opinion of most, violate them. There may be cultural issues to do with the specifics of war, for example, how exactly to cut the throat, break the bones, or humiliate the women, or mutilate the corpses of

those from the other side, but the broad picture is universal: nationalist movements eager to proclaim their own self-righteousness have been responsible and are today responsible for gross violations of the rules of war. Again, the examples are evident. The history of the Balkans from the mid-nineteenth century through to 1914 reveals a pattern of repeated, universal crimes involving the killing of civilians, the destruction of villages, the raping of women, the starving of civil populations, the abuse of prisoners of war, not to mention the expulsion of populations. Here Serbs, Croats, Montenegrans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Turks, Albanians all participated in a frenzy of cruelty and vindictiveness. In the 1970s and 1980s we saw in the Lebanese civil war terrible massacres, bombardment of cities, mass kidnapping and killing of prisoners, destruction of villages and much else besides by the participants in that conflict, one on which the external states involved, Syria and Israel, also played their part. In the past 10 years we have the massacres in Rwanda, repeated violations of rights of combatants and civilians in Bosnia and Kosovo, atrocities in the Armeno-Azeri conflict. In Northern Ireland militant nationalists on both sides have, over three decades, engaged in sectarian murder. We have seen in the Palestine–Israel conflict of the past three years evidence of repeated violations of the rules of war by both the Israeli armed forces and Palestinian militants, actions that, if not ordered, were in general terms sanctioned and retrospectively condoned by their political leaders and by their own peoples. To all of this has been added an orgy of unrestrained hate-speech, the cult of violence, violation of the rights of children and reckless disregard for the security of their own peoples.

Faced with this record, and one which I repeat is far from over, there is little space for attributing this to a culture problem with human rights. Both sides are quick to acknowledge the relevance of universal principles by dint of their denunciation of the other side. Equally, their ferocious denial that they have been involved in any such actions is testimony to a recognition that these principles do apply and that they would suffer, in terms of reputation and morale, if the claims of violation are proven. Yet too quickly the partisans in such conflicts, and outside observers, get drawn into a trap, one set by nationalism, which is not only that of partisan assertion or denial, but one of comparison. Hence the argument becomes as to which side is worse, has, as it were, piled up more corpses, burnt villages or

rape victims, or, alternatively, which side bears prime responsibility, be this in terms of origination, 'who started it?', or in terms of continued obstruction of a settlement. Yet the very fact of comparison is itself a mistake, a concession to nationalism. For the issue is not which side is worse, or who started it, but whether the principles that are generally held to apply in armed conflict, and which are binding on all parties, have been respected or not. When within a domestic juridical process two people are charged with theft, or murder, we do not ask which of them committed a worse theft, or a more horrible murder. We ask whether they have broken the law. The same can, and should, apply in ethnic conflicts and in nationalist wars. We need to wrench the argument back to that of universality, and away from the nationalist traps, of denial/denunciation, or comparison, that are too easily set.

Terrorism

This issue of the relation of nationalism to human rights in the context of war has been most forcefully posed with regard to the question much discussed in the contemporary context of terrorism. 'Terrorism' is a word that allows for much polemical usage, but it also allows for more precise political and legal usage, and for some historical context. This context allows us to remember that the use of violence against a civilian population in violation of the rules of war is a practice that is resorted to by all parties in conflict, states as well as their opponents, and that it is part of a political conflict in which the subjugation of the political will of the opposing side is a central goal.

That nationalists have throughout much of the past century resorted to terrorism, against their national oppressors and against subject peoples, needs little underlining. It is the prerogative of no nation, or religion. There are, moreover, three ways in which it is particularly central to any question of the relation of nationalism to human rights. First of all, terrorism, by states or their opponents, is an extreme example of the denial of universality: it involves a rejection not only of the claims of an opposing group, but of their very humanity. This is a more extreme version of the denial of universality involved in rejecting the claims of rival groups for self-determination. Second, the use of terrorist practices touches on one of the central problems and occasions for abuse inherent in discussion of the rules of war, the relation between *jus as bellum* and *jus in bello*. These are

two separate categories, and supposedly discrete: there is no necessary relation, no rate of exchange, between the issue of just authority, and that of the methods used in war, or, in this case between the claims of a nationalist movement, to territory or independence, and the methods used. But in practice such a rate of exchange is understood: all parties to a conflict know that if they are held to account on the methods used this will prejudice their overall case. Those who wish to discredit the authority of another side are liable to accuse it of atrocities. Those accused of atrocities deny these, in order to project the overall claim of just case. Hence a group that carries out terrorist acts, beyond the political aim involved, must also be concerned to prevent its practice of abhorrent actions from prejudicing its broader political goal. Those who are generally held to be terrorists forfeit, or at least to a considerable degree prejudice, their general political goals. All of this both obscures, but also implicitly endorses, the relevance of universal principles to the conduct of nationalist, inter-ethnic and communal conflicts.

There is a third aspect of the relation between terrorism and human rights that needs examination here, and which is much in evidence, namely the relation of anti- or counter-terrorist policies to human rights. States and peoples have a right to their own security, to protect themselves against attack. This applies to terrorism as much as any other more conventional form of attack. But nationalism is a very dubious basis on which to base such a response: it opens the possibility of discrimination in the treatment of detainees and suspects, and, implicitly, places those suspected of terrorism, or by extension from communities suspected of harbouring terrorists, on an inferior basis. Alternatively, and often at the same time, it places those opposed to terrorism outside the jurisdiction of law and norms of combat. It is a denial of universality, and on both sides. Herein and beyond any special suspension of human rights provisions in detention and trial lies the danger of the response taken by the US administration to the events of 11 September 2001. The set of anti-terrorism measures put through in October was termed 'The Patriot Act' as if patriotism, a necessarily partisan and emotional principle, provides any basis for law. Equally, the appeal to patriotism and to a national, as distinct from universal, legitimation obscures two other aspects of the issue: one, it absolves the USA and American citizens, the presumed beneficiaries of this patriotism, from any reflection on the

past actions of their own states including support for groups practising terrorism in the 1980s; second, it implicitly exempts the state, armed forces and citizens from respect for universal principles. Patriotism is not the first, but the last, place to start in legitimating a campaign, which may be valid in itself, in terms of a universally defensible goal of security, against terrorism.

Solidarity

So far I have discussed three areas where a conflict between universal principles of human rights and nationalism may be observed and where a connection, iterative if not necessary, between the two has been evident these many decades past. I want in conclusion to examine another area where the partisan character of nationalism may affect concern with human rights, and this is an area that might at first sight appear to be one suited to a more positive relation with nationalism, namely solidarity. In essence I want to argue, in the face of much liberal and internationally concerned involvement in conflicts and nationalism the world over, that solidarity on the basis of ethnic or national affiliation, far from being desirable, is in contradiction with universal principles and is inherently undesirable as far as human rights are concerned.

We are all familiar with the role of solidarity in inter-ethnic conflicts. Some of this is based on well-intentioned, but often politically motivated, campaigns of support for particular ethnic or national groups – Tibetans, Bosnians, Palestinians, Israelis, Kurds, Irish, Chechens and so forth. Much of the activity of support for such groups is promoted by groups who claim an ethnic affiliation with the oppressed people, diasporas. In both of these cases there is a conflict with universality. To proclaim support for a particular people, on the basis of ‘universal’ principles, is inherently contradictory: be it in regard to self-determination or the conduct of war it necessarily ascribes moral import to one side and denies it, to a greater or lesser extent, to the other. We can see this very clearly in discussion of the Palestine–Israel conflict. The great majority of public comment, let alone letters to the press, is simply one-sided, invoking moral principles but in a partisan spirit. Even more questionable is the advocacy of support on the basis of national, diaspora, or particularist affiliation. This of necessity establishes a split between moral and legal systems, let alone one in which history, religious claims and nationalist

invention of all kinds have free rein. To take an obvious example: the arguments advocated by diaspora Jews on the one side and by Muslims on the other with regard to the status or division of Jerusalem. Here I would suggest that such affiliation is by dint of the very basis on which it is proclaimed suspect. Not only are they partisan, but they are, on universal grounds, simply invalid: given their starting point, neither side, and the religious or other spokespersons for them, have not just qualified, but no moral standing in the matter. To spell it out: in terms of discussion in Britain, I would argue that neither the Jewish community nor the Muslim community, both of these rather flexible terms, have any special standing in the matter of the Israel–Palestine conflict. Indeed, given the partisan positions they uphold, and which are not conducive to peace, they lay a negative role. The same would go for other diaspora solidarities, be these diasporas comprising peoples who themselves migrated, or whose relatives recently migrated, or on historic links of affect and invention that are so often invoked. This would apply to campaigns about the rights of religious minorities: campaigns about the rights of Christians were in the late nineteenth century the stock-in-trade of European states, and this issue has come up again through agitation in the USA. The rights of believers are an important part of human rights concern, but on the basis of universal principles. Those who proclaim by dint of some affinity of faith or superstition solidarity with kindred believers also, by the logic of their position, exclude others from the same rights.

Conclusion

Much has been said, by political theorists and by the academic friends of nationalism, about how nationalism, as an ideology and as a practice, may be compatible with other, desirable, modern goals: democracy, identity, community and international order. As I have argued elsewhere, this may all be so, but it will only be so if a priority of values is established; if, in other words, nationalism knows its place. Faced with the record over the past century and more of nationalists in regard to universal principles and with the ongoing abuse of human rights by nationalists in several continents, we should be uneasy about accepting too readily that such a compatibility will occur. Of the three major obstacles to such a

compatibility, sovereignty, culture and particularity of interpretation, it is the last, I would suggest, which poses the greatest problem and danger for human rights.

Note

- 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented to ASEN Conference on 'Human Rights and Nationalism', London School of Economics, 26 April 2002.

5

Nationalism, Globalism, and the Conflict of Civilizations

John Hutchinson

In recent decades the apparent global resurgence of nationalism has been accompanied by a questioning of the future of nationalism, the nation, and the nation-state. Will nationalism and national identities continue to exist in the next century? If so, will their characteristics change, and in what manner? If not, what are the alternatives to the nation and the nation-state? Since the nation is generally regarded as the hegemonic cultural and political unit of the modern period and the nation-state remains the major institution (via its membership of international organizations) through which the great planetary problems such as environmental change, nuclear proliferation, world trade, human rights, and the rights of minorities are addressed, these questions are naturally of great import.

Social scientists cannot pretend to offer authoritative answers to any of these questions. Karl Popper (1960) has rightly argued that since the action of human beings is shaped by their knowledge of the world, a successful long-range historical prediction would require us to know now what people will know in the future and the conditions they will encounter. Forecasting, then, in any strict sense is impossible. All we can do is examine if there are 'current' indications that the nation is being superseded by other forms of collective identification.

This in itself is a potentially vast topic, and I can offer here only a very limited analysis. What I wish to do in this chapter is to expose the lack of a long-range historical perspective displayed by many social scientists (including historians) who assert the declining salience of nations. I address two influential positions, which have

raised doubts about the continued existence of the secular nation. The first argues that globalization is leading to the supersession of nations as relevant political actors, whereas the second, rapidly gaining audibility since the recent extraordinary terrorist attacks on the USA, suggests that the major battleground in the world is not between nations and their states but between civilizations, in particular religious civilizations.

I reject both arguments. Each suffers, I argue, from a characteristic of social scientists to (in John Breuilly's words) 'eternalise the present' (Breuilly 2000). A longer historical perspective indicates that globalization rather than eroding may engender ethnic- and nation-formation, and that the current religious resurgence is as likely to contribute to nation-formation as to undermine it. Both positions exaggerate the uniqueness of the nation to the modern world and the potency of nations and nation-states within modernity. We require a much more calibrated discussion that charts the changing characteristics of ethnic communities and nations over historical periods and their fluctuating strength *vis-à-vis* other collective attachments.

Some rough definitions are necessary to make this discussion intelligible. Many differences between scholars arise out of competing definitions of the nation. I follow Anthony Smith in agreeing with the modernist school that nations, as entities based on conceptions of popular sovereignty and common citizenship, a consolidated territory and economy, are generally post-eighteenth-century formations (Smith 2001: 19). But as Smith observes, nations are also communities of sentiment that in large part rest on ethnic cultures which predate the modern period. These provide the nation with a collective name, myths of unique origins, a sense of belonging to a homeland, of shared history and culture, and common political fate. It is the sense of belonging to an ancient 'timeless' community that gives the ideology of nationalism such potency in the modern world. Nationalism is able to bind individuals into a society (the nation) through which they can overcome contingency and death, achieving immortality by adding their story to that of an eternal unit (Smith 1999: 88).

This is not to say that populations without pre-modern ethnic traditions cannot become nations. Ethnogenesis continues in the contemporary period. It is also true that many states or populations claiming to be nations do not fit the above definition, but I suggest

that part of the disruption in world politics is an attempt to create substantive nations. In contrast with those commentators who suggest we are reaching the end of the nation period, I would argue that many areas of Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America are still in the early processes of nation-formation, and that this will be accompanied by social and political upheavals.

The globalization perspective

In 1919 John Maynard Keynes recalled the liberal Europe before the First World War:

What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August 1914! The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their delivery early upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world... he could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality... But, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement... (Keynes 1920: 9–10)

What is interesting in this passage is Keynes' nostalgic presentation of this cosmopolitan free-trading civilization as a golden 'past', destroyed by war and fanatical ideologies (nationalism and Bolshevism).

This should make us cautious about the claims of scholars (Giddens 1990; Albrow 1996; Castells 1996) who argue that we have recently entered a new period of world history, a shift from modernity to postmodernity, engendered by globalization. 'Globalization' is defined here as an intensification of interconnectedness between the populations of the world. As Montserrat Guibernau (2001) ably outlines, theorists of globalization argue that advances in technology and communications have intensified the contacts between the world's populations to such an extent that time and space have been

compressed to form human populations into one world, transforming our sense of the 'local'. The later twentieth century saw the rise of multinational corporations and transnational non-governmental agencies, international codes to protect human rights, world bodies such as GATT, the World Bank and the UN, regional associations of states such as the EU and NAFTA, and the new world language of English. As we seek in our everyday life to adjust to these new horizons and organizations, the nation and nation-state, those primary institutions of modernity, cease to be our primary political and cultural reference points, unable by themselves to manage the problems of nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, long-distance economic migrations and refugee flows, and climatic change.

There are various versions of this thesis, but they all presume the existence during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of a 'classical' nation-state that was politically sovereign, militarily autonomous, territorially bounded, culturally homogeneous, and economically integrated. A radical version, heavily economicist in its assumptions, predicts the erosion of such nation-states by institutions of global and regional governance as they become increasingly powerless to regulate the new borderless world of economic transactions (Wriston 1992; Ohmae 1996).

A more qualified version argues for a transformation not a destruction of the classical nation-state (Giddens 1990; Held *et al.* 1999). According to this, the autonomy of the nation-'state' is qualified by the growth of transnational institutions that has resulted in a pooling or loss of sovereignty. The 'identity of nations' has also been recast. The unlikelihood of large-scale war between great powers means that 'internal' others such as immigrants and refugees are substituting for 'external' enemies for purposes of collective differentiation; the greater visibility of immigrants and national minorities means that homogeneous national cultures are being pluralized and hybridized; and the rise of English as the world language, carried by transnational media channels, encourages a global consciousness and culture at elite and popular levels. There are countervailing tendencies that are strengthening nations and nation-states, but the overall effect is weakened nation-states having to come to terms with multiculturalism (on all this, see Guibernau 2001).

My chief target will be the radical thesis, for there is some substance in the transformationalist thesis (though not as much as is

being claimed). I wish, however, to take issue with the assumptions of both positions, because of the confusion of globalization with modernity or postmodernity; an over-technological conception of globalization that underplays the importance of religious and military factors; and a unitary conception of globalization. Globalization has a long historical duration and brings with it a sense of unpredictable threat that in turn has often resulted in the crystallization and articulation of ethnic and national differences.

World history, nation-states, and the global

The starting ground for a discussion of the global in history is W.H. McNeill's *The Rise of the West* (1963), one of the great works of twentieth-century historical scholarship. McNeill argued that a global society formed in the twentieth century out of the world dominance of the West (first in the guise of European nation-states, then the USA). The origins of globalism lay in fifteenth-century Europe when militaristic nation-states, forming out of a competitive continental state system, expanded overseas, given impetus by revolutions in science and communications, until by the twentieth century, Europe had overthrown all other civilizations. The revolutionary disruptions engendered by the scientific ideas could be seen as either a threat to all older religiously-based civilizations, including the West, or a continuation of the West's revolutionary potential. What was undeniable was the emergence for the first time of a single cosmopolitan humanity, one that would make obsolete the European nation-states themselves. In McNeill's treatment nation-states precede and indirectly engender globalism only to be superseded by it, and globalism is defined as Western in origin and secular in character (McNeill 1963: chapters 11–13).

McNeill's account is richly illuminating but it can be criticized on three grounds. First, globalization should not be seen as a modern revolutionary development but a recurring and evolutionary process. Adshad, in dating the origins of world history in the Mongolian 'explosion' of the thirteenth century in Central Asia, argues that the contemporary world system was built on successive layers of interlocking networks: information, microbial and military circuits, religious internationals, the republic of letters, the global armoury, the world commodity market, the world technological bank, and a

common consciousness expressed through the use of English (Adshead 1993: 3–4). McNeill, himself, influenced by the work of Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) revised his earlier views to admit precursors of the Western capitalist world system on which the latter built. The first developed in the Middle East from the second millennium B.C. until its decay by A.D. 200. A second, again centred on the Middle East, accompanied the rise of Islam from A.D. 600–1000. Between A.D. 1000–1500 China, borrowing from the Middle East, became the centre of gravity of a third world economic network, stretching through the Middle East to Western Europe (McNeill 1990).

A second criticism made by Marshall Hodgson (1993) among others (see Eaton 1990) is that globalization cannot be equated with either 'Western' characteristics or 'universalization'. Islam preceded Christian Europe as a global civilization, and in Marshall Hodgson's interregional model world history is the story of the interactions of four major culture zones over a period of 2800 years, each of which emerged for a time as the leading edge before its innovations were (over a period of 500 years) assimilated by the other zones. This interaction was both peaceful (e.g. trade and the diffusion of ideas) and violent (warfare and imperial conquest). Among the implications are that 'globalization' always flows from 'particular' centres and that the rise of the 'West' (an area previously on the margins) is not unprecedented or final but is only the latest manifestation of a series of 'jumps' in global social power, which is at present being absorbed world-wide. In the 1980s it appeared that Japan as the second industrial economy had developed an alternative mode of development to the (American-dominated) 'West', leading some to speak of its impact on Asian societies as a form of 'Easternization'. Although the Japanese model is now discredited, it is not inconceivable that China now rapidly developing its vast population could eventually become the global centre of gravity. Indeed, there is a Chinese project to present a Neo-Confucianism, emphasizing harmonious co-operation, as a non-exclusionary principle of world order superior to the competitive messianism of the West (Zheng 1999: chapter 4). A growing sense of threat from China has evoked at times an ethnocentric response from the supposedly global civilization of the USA. In short, global currents come with their own ethnocultural assumptions and can provoke countervailing visions, and in turn rival nationalisms.

Third, globalization cannot be defined as a unitary and secular process, since 'globalizing' institutions include as well as the rise of secular sciences, technologies, and ideologies, those of missionary religious expansion, imperial conquest and colonization, migrations, and long-distance trade that often cut across each other. Michael Mann (1986) has analysed patterns of world history through the interaction of four overlapping and competing networks of power, the economic, the political, the ideological, and the military, each of which has its own technologies and boundaries.

This should make us reconsider the causal relationship between globalization, ethnic formations and nations in three ways. If globalization has been in process for a millennium or more, then claims that it will result in the supersession of nations become problematic, to say the least. It is at least possible that ethnic- and nation-formation accompanies and is engendered by globalization. Secondly, globalization is an inherently dynamic process which produces differentiation rather than homogenization, since it always comes laden with the assumptions from an originating region and is transformed into the specificities of the 'receiving' culture as it seeks to absorb it and compete with its challenger. Thirdly, because there are multiple agents and processes of interconnectedness, there is an inherent unpredictability in world history. Indeed, McNeill's own 'contact model' acknowledges this. He argues that world history is marked by a shift from isolated individuals to increasing social interdependence, and through this an enhancement of human power over nature. But he noted that such contacts have engendered conflict as well as harmony (Costello 1993: 197–9). Indeed, I would argue that such contacts (and conflicts) are one of the catalysts of ethnic crystallizations and that the resulting ethnic communities have often provided the basis of the modern nation.

The emergence of universalistic scriptural religions has been critical in binding dispersed populations together into the major civilizations. Although such religions have traditionally been regarded as undercutting ethnic affiliations to territory and culture, they have often been catalysts of ethnic and, some would argue, national formation. Adrian Hastings (1997) claims a special role for Christianity. Evangelism, inspired by the Biblical recognition of linguistic diversity, effected the translation of the scriptures into local languages and the proliferation of written vernaculars. In presenting Israel as the

exemplary political community of unified kingdom, sacred territory, and holy people bound by their distinctive culture, the Old Testament diffused the model of the nation first in Western Europe, then, as Christianity expanded with European imperialism, world-wide.

In fact, all religions have stimulated ethnic formation for several reasons. This includes their need to accommodate (in different degrees) to the ethos and practices of the previous cultures in order to reach the people; their proclivity to schism and internal differentiation which can transform ethnic categories into rival ethnic communities; their employment by rulers seeking to build culturally cohesive populations, differentiated from neighbouring groups; and, above all, by wars between political communities of different faiths.

The tendency of all great religions including Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism to fissure into different traditions endowed them with ethnogenetic potential, particularly whenever rival traditions took root in adjacent and competing populations or states. The rooting of Shiite Islam in Iran was accompanied by a rejection of Arab dominance and a Persian ethnocultural revival, given intensity by the wars of the Sunni Ottoman Empire against the Safavid Empire of Persia. As John Armstrong (1982: chapter 3) demonstrates, the global ambitions of rival proselytizing religions brought them into military conflict, and states on the fault lines developed *antemurale* myths that depicted them as elect polities, destined to be the border guards of their civilization. The conflict between Islam and Christianity over 1000 years saw several polities claim such a status: on the Christian side, Byzantium, Castilian Spain, and Tsarist Russia, and on the Muslim, Mameluke Egypt. The *antemurale* myth also re-emerged from wars between Catholic and Orthodox, and between Catholic and Protestant states. Poland regarded itself as the defender of Catholicism in Western Europe against 'Eastern' Russian Orthodoxy, and England and Holland saw themselves as the bulwarks of Protestant liberty against Catholic despotism. All of these identifications have strongly shaped the trajectories of the modern nations.

Although imperial expansions would seem to be the enemy of ethnic communities, ethnic consciousness can also arise as one of their unintended consequences. A powerful ethnicity was forged in Armenian and Jewish populations, caught on exposed trade and communication routes between rival Roman and Persian empires, who suffered collective subjugation and 'exile' (Armstrong

1982: chapter 7). Empires, Michael Hechter (2000: chapters 2 and 3) claims, can consolidate ethnic communities through systems of indirect rule that reinforce indigenous leaderships, as under the Ottoman *millet* system.

In general, interstate warfare intensifies ethnic difference. Of course, the psychological and social effects of warfare on the populations are more limited when warfare is conducted by mercenaries or a small aristocratic stratum, or, indeed, limited corps of professionals. But recurring and protracted interstate wars even between feudal states such as the Hundred Years War between the French and English kingdoms have resulted in a social penetration of ethnic sentiments. Warfare, as Anthony Smith (1981) has argued, has had ethnicizing effects by mobilizing localized groups into a state army and thereby creating an identification with a larger territory which becomes a homeland, by generating propaganda through which mutually opposing ethnic stereotypes are constructed between opposing populations, and by throwing up heroes and epochal battles. These epic events when celebrated subsequently by poets, historians and artists, such as Froissart and Shakespeare, popular legends and commemorative rituals become institutionalized in the group consciousness. Even when wars result in the overthrow of a state, an ethnic consciousness may persist, especially where groups define themselves in religious terms, interpreting their defeat like the Serbs at the battle of Kosovo as a test of their commitment to the true religion. A religious sense of election thus explains away defeat, indeed instils a reinforced drive to defend collective traditions as a means of eventually regaining divine favour.

The development of long-distance trade also excited the ambitions of groups to control it and brought far distant cultures into contact and often conflict. Waves of steppe migrations or invasions of the wealthy agrarian civilizations of Asia and Europe followed the land-based silk and spice routes, including the Mongol drive for world Empire of the thirteenth century, which has been explained by historians as motivated in part by a desire to seize control of the silk route. The memory of the 'Mongol/Tatar yoke' had a deep impact on Muscovite Russia and Magyar Hungary. The Mongol unification of the silk route created an information circuit linking Asia and Europe, inspiring Western states to discover a seaward route to the riches of the East (Adshead 1993: chapter 3). Out of this came the European

'discovery' of America, large-scale colonizations which led to new ethnic crystallizations, and wars between the European great powers in their struggle for overseas wealth and empire. This together with the religio-dynastic wars of the Reformation on the European sub-continent was the context from which early modern national identities developed, articulating a universal religious mission.

In short, globalization when conceived in *la longue durée* has gone hand-in-hand with an intensification, if not creation, of differentiation that often takes ethnic forms. To adopt McNeill's contact perspective, of course, is to accept a 'non-essentialist' concept of ethnicity that acknowledges that ethnic formations even when strongly institutionalized are subject to recurring challenges of different kinds. These may result in internally generated innovation, imposed syncretization through conquest, and possibly dissolution through voluntary or coerced assimilation and ethnocidal programmes. The multiple and disaggregated nature of these challenges entails that ethnic formations may often contain a repertoire of many different pasts, cultural heritages, and hence models of individual and collective identity to which they can turn in order to negotiate change. Ireland had such heritages as the pagan era of Celtic aristocratic warriors, encoded in epic poetry; the Catholic *insula sacra* of St Patrick and Irish saints; the Anglo-Norman heritage of parliamentary autonomy. In Magyar lands, the early pagan warrior ethos of the steppes was overlaid (though never obliterated) after conversion to Christianity by an *antemurale* identity as a European Christian bulwark against the Asiatic Islam.

Yet, globalization theorists build on modernist interpretations such as Ernest Gellner (1983), Eric Hobsbawm (1990), and John Breuilly (1993) who view the nationalism and nations of the late eighteenth century onwards as discontinuous with older ethnic communities, and as products of a secular modernization process that is tending to the organization of humanity into ever more extensive units. Although the nation may profess a commitment to an ethnic past, it is essentially novel, even invented, for the nation is a political unit, territorially more extensive and bounded, economically integrated and culturally homogeneous than earlier entities. It is the bearer of the scientific and technological revolutions of the eighteenth century that made possible a single and uniform culture based on a new rational and political concept of humanity, which is transmitted by

a centralized territorial state and an industrial economy over much of the planet. Nations are directed to modernity and modern nation-states are much alike: they share an industrial culture, and the very rise of a nation-state system is the harbinger of increasing interdependence and of a new system of governance by transnational institutions.

One can agree with modernists that modern nations contain many novel features, but they underplay the degree to which states have been shaped in their modernizing policies by older ethnic identities. For example, the emancipatory mission of revolutionary France to Europe fed off medieval conceptions of the kingdom of France as the 'elected' defender of European Catholic Christianity. Modernists also exaggerate the autonomy of states when facing the greater intensity of contacts since the eighteenth century, and fail to observe the recurring crises that states encounter and that compel them to 'return' to the resources of ethnocommunal heritages. Throughout the modern period, states, whether they were long established empires or indeed avowedly nation-states, have periodically been shaken or even destroyed by unforeseen events such as warfare, economic crises, migrations and demographic shifts, ecological changes, and ideological challenges.

Although modern states can exert immense power by mobilizing their populations through efficient administrations, educational systems, and their economic alliances, as only one of many power actors, they are tested to their limits by unpredictable political, military, economic, and ideological challengers. Warfare in the modern period (particularly in the Napoleonic era and the First World War) has required a continuous redefinition of political communities with respect to each other. An ethnic nationalism has been fanned as a result of the overthrow and rise of states, the shifting of states into new geopolitical spaces, the turning of dominant groups into national minorities and vice versa, and large-scale transfers of population. Even aggressive secular French republican nationalists found it necessary to appropriate traditional religious symbols such as St Joan to mobilize support for the state after France's defeat in 1871 and during the German invasion of the First World War (Gildea 1994: 154–65).

Waves of transnational economic revolutions have also upset the power of states *vis-à-vis* each other and the status of regions and classes within nation-states. Prussia's deployment of railways in its

crushing defeat of France in 1871, and German leadership of the 'second industrial revolution' of iron and steel seemed to presage the rise of new hegemon in Europe. This resulted in intensified nationalist rivalries in the early twentieth century with France and also with Britain, which felt its traditional naval superiority threatened by Tirpitz's development of an armoured battleship fleet. The economic depressions of the 1870s, the threat to the traditional European landed order from an emerging world agrarian market, together with the growth in rapidly expanding cities of a large and politicized unskilled working class attracted to militant socialist parties, large migrations of Jews resulted in racial and anti-semitic nationalism across Western Europe.

Competing ideological movements arising from the heritage of the Enlightenment and religious counter challenges, transmitted through transnational institutions such as churches, revolutionary internationals, diaspora groups, and printed media have fed national antagonisms. In the late eighteenth century fears of the imposition of radical republican ideas by France and its ideological supporters resulted in the crystallization of a modern conservative British identity focused on the crown (Colley 1992: 216–20). Papal 'ultramontane' rejection of secular nationalist principles, culminating in the Syllabus of Errors (1863) and the declaration of the doctrine of Infallibility (1870), intensified tensions within Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The Bolshevik revolution, in similar vein, created a nationalist panic in Western and Eastern Europe, particularly among conservative middle-class groups, fearful not just of a large external enemy but also an enemy within in the form of an internationalist working class.

Furthermore, closer contact between peoples has intensified and widened the impact of 'natural' disturbances – diseases, famines, ecological disturbances, shifts in fertility patterns – heightening national tensions and conflict. The inability of the British government to avoid the Great Famine in mid-nineteenth-century Ireland permanently alienated the Catholic Irish from the union with Britain, and the flight of many thousands of diseased emigrants to the cities of the USA and Britain stoked nativist reactions in both these countries. A racial nationalism in the European imperial nations in the early twentieth century was fuelled by fears of demographic decline in the face of the superior fertility of the 'yellow races'.

Under such circumstances the motifs of cultural nationalism of communal self-help and of the recreation of social and political institutions from below have resonated, often reviving and allying with older ethno-religious sentiments. At the same time, the plurality of ethnic heritages allows nationalists to reject 'failed' traditions, and to justify necessary social innovations by appealing to 'forgotten' golden ages. Although Greek national identity was defined by reference to Orthodox and the Byzantine Empire, it was the 'rediscovery' of secular Hellenism that inspired early nineteenth-century Greek nationalists to secede from the Ottoman Empire and 'rejoin' the European 'West'. In short, nationalism does have modernizing objectives, but even more its power derives from its capacity to overcome contingency by finding 'solutions' based on a past believed to be authentic.

The idea of a sovereign nineteenth-century nation-state, then, is something of a myth since there have long been oscillations between national and imperial, class, regional, and religious identities throughout the modern period. Eugene Weber's analysis (1976) of the strength of regionalism in the 1870s implies a decline in the pervasiveness of French nationalism since the period of the revolutionary wars. Modern nations and nation-states from their very beginnings have operated in alliance or contest with the transnational institutions of empires, the great religions, revolutionary internationals, and capitalism. Acknowledging this, states have historically developed different strategies to overcome such challenges. The British adherence to liberal economics until the early twentieth century accorded with their self-interest, whereas late nineteenth-century Germany espoused a protectionist approach. For much of the nineteenth century Britain remained a world power, in part because of its skill in mustering coalitions of states against the dominant great power on the European sub-continent.

In short, the crisis of the contemporary nation-'state' which is allegedly no longer capable of exercising sovereignty in military, economic, and religious matters has a long history, and has been addressed by a recurring mobilizing of social networks. As one would expect, national identities have evolved in response to new contingencies, dramatically so in the case of (West) Germany after 1945 when there was an attempt to reject the national past and redefine the German future in terms of a commitment to 'European' democracy; but even here recent debates since unification indicate a desire

to 'legitimize' Germany by discovering an acceptable national heritage (Fulbrook 1999: chapters 4, 6, and 7).

What then of the claims that these problems are intensifying and that globalization has reached a new stage in the post-1945 world with the rise of transnational and international alliances that indicate that the era of the nation-state is passing? Do we not see emerging a new planetary consciousness expressed through the rise of English (or American) as the world language, global institutions – political (the UN) and economic (GATT), a world civil society represented by NGOs, international covenants recognizing human rights: and this in response to a recognition of problems such as nuclear proliferation, environmental threats, large-scale international migratory and refugee flows, and terrorism that cannot be managed by existing nation-states? Does not the rise of regional associations (the European Union, ASEAN) represent a fundamental revulsion against the national principle in the name of wider cultural loyalties? The European Union, for example, is expropriating many of the traditional powers of the nation-state in monetary management, defence, border controls, and sub-continental elite networks are forming which suggest to some that a new European identity will develop, possibly based on an extension of civic models of the nation to a European scale (see Wallace 1990).

From the world historical perspective it is much too soon to evaluate the long-term viability of the European Union as a 'federal' enterprise, when in recent years we have seen the collapse or destabilization of multinational states whether federal or unitary from the USSR to Indonesia, in response to global military and economic pressures. It is more plausible to explain the development of the EU as a new strategy of national elites to maximize their sovereignty in an increasingly globalized world, rather than a rejection of the nation-state principle. The negotiating games of national elites are complex. Nation-states in Europe can use the 'global' as an instrument in their struggle for autonomy against the 'regional' pressures of 'Europe' or against the dominant regional power. The global military reach of the USA, made possible by technology, is welcomed by many states, both in Europe and Asia.

In any case, the very growth of transnational institutions has provoked a widespread reaction against the 'Western' values that they seem to embody in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. What many

scholars have failed to acknowledge is that in the contemporary period religious organizations such as Islam and Evangelical Protestantism, their reach extended by modern communication systems, remain among the most potent globalizing agents and offer a rival vision to that of secular modernity. The recent attacks on the USA have shown the unpredictable threats that can arise out of a global interconnectedness. Globalization has engendered a hostility against the West on the part of large sections of the Muslim world, and whereas the prophets of multiculturalism have viewed the migration of millions of peoples from a historically rival civilization into the heartlands of the West as encouraging a creative hybridization of identities, many now fear instead an intensified and perhaps even religio-racial nationalism in the West triggered by conflicts between host community and 'immigrants'. Already there are calls to 'nationalize' immigrant minorities by teaching them the values of citizenship defined in terms of the dominant ethnic culture.

The clash of civilizations

If a single world united by secular cosmopolitan values seems some way off, is secular nationalism not threatened in a new way by a resurgence of religious movements in much of the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America? Mark Juergensmeyer (1993) has likened this religious revival to that of a new Cold War against the West. The current Islamist revival against Western secularism, highlighted in the Iranian revolution, has not only reshaped the politics of states with a Muslim majority, but also fanned a widely-based ethnocentric reaction in European nation-states against Muslim immigrants, including France where politicians of the left and right have expressed fears of the erosion of secular republican traditions by militant Islam. Samuel Huntington (1997), while rejecting this notion of a binary conflict between a secular West and a religious non-West, offers a vision of a future as one of a battle of civilizations, underpinned for the most part (though not exclusively) by antagonistic religious heritages. In such a vision, states (and nation-states) play a secondary role as leading political actors within their civilization. Civilizations without leading states will be politically flaccid, but equally states that seek to escape their historic civilization such as Greece (which should be in the Orthodox camp but seeks to be Western) or Turkey

(which also seeks to be European but is within Islam) will be perpetually torn. Those interstate or intrastate conflicts that coincide with religio-civilizational fault-lines are likely to be the most intense.

There are several obvious criticisms one can make of Huntington's associations of conflict with civilizational difference. He defines the European world of Latin Christianity as a single civilization, but from the sixteenth century the most ferocious conflicts conducted by Europeans were not with Muslim, Confucian or Orthodox Christian civilizations but were rather directed against themselves, first in the wars of Reformation and Counter Reformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and then in the world wars of the twentieth century. One should note also that the modern religious movements can be directed against the West, but even where they critique external 'others' the 'real' enemy is generally not global but particular. Their main target is 'within', since they wish to morally regenerate a traditional culture being eroded by secular forces allied to alien cosmopolitan principles. The Islamist movements of the Middle East, Africa, and Pakistan and the Hindu revivalism in India were born out of the failures of secular (socialist) nationalism: to deliver the promises of social and economic emancipation of the masses, to free them from Western 'neo-colonialist' capitalism, and to provide law and order (see Hutchinson 1994: chapter 3). In each case there has been a 'return' to older religious traditions and institutions long pre-dating the Western colonial impact in order to provide more 'authentic' models of development and to deliver basic social services, including justice (hence the appeal for Muslims of shariah law), education and the relief of poverty. The objective of these movements has been focused on a transformation of an existing political community rather than a world-wide crusade. Where the target is also external this is often a neighbouring country (Israel for Middle Eastern Muslims, India for Pakistanis), and, just as in the case of medieval *antemurale* kingdoms, this has reinforced a sense of nationality by defining the community as a unique custodian of spiritual values now under threat.

It is also a mistake to view such religious revivals as the domain of 'backward' non-western countries. Religion has been one of the sources of national identity for many avowedly secular states such as Holland and France, and it remains a powerful force in many contemporary 'Western' societies, including the USA, Germany, Italy,

Ireland and Greece. The current religious revival can be viewed as the most recent manifestation of a long-recurring conflict between secular and religious concepts 'within' nations. Internal conflicts erupted in Europe at the very beginning of modern nationalism as part of a general reaction against the secularism of the French revolution, and they continued through the nineteenth century, including within France itself. Such contestations are often an integral part of the nation-building process, for even many 'established' nations are riven by embedded cultural differences that generate rival symbolic and political projects. As I have already argued, nations are culturally plural, and the assumptions that there is a trend towards homogenization means that the centrality of cultural struggles in nation-formation has been neglected.

In Russia competition between Slavophiles and Westerners, the first defenders of Russia's distinctive Orthodox traditions and the second looking to Western European models, originated in the early nineteenth century and continues. In France the struggle between republicans, and clerico-legitimists since the French Revolution recurs in various forms, most visibly in the campaigns of Le Pen's National Front against the Fifth Republic. British society was riven in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries between the nonconformist Protestantism of the urban regions of Wales, Scotland and the north of England, which supported, first the Liberal, then the Labour parties, and the rural Anglican Protestantism of the more rural South, which supported Conservatism.

These divisions may reflect radically different views of the structure of politics, the status of social groups, relations between regions, the countryside and the city, economic and social policies and foreign policy. They also reflect the diverse heritages of populations whose geopolitical setting continues to expose them to unpredictable changes from several directions. Modern Russia has been shaped by interaction with Western and Central Europe, Byzantium, and the Asian steppes, and both Westerners and Slavophiles have recognized the validity of the other. The westerner Alexander Herzen, uneasy at wholesale importation of European ideas, especially after the failure of 1848, declared that Westerners would be cut off from the people as long as they ignored the questions posed by the Slavophiles (Neumann 1996: 170). Similarly, Dostoyevsky, advocate of Russia's Orthodox mission and its Eastern destiny, reveals the

ambivalence of neo-Slavophiles, and how they had internalized assumptions of the Westerners: 'In Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in Asia we too are Europeans ... We shall go to Asia as masters' (*ibid.*: 64). These visions have alternated in power both at the level of state and of 'educated society', with groups, at times switching positions, in part affected by the sense of place and security of the national territory.

In short, nations are pluralist not culturally homogenous and the survival of these diverse heritages, it may be argued, is explained by geopolitical setting and because they enhance options for societies when faced with unpredictable challenges. But it may be fairly asked what prevents internal conflicts, especially when religiously based, leading to social breakdown and civil wars.

This is a pressing question today in many parts of the world. The short answer might be that breakdown is avoided when there is a potent common live ethnic heritage to which both secular and religious movements can appeal. In the Middle East and Asia the secular nation-state is threatened because it is seen to be a derivative of Western colonial rule, compared to 'rooted' religious traditions which can claim at times of crisis to be more 'authentic'. Often the nationalist initiative is taken by religious minorities, the Copts in Egypt, Maronite Christians in Lebanon, and Protestants in Korea who find in a secular nationalism, based on an historic period before that of the dominant religion, an instrument that allows them participation as (at least) equals in the political community. The danger is that this ethnic vision has little resonance with the majority. In those nation-states or state-nations with multiple ethnoreligious or religious communities, an ethnoreligious rejection of secular nationalism by the dominant group threatens to dissolve the state.

Even in contemporary Israel, a nation-state that claims legitimation by reference to an ancient kingdom and a myth of chosenness, the conflict with Palestinians only partly keeps the lid on an internal battle between secular Zionists and Orthodox Jews and religious nationalists about the character of the state. The Israeli example illustrates two important points. First, it reveals the inability of secular nationalism to override an old and institutionalized ethnoreligious heritage, in spite of its association with a powerful modern foundation story and victorious wars that have generated a pantheon of heroes and legends of sacrifice. Second, accommodation, although at

times precarious, has been possible between bitter secular and religious rivals because of a common ethnoreligious heritage to which they refer, but there has been an increasing shift in the identity of the state from its original more secular and socialist orientation.

One may wonder whether the 'success' (however qualified) of the Israeli case is something of an exception in those non-European countries where secular nationalism aggressively confronts a traditional religious heritage. States, however, remain the potent instruments of politics, with the result that religious movements tend to become particularized, and the world religions lack transnational institutions and foci capable of mobilizing the faithful in alternative political formations. That said, the emergence of a world of 'real' nation-states if it ever comes is likely to be a protracted, uncertain, and potentially reversible process.

Conclusions

We can agree with some points of proponents of 'globalization' and of 'the clash of civilizations'. Undoubtedly, the strategies and perhaps the forms of nation-state are changing to face the new international environment. States in many contexts pool sovereignty; international institutions and doctrines have emerged restricting sovereignty, though uncertainly; and trends in democracy and human rights have enabled ethno-regional movements to become more visible and salient. But much discussion of the post-national state remains West Eurocentric, and the conditions that allow such national 'weakening' may remain temporary; even in Europe. I have expressed scepticism about the erosion of national principle in the face of globalization.

Globalization is a much longer phenomenon than most theorists of the subject are willing to acknowledge, and the agents and processes are not simply secular but include religion and warfare, both of which encourage difference. Before the modern world such factors resulted in large-scale ethnic phenomena, much of which has shaped the way that modern societies have evolved. More intense forms of interaction, engendered by scientific and technological revolutions, in turn produced the rise of nationalism but the empowerment of states came through not an eradication but a transformation of older ethnic heritages. Although the state principle is widely

regarded as obsolete in the face of transnational entities, the major world actors remain nation-states or would-be nation-states. New threats will intensify nationalism in many parts of the world, such as climatic changes on states already locked in conflict over such natural resources as water, a major issue between Israel and Jordan and between India and Bangladesh.

We can also agree that religions remain potent global agents in the contemporary world, and that in much of the world nationalism is thinly based, statist and bearing little relation to ethnic and other traditional realities. Nonetheless, the current religious revival does not offer a significant threat to the system of nation states; as we have seen religion has, in many cases, become ethnicized. Religious conflict has as often as not intensified ethnic or national identity between neighbouring states (India and Pakistan). Much of the current religious revival is directed internally at the supposed inauthenticity of secular nationalism in relation to native heritages. Its effects vary according to context. In some cases it is a reflection of the multiple heritage of communities and can provide an alternative option to populations at times of crisis when established ideas and institutions have failed. In other cases where there are no common ethnic memories to which the rival projects can appeal, internal conflict becomes problematic. The result is likely to be long-term instability and state paralysis.

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6

Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism

Craig Calhoun

A certain attenuated cosmopolitanism had taken place of the old home feeling.

Thomas Carlyle, 1857

Among the great struggles of man – good/evil, reason/unreason, etc. – there is also this mighty conflict between the fantasy of Home and the fantasy of Away, the dream of roots and the mirage of the journey.

Salman Rushdie, 2000

Nineteenth-century thinkers, like Thomas Carlyle, were often ambivalent about cosmopolitanism.¹ They worried that it was somehow an ‘attenuated’ solidarity by comparison with those rooted in more specific local cultures and communities. Today cosmopolitanism has considerable rhetorical advantage. It seems hard not to want to be a ‘citizen of the world’. Certainly, at least in Western academic circles, it is hard to imagine preferring to be known as parochial. But what does it mean to be a ‘citizen of the world’? Through what institutions is this ‘citizenship’ effectively expressed? Is it mediated through various particular, more local solidarities or is it direct? Does it present a new, expanded category of identification as better than older, narrower ones (as the nation has frequently been as opposed to the province or village) or does it pursue better relations among a diverse range of traditions and communities? How does this citizenship contend with global capitalism and with non-cosmopolitan dimensions of globalization?

My questioning is meant not as an attack on cosmopolitanism but as a challenge to the dominant ways in which it has been conceptualized. First, I want to question the social bases for cosmopolitanism. What experiences make this an intuitively appealing approach to the world? Which are reflected poorly or not at all? What issues are obscured from view? Second, I want to ask how much the political theory of cosmopolitanism is shaped by the spectre of bad nationalism and a poorly drawn fight with communitarianism, how well it defends social achievements against neoliberal capitalism, and to what extent it substitutes ethics for politics. Finally, I wish to offer a plea for the importance of the local and particular – not least as a basis for democracy, no less important for being necessarily incomplete. Whatever its failings, ‘the old home feeling’ helped to produce a sense of mutual obligations and what Edward Thompson (1971) echoed an old tradition in calling a ‘moral economy’.

A thoroughgoing cosmopolitanism might indeed bring concern for the fate of all humanity to the fore, but a more attenuated cosmopolitanism is likely to leave us lacking the old sources of solidarity without adequate new ones. Much cosmopolitanism focuses on the development of world government or at least global political institutions. These, advocates argue, must be strengthened if democracy is to have much future in a world where nation-states are challenged by global capitalism, cross-border flows and international media and accordingly less able to manage collective affairs (Held 1995; Archibugi and Held 1995; Archibugi *et al.* 1998).² At the same time, most of these advocates see growing domestic heterogeneity and newly divisive subnational politics as reducing the efficacy of nation-states from within. While most embrace diversity as a basic value, they simultaneously see multiculturalism as a political problem. In the dominant cosmopolitan theories, it is the global advance of democracy that receives most attention and in which most hopes are vested. But cosmopolitanism without the strengthening of local democracy is likely to be a very elite affair.

The political theory of cosmopolitan democracy

Generally speaking, to say ‘cosmopolitan’ has been to say anything *but* ‘democratic’. Cosmopolitanism was the project of empires, and as an intellectual and a personal style – and indeed a legal arrangement – it

flourished in imperial capitals and trading cities. The tolerance of diversity in cosmopolitan imperial cities reflects among other things precisely the absence of a need to organize self-rule (I have argued this at greater length in Calhoun 1993 and 1995).

Liberalism and belonging

Contemporary cosmopolitanism is the latest effort to revitalize liberalism.³ It has much to recommend it. Aside from world peace and more diverse ethnic restaurants, there is the promise to attend to one of the great lacunae of more traditional liberalism. This is the assumption of nationality as the basis for membership in states, even though this implies a seemingly illiberal reliance on inheritance and ascription rather than choice, and an exclusiveness hard to justify on liberal terms.

Political theory has surprisingly often avoided addressing the problems of political belonging in a serious, analytic way by presuming that nations exist as the prepolitical bases of state-level politics. I do not mean that political theorists are nationalists in their political preferences, but rather that their way of framing analytic problems is shaped by the rhetoric of nationalism and the ways in which this has become basic to the modern social imaginary (on the predominance of nationalist understandings in conceptions of 'society', see Calhoun 1999). 'Let us imagine a society', theoretical deliberations characteristically begin, 'and then consider what form of government would be just for it'. Nationalism provides this singular and bounded notion of society with its intuitive meaning.

Even so Kantian, methodologically individualistic and generally non-nationalist a theorist as Rawls exemplifies the standard procedure, seeking in *A Theory of Justice* to understand what kind of society individuals behind the veil of ignorance would choose – but presuming that they would imagine this society on the model of a nation-state. Rawls modifies his arguments in considering international affairs in *Political Liberalism* and *The Law of Peoples*, but continues to assume something like the nation-state as the natural form of society. As he unhelpfully and unrealistically writes:

...we have assumed that a democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system.

It is complete in that it is self-sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of human life. It is also closed, in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death. (Rawls 1993: 41)

Rawls is aware of migration, war and global media, of course. But he imagines questions of international justice to be just as that phrase and much diplomatic practice implies: questions 'between peoples', each of which should be understood as unitary. Note also the absence of attention to local or other constituent communities within this conception of society. Individuals and the whole society have a kind of primacy over any other possible groupings. This is the logic of nationalism.

This is precisely what cosmopolitanism contests – at least at its best – and rightly so. Indeed, one of the reasons given for the very term is that it is less likely than 'international' to be confused with exclusively intergovernmental relations (Archibugi 1998: 216). Advocates of cosmopolitanism argue that people belong to a range of polities of which nation-states are only one, and that the range of significant relationships formed across state borders is growing. Their goal is to extend citizenship rights and responsibilities to the full range of associations thus created. In David Held's words,

people would come, thus, to enjoy multiple citizenships – political membership in the diverse political communities which significantly affected them. They would be citizens of their immediate political communities, and of the wider regional and global networks which impacted upon their lives. (1995: 233)

Though it is unclear how this might work out in practice, this challenge to the presumption of nationality as the basis for citizenship is one of the most important contributions of cosmopolitanism.

The cosmopolitan tension with the assumption of nation as the prepolitical basis for citizenship is domestic as well as international. As Jurgen Habermas puts it,

the nation-state owes its historical success to the fact that it substituted relations of solidarity between the citizens for the disintegrating corporative ties of early modern society. But this republican achievement is endangered when, conversely, the integrative force of the nation of citizens is traced back to the prepolitical fact of a

quasi-natural people, that is, to something independent of and prior to the political opinion- and will-formation of the citizens themselves. (2000: 115)

But pause here and notice the temporal order implied in this passage. *First* there were local communities, guilds, religious bodies and other 'corporative bonds'. *Then* there was republican citizenship with its emphasis on the civic identity of each. *Then* this was undermined by ethnonationalism. What this misses is the extent to which each of these ways of organizing social life existed simultaneously with the others, sometimes in struggle and sometimes symbiotically. New 'corporative ties' have been created, for example, notably in the labour movement and in religious communities. Conversely, there was no 'pure republican' moment when ideas of nationality did not inform the image of the republic and the constitution of its boundaries.

As Habermas goes on, however, 'the question arises of whether there exists a functional equivalent for the fusion of the nation of citizens with the ethnic nation' (*ibid.*: 117). (Note that Habermas tends to equate 'nation' with 'ethnic nation'.) We need not accept his idealized history or entire theoretical framework to see that this raises a basic issue. That is, for polities not constructed as ethnic nations, what makes membership compelling? This is a question for the European Union, certainly, but also arguably for the United States itself, and for most projects of cosmopolitan citizenship. Democracy requires a sense of mutual commitment among citizens that goes beyond mere legal classification, holding a passport, or even respect for particular institutions. As Charles Taylor (2002) has argued forcefully, 'self-governing societies', have need 'of a high degree of cohesion'.

One of the challenges for cosmopolitanism is to account for how social solidarity and public discourse might develop in these various wider networks such that they could become the basis for an active citizenship. So far, most versions of cosmopolitanism share with traditional liberalism a thin conception of social life, commitment and belonging. Actually existing cosmopolitanism exemplifies this deficit in its 'social imaginary'. That is, it conceives of society – and issues of social belonging and social participation – in too thin and casual a manner.

The result is an emerging theory of transnational politics that suffers from an inadequate sociological foundation. As Bellamy and

Castiglione (1998) write, hoping to bridge the opposition between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, 'a pure cosmopolitanism cannot generate the full range of obligations its advocates generally wish to ascribe to it. For the proper acknowledgement of "thin" basic rights rests on their being specified and overlaid by a "thicker" web of special obligations'. Held agrees: persons inhabit not only rights and obligations, but relationships and commitments within and across groups of all sorts including the nation.

This image of multiple, layered citizenship directly challenges the tendency of many communitarians to suggest not only that community is necessary and/or good, but that people normally inhabit one and only one community.⁴ It also points to the possibility – so far not realized – of a rapprochement between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. More often, cosmopolitans have treated communitarianism as an enemy, or at least used it as a foil. At the same time, though, advocates of cosmopolitan democracy find themselves falling back on notions of 'peoples' as though these exist naturally and prepolitically. They appeal, for example, for the representation of peoples rather than or in addition to states in various global institutions including an eventual world parliament (Archibugi 2000: 146). This poses deeper problems than is commonly realized. Not only is the definition of 'people' problematic, the idea of representation is extremely complex. Representing peoples has been one of the primary functions of modern states – however great the problems with how they do it. Absent state-like forms of explicit self-governance, it is not clear how the representation of peoples escapes arbitrariness.

Cosmopolitan democracy would appear to require not only a stronger account of representation, but also a stronger account of social solidarity and the formation and transformation of social groups. If one of its virtues is challenging the idea that nationality (or ethnic or other identities understood as analogous to nationality) provides people with an unambiguous and singular collective membership, one of its faults is to conceptualize the alternative too abstractly and vaguely. Equally, most cosmopolitanism seems to underestimate the positive side of nationalism, the virtues of identification with a larger whole, which as a polity or potential polity is more open to democratization than religions or some other kinds of larger groupings.

Part of the problem is that cosmopolitanism relies heavily on a purely political conception of human beings. Such a conception has

two weak points. First, it does not attend enough to all the ways in which solidarity is achieved outside of political organization, and does not adequately appreciate the bearing of these on questions of political legitimacy. Second, it does not consider the extent to which high political ideals founder on the shoals of everyday needs and desires – including quite legitimate ones. The ideal of civil society has sometimes been expressed in recent years as though it should refer to a constant mobilization of all of us all the time in various sorts of voluntary organizations.⁵ But in fact one of the things people quite reasonably want from a good political order is to be left alone some of the time – to enjoy a non-political life in civil society. In something of the same sense, Oscar Wilde famously said of socialism that it requires too many evenings. We could say of cosmopolitanism that it requires too much travel, too many dinners out at ethnic restaurants, too much volunteering with *Médecins Sans Frontières*. Perhaps not too much or too many for academics (though I wouldn't leap to that presumption) but too much and too many to base a political order on the expectation that everyone will choose to participate.

A key issue is simply what people choose to do with their time. In addition, actually existing politics have developed a less engaging face than they might have. But surely scale is a third factor. Participation rates are low in local and national politics; it is not clear that the spread of global social movements offers evidence enough for a possible reversal on the supranational scale. On the contrary, there is good reason to think that the very scale of the global ecumene will make participation even narrower and more a province of elites than in national politics. Not only does Michels's law of oligarchy apply, if perhaps not with the iron force he imagined, but the capacities to engage cosmopolitan politics – from literacy to computer literacy to familiarity with the range of acronyms – are apt to continue to be unevenly distributed. Indeed, there are less commonly noted but significant inequalities directly tied to locality. Within almost any social movement or activist NGO, as one moves from the local to the national and global in either public actions or levels of internal organization one sees a reduction in women's participation. Largely because so much labour of social reproduction – child care, for instance – is carried out by women, women find it harder to work outside of their localities. This is true even for social movements in which women predominate at the local level.

Rationalism and difference

Contemporary cosmopolitan theory is attentive to the diversity of people's social engagements and connections. But this cosmopolitanism is also rooted in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalism with its ethical universalism counterposed specifically to traditional religion and more generally to deeply-rooted political identities. Against the force of universal reason, the claims of traditional culture and communities were deemed to have little standing. These were at best particularistic, local understandings that grasped universal truths only inaccurately and partially. At worst, they were outright errors, the darkness to which Enlightenment was opposed. Rationalism challenged more than just the mysticism of faith. The sixteenth- and seventeenth-century wars of faith seemed to cry out for universalistic reason and a cosmopolitan outlook. Yet, this rationalism was also rich with contractarian metaphors and embedded in the social imaginary of a nascent commercial culture. It approached social life on the basis of a proto-utilitarian calculus, an idea of individual interests as the basis of judgement, and a search for the one right solution. Its emphasis on individual autonomy, whatever its other merits, was deployed with a blind eye to the differences and distortions of private property. The claims of community appeared often as hindrances on individuals. They were justified mainly when community was abstracted to the level of nation, and the wealth of nations made the focus of political as well as economic attention.

Like this earlier vision of cosmopolis, the current one responds to international conflict and crisis.⁶ It offers an attractive sense of shared responsibility for developing a better society and transcending both the interests and intolerance that have often lain behind war and other crimes against humanity. However, this appears primarily in the guise of ethical obligation, an account of what would be good actions and how institutions and loyalties ought to be rearranged. Connection is seldom established to any idea of political action rooted in immanent contradictions of the social order. From the liberal rationalist tradition, contemporary cosmopolitanism also inherits suspicion of religion and rooted traditions; a powerful language of rights that is also sometimes a blinder against recognition of the embeddedness of individuals in culture and social relations; and an opposition of reason and rights to community. This last has

appeared in various guises through 300 years of contrast between allegedly inherited and constraining local community life and the ostensibly freely chosen social relationships of modern cities, markets, associational life and more generally cosmopolis.

Confronting similar concerns in the mid-twentieth century, Theodore Adorno wrote:

An emancipated society ... would not be a unitary state, but the realization of universality in the reconciliation of differences. Politics that are still seriously concerned with such a society ought not, therefore, propound the abstract equality of men even as an idea. Instead, they should point to the bad equality today ... and conceive the better state as one in which people could be different without fear. (1974: 103)

The tension between abstract accounts of equality and rooted accounts of difference has been renewed in the recent professional quarrels between liberal and communitarian political theorists. For the most part, cosmopolitans model political life on a fairly abstract notion of person as a bearer of rights and obligations.⁷ This is readily addressed in rationalist and indeed proceduralist terms. And, however widely challenged in recent years, rationalism retains at least in intellectual circles a certain presumptive superiority. It is easy to paint communitarian claims for the importance of particular cultures as irrational, arbitrary and only a shade less relativist than the worst sort of postmodernism. But immanent struggle for a better world always builds on particular social and cultural bases.⁸ Moreover, rationalist universalism is liable not only to shift into the mode of 'pure ought' but to approach human diversity as an inherited obstacle not a resource or a basic result of creativity.

Entering this quarrel on the liberal side, but with care for diversity, Held suggests that national communities cease to be treated as primary political communities. He does not go so far as some and claim that they should (or naturally will) cease to exist, but rather imagines them as one sort of relevant unit of political organization among many. What he favours is a cosmopolitan democratic community:

a community of all democratic communities must become an obligation for democrats, an obligation to build a transnational,

common structure of political action which alone, ultimately, can support the politics of self-determination. (Held 1995: 232)

In such a cosmopolitan community, 'people would come... to enjoy multiple citizenships – political membership in the diverse political communities which significantly affected them' (*ibid.*: 233). Sovereignty would then be 'stripped away from the idea of fixed borders and territories and thought of as, in principle, malleable time-space clusters....it could be entrenched and drawn upon in diverse self-regulating associations, from cities to states to corporations' (*ibid.*: 234). Indeed, so strong is Held's commitment to the notion that there are a variety of kinds of associations within which people might exercise their democratic rights, that he imagines 'the formation of an authoritative assembly of all democratic states and agencies, a reformed General Assembly of the United Nations...' with its operating rules to be worked out in 'an international constitutional convention involving states, IGOs, NGOs, citizen groups and social movements' (*ibid.*: 273–4). The deep question is whether this all-embracing unity comes at the expense of cultural particularity – a reduction to liberal individualism – or provides the best hope of sustaining particular achievements and openings for creativity in the face of neoliberal capitalism.

The very idea of democracy suggests that it cannot be imposed from above, simply as a matter of rational plan. It is inherently a matter of differences – of values, perceptions, interests and understandings. The power of states and global corporations and the systemic imperatives of global markets suggest that advancing democracy will require struggle. This means not only struggle against states or corporations, but struggle within them to determine the way they work as institutions, how they distribute benefits, what kinds of participation they invite. The struggle for democracy, accordingly, cannot be only a cosmopolitan struggle from social locations that transcend these domains, it must be also a local struggle within them. Moreover, it would be a mistake to imagine that cosmopolitan ethics – universally applied – could somehow substitute for a multiplicity of political, economic and cultural struggles. Indeed, the very struggle may be an occasion and source for solidarity.

Moreover, it is important that democracy grows out of the lifeworld, that theories of democracy seek to empower people not in the abstract

but in the actual conditions of their lives. To empower people where they are means to empower them within communities and traditions, not in spite of them, and as members of groups not only as individuals. This does not mean accepting old definitions of all groups; there may be struggle over how groups are constituted. For example, appeals to aboriginal rights need not negate the possibility of struggle within Native American or other groups over such issues as gender bias in leadership (this is a central issue in debates over group rights; see for example Kymlicka 1995). It is important that we recognize that legitimacy is not the same as motivation. We need to pay attention to the social contexts in which people are moved by commitments to each other. A cosmopolitanism that does so will be variously articulated with locality, community and tradition, not simply a matter of common denominators. It will depend to a very large extent on local and particularistic border crossings and pluralisms, not universalism.

Such a cosmopolitanism would challenge the abandonment of globalization to neoliberalism (whether with enthusiasm or a sense of helpless pessimism) and challenge the impulse to respond simply by defending nations or communities that experience globalization as a threat. It is unclear, however, just what social life is like in 'malleable time-space clusters' and what it would mean for global politics to be a matter of cross-cutting membership in a host of different 'agencies' from communities to corporations. Multiplicity is one issue; scale is another. It is clear, moreover, that cosmopolitanism has yet to come to terms with tradition, community, ethnicity, religion and above all nationalism. In offering a seeming 'view from nowhere', cosmopolitans commonly offer a view from Brussels (where the postnational is identified with the strength of the European Union rather than the weakness of, say, African states), or from Davos (where the postnational is corporate) or from the university (where the illusion of a free-floating intelligentsia is supported by relatively fluid exchange of ideas across national borders).

The spectre of bad nationalism

Acknowledging diversity is basic to the political theory of cosmopolitan democracy. But the theory is nonetheless ambivalent. Cosmopolitanism seems to be more about transcending cultural specificity and differences of local institutions than about defending

them. The claims of ethnicity and nationhood appear primarily as problems, and are analysed in terms of the prejudicial opposition of cosmopolitan liberalism to communitarianism and nationalism.

Cosmopolitan thought has a hard time with cultural particularity, local commitments, and even emotional attachments. This comes partly from its Enlightenment liberal heritage of rationalist challenge to religious and communal solidarities as 'backward'. It is reinforced powerfully by the image of 'bad nationalism'. For many advocates of cosmopolitanism, this image of the 'other' is definitive. Nazi Germany is paradigmatic, but more recent examples, such as Milosevic's Serbia and ethnic war in Rwanda and Burundi, also inform the theories. At the core of each instance, as generally understood, is an ethnic solidarity triumphant over civility and liberal values and ultimately turning to horrific violence.

Advocates of a postnational or transnational cosmopolitanism, however, do themselves and theory no favours by equating nationalism with ethnonationalism and understanding this primarily through its most distasteful examples. Nations have often had ethnic pedigrees and employed ethnic rhetorics, but they are modern products of shared political, culture and social participation, not mere inheritances. To treat nationalism as a relic of an earlier order, a sort of irrational expression, or a kind of moral mistake is to fail to see both the continuing power of nationalism as a discursive formation and the work – sometimes positive – that nationalist solidarities continue to do in the world. As a result, nationalism is not easily abandoned even if its myths, contents and excesses are easily debunked (I have discussed nationalism as a discursive formation in Calhoun 1997). The way in which it still informs notions of the representation of 'peoples' is a case in point.

Not only this, the attempt to equate nationalism with problematic ethnonationalism sometimes ends up leading cosmopolitans to place all 'thick' understandings of culture and the cultural constitution of political practices, forms and identities on the nationalist side of the classification. Only quite thin notions of 'political culture' are retained on the attractive cosmopolitan side (see, for example, Habermas 1994; Taylor 1994; on the cosmopolitan side, see Thompson 1998). Yet republicanism and democracy depend on more than narrowly political culture; they depend on richer ways of constituting life together.

Democracy and cosmopolitanism have not always been close fellow travellers. The current pursuit of cosmopolitan democracy flies in the face of a long history in which the cosmopolitan has thrived in market cities, imperial capitals, and court society. Historically, cosmopolitanism often flourished precisely where democracy was not an option. It thrived in Ottoman Istanbul, for example, and old regime Paris, and both ancient and later colonial Alexandria, because in none of these were members of different cultures and communities invited to organize government for themselves. It was precisely when democracy became a popular passion and a political project that nationalism flourished. Nationalism – not cosmopolitanism – has been the social imaginary most compatible – one might say complicit – with democracy. Democracy, in particular, has depended on strong notions of who ‘the people’ behind phrases like ‘we the people’ might be, and who might make legitimate the performative declarations of constitution-making and the less verbal performances of revolution (Taylor 2002). In this respect, its seventeenth-century ancestors are less the liberal individualists of social contract theory than early English nationalists.

It is not only nationalism that figures as a defining ‘other’ to cosmopolitanism. It is also community, ethnicity and religion. Indeed, part of the problem is that the ‘bad nationalist’ image informs the whole reading of tradition and community. Religion is a particular issue in this. Communitarians generally acknowledge the importance of religion as a basis for community, whether they personally embrace faith or not. Liberals may advocate tolerance, but partly as believers in tolerance they are troubled by the deep prejudices against other ways of life implicit in many religious faiths. But attitudes towards Catholicism and Islam remain litmus tests for the distinction, not least when it is extended into international affairs. Are these potentially sources for alternative and possibly better visions of modernity? Or are they illiberal challenges to a modernity that is necessarily rational-individualist in character?

Cosmopolitanism is in this sense a latent bad conscience to liberalism, a reminder that most liberals had become tacit nationalists, allowing their universalism to extend only to the borders of the countries. Implicitly, liberals had fallen into accepting the illiberal idea that inheritance – birth – rather than choice should be the basis of political identity. A liberal internationalism developed, to be sure,

but it was itself rooted in liberal nationalism. Assistance offered to 'less developed countries' was never extended on the basis of the same universalism as that conditioned on domestic citizenship (even if the latter too allowed great inequality and often reduced what should have been universal entitlements to acts of charity). But for the most part, liberalism simply accepted national identities as framing the boundaries of political communities and didn't push the point very hard.

While the cosmopolitan challenge to deeply-rooted traditional identities was often deployed against claims to ground national identity in ethnicity throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, liberals also seized on the state apparatus to promote national integration and homogenization within nation-states. Projects of rational planning and liberal modernization were developed within the boundaries offered by nation-states – even though liberal theory could offer no good account of why those boundaries should be defended against immigrants. It is perhaps paradoxical that in their struggle against benighted local prejudice, against provincialism, that liberals were the advocates of homogenizing nationalism – for example, in education policy – that now helps to underwrite the idea of the nation as a primary and self-sufficient solidarity.

Tradition and self-determination

The idea of approaching autonomy in terms of national self-determination is especially troubling to cosmopolitans. First, it privileges an unchosen whole over individual choice. Second, the idea of nation typically involves a strong claim to stand alone as politically self-sufficient. Third, national self-determination may even be impossible given the contemporary geopolitical challenges to national autonomy.

As David Held writes in what remains the best-developed, most thorough and thoughtful account of cosmopolitan democracy:

The idea of a community which rightly governs itself and determines its own future – an idea at the very heart of the democratic polity itself – is ... today deeply problematic. (1995: 17)

Held goes on to note the importance of the fact that 'nations' are not today strong containers of the social connections of individuals – if indeed they ever were.

... in a highly interconnected world, 'others' include not just those found in the immediate community, but all those whose fates are interlocked in networks of economic, political and environmental interaction. (*ibid.*: 228)

It is worth pausing to note that 'immediate community' refers here to nation more than to any actual networks of local or other directly interpersonal relationships. The nation is indeed in a sense a 'direct access' construct – individuals are members immediately rather than through their membership of smaller groupings (see Calhoun 1997). But this is in fact part of what is novel about the modern nation by comparison with empires or feudal kingdoms or a variety of other forms of polity. If we are to take seriously people's different forms of belonging to social groups, then we need to avoid using the term 'community' in such an elastic sense that nations, religious confessions, cities and neighbourhoods all appear as exemplars.

This is important for thinking about ethnicity. Too easily, ethnicity is rendered the 'other' to globalization. It is treated as static, or at best grudgingly resistant to modernization and cosmopolitan virtues. It is described as a matter of 'tradition' in a usage that resembles Bagehot's notion of 'the hard cake of culture' rather than emphasizing the importance of passing on creations, sharing ideas and values, reproducing meanings, learning culture in directly interpersonal relations. Like all forms of traditional culture, ethnicity is changed dramatically by the introduction of mass literacy, reliance on fixed texts and authorized interpreters – not to mention newer communications technologies. In efforts to fix and stabilize tradition, the contents of ethnicity are sometimes hardened – though it is almost always the case that if ethnic cultures remain alive this hardening is challenged by new generations and new creativity.

Moreover, ethnicity is not simply an inheritance from the past of small, kin-organized communities. It developed in the context of cities, states and migrations as a distinctive way of constructing identities and solidarities on relatively large scales to which kinship and similar relational structures of very local life were inadequate. It exists not as a simple carry-over from an earlier world of 'pure' local identities, thus, but as a means of managing the interrelationship of the local and the translocal, the interpersonally communicated and

the impersonally communicated, the social organization constructed by markets and bureaucracies and that built out of direct relationships. It combines abstract categories of identity with concrete identification within social networks. It is a way of participating in globalization – and other large-scale processes – not their opposite.

Community has always been stronger at local levels than national ones, and necessarily so. This is obscured by use of the same term to refer to the national ‘political community’ and to neighbourhoods, towns and villages. Accounts of local democracy are strikingly underdeveloped in cosmopolitan theory. It is as though theorists assume that the problems of the nation are to be solved entirely by its transcendence in a welter of border crossings. In fact, the construction of viable local communities – and more democratic local communities – may be equally central. The nation has no monopoly on being a ‘community of fate’. At the same time, the existence of communities of fate is not simply conservative. It is also, and often at the same time, in the sort of tension with dominant trends that makes it a basis for radical struggle (on this point, see Calhoun 1983). This struggle, it is true, may be resistance more than proactive construction. Capitalist globalization has spawned a variety of movements seeking exemption from its dictates. But the existence of deep roots for struggle, deep roots to community, does not mean simply resistance. It means also a foundation for serious and radical struggle. This depends on roots and bonds that cannot be simply matters of immediate choice, and thus often on local community. Indeed, one of the oddities of the cosmopolitan hostility to communitarianism is neglect of the extent to which communitarian arguments are actually about sub-national communities, not nations.

For the most part, contemporary public discourse is conceived within a social imaginary in which the idea of nation is still basic, defining not only a new sense of local which is not local at all but national, but also defining the global often as the international. This takes attention away from the extent to which transnational corporations organize apparently international relations. These corporations themselves, like nations, depend on this social imaginary to be construed as natural, normal. In this social imaginary, cosmopolitanism appears mainly in the guise of adaptation to the institutional order of power relations and capital.

Social foundations of cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism presents itself simply as global citizenship. It offers a claim to being without determinate social basis that is reminiscent of Mannheim's idea of the free-floating intellectual. But the view from nowhere or everywhere is more located than this. Cosmopolitanism reflects an elite perspective on the world (although what academic theory does not?).

It is worth recalling the extent to which the top ranks of capitalist corporations and the NGOs that support them – from the World Bank to organizations setting accountancy standards – provide exemplars of cosmopolitanism. Even the ideas of cosmopolitan democracy and humanitarian activism reflect the kind of awareness of the world that is made possible by the proliferation of non-governmental organizations working to solve environmental and humanitarian problems, and by the growth of media attention to those problems. These are important – indeed vital – concerns. Nonetheless, the concerns, the media and the NGOs need to be grasped reflexively as the basis for an intellectual perspective. It is a perspective, for example, that makes nationalism appear one-sidedly as negative. This is determined first perhaps by the prominence of ethnonationalist violence in recent humanitarian crises, but also by the tensions between states and international NGOs. It is also shaped by specifically European versions of transnationalism. Both nationalism and questions of whether states should be strengthened would look different from an African vantage point. Similarly, the development of the 'emergency' as a basic category for understanding the world opens our eyes to important issues, but also structures the way we see them.

Various crises of the nation-state set the stage for the revitalization of cosmopolitanism. The crises were occasioned by the acceleration of global economic restructuring in the 1990s, new transnational communications media, new flows of migrants, and proliferation of civil wars and humanitarian crises in the wake of the Cold War. The last could no longer be comprehended in terms of the Cold War, which is one reason why they often appeared in the language of ethnicity and nationalism. Among their many implications, these crises all challenged liberalism's established understandings of (or perhaps wilful blind spot towards) the issues of political membership and sovereignty. They presented several problems simultaneously: (1) Why

should the benefits of membership in any one polity not be available to all people? (2) On what bases might some polities legitimately intervene in the affairs of others? (3) What standing should organizations have that operate across borders without being the agents of any single state (this problem, I might add, applies as much to business corporations as to NGOs and social movements) and conversely how might states appropriately regulate them?

Enter cosmopolitanism. Borders should be abandoned as much as possible and left porous where they must be maintained. Intervention on behalf of human rights is good. NGOs and transnational social movements offer models for the future of the world. These are not bad ideas, but they are limited ideas.

Cosmopolitanism is a discourse centred in a Western view of the world.⁹ It sets itself up commonly as a 'Third Way' between rampant corporate globalization and reactionary traditionalism or nationalism. If Giddens' account of the Third Way is most familiar, Barber's notion of a path beyond 'Jihad vs. McWorld' is equally typical.¹⁰ Such oppositions are faulty, though, and get in the way of actually achieving some of the goals of cosmopolitan democracy. In the first place, they reflect a problematic denigration of tradition, including ethnicity and religion. This can be misleading in even a sheer factual sense, as for example Barber describes Islamism as the reaction of small and relatively homogeneous countries to capitalist globalization. The oppositions are also prejudicial. Note, for example, the tendency to treat the West as the site of both capitalist globalization and cosmopolitanism but to approach the non-West through the category of tradition.

It is worth noting that cosmopolitanism is itself a tradition, with roots in the ancient world (perhaps especially in Hellenism), in early modern Humanism, and in empire. More generally, the opposition to tradition (and with it to community, religion, ethnicity and the like) is based on a limited and static view. This does damage especially to the notion of ethnicity as living, creative culture. In this connection, we should also recall how recent, temporary, and never complete the apparent autonomy and closure of 'nation' was. Looked at from the standpoint of India, say, or Ethiopia, it is not at all clear whether 'nation' belongs on the side of tradition or on that of developing cosmopolitanism. Or is it perhaps distinct from both – a novel form of solidarity and a basis for political claims on the state,

one which presumes and to some extent demands performance of internal unity and external boundedness?

This way of ordering the world does not simply reflect pre-existing internal histories of nations; it reflects also their development amid the struggles of religious wars, imperialism and capitalist competition. Nation-states offered powerful means for disciplining their members – not least in demanding loyalty across class lines – as well as attempting to control transborder flows. But imperialism is intrinsic not only to the story of nation-states but of cosmopolitanism. It shapes the very claim to difference within unity that is basic to most modern cosmopolitan theories. As Brennan puts it, cosmopolitanism ‘designates an enthusiasm for customary differences, but as ethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic culture – a new singularity born of a blending and merging of multiple local constituents’ (2001: 76).¹¹ But this very claim to unity – echoing on a grander scale that of great empires and great religions – underwrites the cosmopolitan’s appeal for all-encompassing world government.

Consumerist cosmopolitanism

Even while the internal homogeneity of national cultures was being promoted by linguistic and educational standardization (among other means), the great imperial and trading cities stood as centres of diversity. Enjoying this diversity was one of the marks of the sophisticated modern urbanite by contrast to the ‘traditional’ hick. To be a cosmopolitan was to be comfortable in heterogeneous public space.¹² This diversity (and to some extent this elitist attitude) remains a support for cosmopolitanism today.

The notion of cosmopolitanism gains currency from the flourishing of multiculturalism – and the opposition of those who consider themselves multiculturally modern feel to those rooted in monocultural traditions. The latter, say the former, are locals with limited perspective, if not outright racists. It is easier to sneer at the far right, but too much claiming of ethnic solidarity by minorities also falls foul of cosmopolitanism. It is no accident either that the case against Salman Rushdie began to be formulated among diasporic Asians in Britain, or that cosmopolitan theory is notably ambivalent towards them. Integrationist white liberals in the United States are similarly unsure what to make of what some of them see as ‘reverse racism’ on the part of blacks striving to maintain local communities. Debates

over English as a common language reveal related ambivalence towards Hispanics and others.

In the world's global cities, though, and even in a good many of its small towns, certain forms of cosmopolitan diversity appear ubiquitous. Certainly Chinese food is now a global cuisine – both in a generic form that exists especially as a global cuisine and in more 'authentic' regional versions prepared for more cultivated global palates. And one can buy Kentucky Fried Chicken in Beijing. Local taste cultures that were once more closed and insular have indeed opened up. Samosas are now English food just as pizza is American and Indonesian curry is Dutch. Even where the hint of the exotic (and the uniformity of the local) is stronger, one can eat internationally – Mexican food in Norway, Ethiopian in Italy. This is not all 'MacDonaldization' and it is not to be decried in the name of cultural survival. Nonetheless, this tells us little about whether to expect democracy on global scale, successful accommodation of immigrants at home, or respect for human rights across the board. Food, tourism, music, literature and clothes are all easy faces of cosmopolitanism. They are indeed broadening, literally after a fashion, but they are not hard tests for the relationship between local solidarity and international civil society.

The spread of consumerist cosmopolitanism is, rather, a reassurance to liberals that in fact globalization is bringing a happy cultural pluralism. This encourages the idea that a cosmopolitan, post-national politics is a potential path to democracy.¹³ It becomes identified with the slogan of a Third Way between unbridled global capitalism and reactionary nationalism. Too many states still wage war or take on projects like ethnic cleansing that an international public might constrain or at least condemn. Transnational flows of people, weapons, drugs and diseases all suggest need for regulation, or at least better design of global institutions, backed up by recognition of human rights. This lends itself to technocratic approaches more than democracy, largely because it neglects the question of solidarity, and it cedes a good deal to neoliberal capitalism. In many versions, the appeal to cosmopolitanism also substitutes ethics for politics, appeals to abstract human rights for efforts to construct a more just and democratic social order.

Cosmopolitanism – though not necessarily cosmopolitan democracy – is now largely the project of capitalism, and it flourishes in the top management of multinational corporations and even

more in the consulting firms that serve them. Such cosmopolitanism often joins elites across national borders while ordinary people live in local communities. This is not simply because common folk are less sympathetic to diversity – a self-serving notion of elites. It is also because the class structuring of public life excludes many workers and others. This is not an entirely new story. One of the striking changes of the nineteenth and especially twentieth centuries was a displacement of cosmopolitanism from cities to international travel and mass media. International travel, moreover, meant something different to those who travelled for business or diplomacy and those who served in armies fighting wars to expand or control the cosmopolis. If diplomacy was war by other means, it was also war by other classes who paid less dearly for it.

Yet there are also non-cosmopolitan facets and forms of globalization. There are mass migrations of non-elites whose experiences abroad make them newly conservative about the culture of 'home'. There are projects for alternative modernities – some in the name of revitalizing ancient religions. An effectively democratic future must be built in a world in which these are powerful, not simply a world of diverse individuals.

Capitalism

The current enthusiasm for global citizenship and cosmopolitanism reflects not just a sense of its inherent moral worth but the challenge of an increasingly global capitalism. It is perhaps no accident that the first cited usage under 'cosmopolitan' in the Oxford English Dictionary comes from John Stuart Mill's *Political Economy* in 1848: 'Capital is becoming more and more cosmopolitan' (this is a point made also by Robbins 1993: 182; see also Robbins 2001). Cosmopolitan, after all, means 'belonging to all parts of the world; not restricted to any one country or its inhabitants'. As the quotation from Mill reminds us, the latest wave of globalization was not required to demonstrate that capital fits this bill. Indeed, as Marx and Engels wrote in the *Communist Manifesto*,

... the bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. ... All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. ... In place of the

old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature. (1976: 488)

This is progress, of a sort, but not an altogether happy story. 'The bourgeoisie', Marx and Engels go on,

by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation... It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e. to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. (*Ibid.*)

My purpose here is not to celebrate Marx and Engels for their insight, remarkable as it is. They were, after all, fallible prognosticators. Not much later in the *Communist Manifesto* they reported that modern subjection to capital had already stripped workers of 'every trace of national character' (*ibid.*: 494). The First World War came as a cruel lesson to their followers and nationalism remains an issue today. My point, rather, is to take a little of the shine of novelty off the idea of cosmopolitanism.

Deep inequalities in the political economy of empire and of capitalism mean that some people laboured and labour to support others in the pursuit of global relations and acquisition. Cosmopolitanism did not and does not in itself speak to these systemic inequalities, any more than did the rights of bourgeois man that Marx criticized in the 1840s. If there is to be a major redistribution of wealth, or a challenge to the way the means of production are controlled in global capitalism, it is not likely to be guided by cosmopolitanism as such. Of course, it may well depend on transnational – even cosmopolitan – solidarities among workers or other groups.

The juxtaposition of empire and capitalism should remind us, moreover, that the rise of the modern world system marked a historical

turn against empire. Capitalist globalization has been married to the dominance of nation-states in politics (this is a central point of Wallerstein 1974). Capitalist cosmopolitans indeed have traversed the globe, from early modern merchants to today's World Bank officials and venture capitalists. They forged relations that crossed the borders of nation-states. But they relied on states and a global order of states to maintain property rights and other conditions of production and trade. Their passports bore stamps of many countries, but they were still passports and good cosmopolitans knew which ones got them past inspectors at borders and airports. Not least of all, cosmopolitanism offered only weak defense against reactionary nationalism. This was clearly *declass * so far as most cosmopolitans were concerned. But Berlin in the 1930s was a very cosmopolitan city. If having cosmopolitan elites were a guarantee of respect for civil or human rights, then Hitler would never have ruled Germany, Chile would have been spared Pinochet, and neither the Guomintang nor the Communists would have come to power in China.

I don't want to paint too strong a picture. Cosmopolitanism is not responsible for empire or capitalism or fascism or communism. Nor does any of this make cosmopolitanism in itself a bad thing. On the contrary, in many ways it is a good and attractive approach to life in a globally interconnected world. The point is that we need to be clear about what work we can reasonably expect cosmopolitanism to do and what is beyond it. In fighting reactionary rightist racism and nationalism, for example, local democracy may be more important than global cosmopolitanism. The two are not contradictory; I hope they can be mutually reinforcing. But they are not the same thing. And in order for them to flourish together it is important not only that local democrats recognize the importance of globalization and the virtues of other cultures, but that cosmopolitans recognize the value of local communities and traditions.¹⁴ The 'catch' to proposing this last recognition is that it flies in the face of capitalist destruction of those communities and violation of those traditions. It is also impeded by the affinity of cosmopolitanism to rationalist liberal individualism.

This has blinded many cosmopolitans to some of the destructions neoliberalism has wrought and the damage it portends to hard-won social achievements. Pierre Bourdieu has rightly called attention to the enormous investment of struggle that has made possible relatively autonomous social fields and at least partial rights of open

access to them (see the essays in Bourdieu 1999 and 2001). Such fields are organized largely on national bases, at present, though they include transnational linkages and could become far more global. This might be aided by the 'new internationalism' (especially of intellectuals) that Bourdieu proposes in opposition to the globalization of neoliberal capitalism. The latter imposes a reduction to market forces that undermines both the specific values and autonomy of distinctive fields – including higher education and science – and many rights won from nation-states by workers and others. In this context, defense of existing institutions including parts of national states is not merely reactionary. Yet it is commonly presented this way, and cosmopolitan discourse too easily encourages the equation of the global with the modern and the national or local with the backwardly traditional.

Neoliberalism – the cosmopolitanism of capital – presents one international agenda as simply a force of necessity to which all people, organizations and states have no choice but to adapt. Much of the specific form of integration of the European Union, for example, has been sold as the necessary and indeed all but inevitable response to global competition (Calhoun 2002). This obscures the reality that transnational relations might be built in a variety of ways, and indeed that the shifting forces bringing globalization can also be made the objects of collective choice.

Re-imagining social solidarity

What is needed here is a theory of social solidarity. This would give an account of why mutual obligations should be compelling. But it would also reveal that not all forms of solidarity can with equal ease be made matters of choice. Collective choice about the terms and nature of social institutions and shared life is distinctively a matter of the public sphere. But both public life itself, and society more generally, also depend on systems, categorical identities, and networks of social relations including communities.

Lacking time to develop such a theory in any fullness, let me simply sketch some distinctions among kinds of solidarity. By invoking this term, I mean to recall both Durkheim and the labour movement. That is, I mean to recall both the sociological problem of explaining different sources and forms of social cohesion and the practical

problem of developing the kinds of mutual commitments that enable collective action. Solidarity, thus, should not be identified solely with either the unchosen, inherited or systemic forces that bind people to each other or the choice to identify certain others as brothers or sisters. Rather, the question of how much choice different forms of solidarity offer should arise alongside that of how strongly they join people together. Solidarity will always be constraining as well as enabling; it is falsely theorized if we imagine it can offer the latter without the former. Moreover, we should not assume that being bound together is always a matter of harmony and consensus. It is often a matter of argument and struggle; it is organized by competition as much as cooperation; it is marred by ethnic jokes as well as honoured in ritual celebrations. What is key is that people treat the others to whom they are connected as necessary to their lives, not optional.

First, there are systemic or functional forms of integration, such as those of markets. These are powerful, probably the most powerful in the world today. But they present themselves as forces of necessity to which people adapt. One of the challenges of critical theory is to reduce the reification of such forces, but it remains the case that part of their power stems from the fact that they organize social life without requiring collective choices as to their overall form. International civil society can challenge and shape but not replace systemic integration. Much of international civil society actually exists to serve it: NGOs are not all activist or philanthropic organizations; they include professional associations, arbitrators and groups seeking to standardize accountancy rules.

Secondly, there is power, especially as organized in states, but also as deployed inside business corporations – which, as Coase (1937) showed years ago, are not creatures of markets but of hierarchies (Williamson 1975, 1991). It is important to distinguish between corporations and markets, because the former are not simply forces of necessity, dictated by efficiency or the invisible hand. Corporations are institutions that people create and inhabit. They are not an automatic response to the market but a way of organizing work and investment that is shaped by culture and choice as well as power, and potentially a setting for important solidarities that do not reduce to the economy as such. Organizations and movements in international civil society focus largely on trying to influence states and corporations. The influence may come through voting, public opinion

or boycotts and other market tactics. We should be clear, though, that the protesters outside WTO meetings do not wield comparable power to the officials of states and corporations represented inside.

Third, there are categorical identities, cultural framings of similarity among people. These include race, ethnicity and nation but also gender and class. Their key feature is to represent people in series, as tokens of a type, as equivalents in respect of some common attribute. International social movements and NGOs rely heavily on categorical identities representing either interests or affinities. Often dispersed members provide financial support to causes with which they identify. Nation has proved the most influential categorical identity in the modern world. Religions often join adherents in a sense of categorical identity. Religion, however, usually involves the combination of categorical identity with embeddedness in specific institutions, practices and relationships.

Social relationships offer a distinct and fourth kind of solidarity. There is no necessary reason for categorical identities to become communities – that is, for similarities to be matched with dense webs of interpersonal relationships. On the contrary, local communities are often precisely the settings in which these categorical identities are combined, in which social relationships establish bridges across race, religion or other lines of categorical difference. In some cases, to be sure, categorical identities are paired with a relatively high density of network relations; they become what Harrison White (1992) calls CATNETS (White's formulation builds on Nadel (1957)). This is part of what gives religious groups force in international civil society. Paying attention to the distinction is important in thinking about community, though, because the word is often used in an ambiguous way. It draws much of its emotional force and attraction from the image of a village or a neighbourhood in which direct ties among people are close. It is used, sometimes ideologically, to refer to nations or other groupings on a very large scale. But the sense of unity that unites millions of people through similarity is importantly distinct from networks of direct interpersonal relationships. Nations are no more communities in this sense than they are families, however often nationalists use either term for its rhetorical value, to promote an illusion of greater closeness than exists.

Fifth, solidarity is created in the production – and continued reproduction and modification – of common culture. This is a matter of shared practices as well as artifacts. In LeRoi Jones's memorable

phrase, 'hunting is not those heads on the wall'. Tradition, likewise, is not the result of cultural creativity, it is the process. Living tradition is never simply inheritance, it is also creative reproduction. To be a speaker of a language is to share in this, though of course some are more influential than others. But to be a speaker of a language is also to be joined to other speakers, and not merely by a sense of categorical similarity. Common language is a basis for shared arguments, for identification and even celebration of difference. More generally, the production of shared culture offers people in local settings, and people in subordinate positions, the occasion to resist the domination of authoritative culture from above, whether this is a class-based construction of the nation, or the culture of a dominant ethnic group or mass consumer culture.

Finally, for this list, public discourse itself is potentially a form of solidarity. It is usually treated simply as a source of opinions, and often an occasion for expressing opinions already formed in less public settings. But engaging in common arguments involves forming relationships of a sort. These are marked by the creation or modification of culture as well as the making of more or less rational decisions. That is, people's identities and understandings of the world are changed by participation in public discourse. Commonalities with others are established, not just found, and common interests are explored. But the importance of public discourse is not simply a matter of finding or developing common interests; it is also in and of itself a form of solidarity. The women's movement offers a prominent example; it transformed identities, it did not just express the interests of women whose identities were set in advance. It created both an arena of discourse among women and a stronger voice for women in discourses that were male dominated (even when they were ostensibly gender neutral). The solidarity formed among women had to do with the capacity of this discourse meaningfully to bridge concerns of private life and large-scale institutions and culture. We can also see the converse, the extent to which this gendered production of solidarity is changed as feminist public discourse is replaced by mass-marketing to women and the production of feminism's successor as a gendered consumer identity in which liberation is reduced to freedom to purchase.

In short, there are a variety of ways in which people are joined to each other, within and across the boundaries of states and other polities. Theorists of cosmopolitan democracy are right to stress the

multiplicity of connections. But we need to complement the liberal idea of rights with a stronger sense of what binds people to each other. One of the peculiarities of nation-states has been the extent to which they were able to combine elements of each of these different sorts of solidarity. They did not do so perfectly, of course. Markets flowed over their borders from the beginning, and some states were weak containers of either economic organization or power. Not all states had a populace with a strong national identity, or pursued policies able to shape a common identity among citizens. Indeed, those that repressed public discourse suffered a particular liability to fissure along the lines of ethnicity or older national identities weakly amalgamated into the new whole; the Soviet Union is a notable case. Conversely, though, the opportunity to participate in a public sphere and seek to influence the state was an important source of solidarity within it. Coupled with a strong and open public sphere, national levels of solidarity remain still among the most important units within which ordinary people can defend the gains of previous social struggles against reductions to global market forces.

Actually existing international civil society includes some level of each of the different forms of solidarity I listed. In very few cases, however, are these joined strongly to each other at a transnational level. There is community among the expatriate staffs of NGOs; there is public discourse on the Internet. But few of the categorical identities that express people's sense of themselves are matched to strong organizations of either power or community at a transnational level. What this means is that international civil society offers a weak counterweight to systemic integration and power. If hopes for cosmopolitan democracy are to be realized, they depend on developing more social solidarity.

Conclusion

One way of looking at modern history is as a race in which popular forces and solidarities are always running behind. It is a race to achieve social integration, to structure the connections among people and organize the world. Capital is out in front. States come close to catching up and state power is clearly a force to be reckoned with in its own right. Workers and ordinary citizens are always in the position of trying to catch up. As they get organized on local levels,

capital and power integrate on larger scales. The integration of nation-states is an ambivalent step in this process. On the one hand, this represents a flow of organizing capacity away from local communities. On the other hand, democracy at a national level constitutes the greatest success that ordinary people have had in catching up to capital and power. Because markets and corporations increasingly transcend states, there is new catching up to do. This is why cosmopolitan democracy is appealing. But it would be a misunderstanding to see nationalism as simply a tradition to overcome, rather than a central moment in the process of expanding scale of social integration, and one with a democratic as well as an authoritarian side.

Even in Europe, it has proved hard to achieve comparable democracy, or public discourse, or labour organization on the scale of the EU than on that of member states. European transnationalism has been driven – and represented publicly – more by the claims of economic necessity (global competition) than by the pursuit of cosmopolitan democracy. The example does not suggest that cosmopolitan democracy should not be pursued – quite the contrary; it only points to how far behind it lags even in a setting where it has considerable advantages. The example of Europe should also remind us that the characteristic oppositions of global to local, universal to particularistic, cosmopolitan to traditional obscure a host of scales of social life between the village and the globe. Not only is nation rendered as local, but the importance of region is obscured. In fact, globalization produces and reproduces regionalization. Much transnationalism – and, indeed, growing cosmopolitanism – is organized on a regional not a global level.

In different ways, both local community and nationalism have developed remarkable capacities for binding people to each other. In the former case this grows out of directly interpersonal relationships; in the latter case it is more a matter of representation. But in both cases this is reproduced in the concrete experiences of everyday life as well as in extraordinary moments. The solidarity of community and nation also offer individuals a sense of location and context vital to a strong sense of self. But community and nation also require commitments and can be limiting. This is one of the reasons for a paradox found especially among second generation immigrants (but not unique to them): the desire to preserve a community one does not wish to be bound by. The tension is real, and community survives

only to the extent that some commitments are binding. Nationalism also makes demands on citizens – not least for military service.

Cosmopolitan democracy cannot flourish without a comparable basis in social solidarity. Citizenship must be more than an abstraction; to flourish it must be embedded in the practices of everyday life, of civil society. It must be able to make demands. Transnational solidarity can only be based on community to a small extent – though, in fact, diversity of local communities may predispose people to it. UN peace-keeping missions are only a very distant analogue to national service. But humanitarian missions and volunteer service of various sorts do give people a compelling sense of transnational solidarity. These are woven into everyday life over the long term for only a small minority of people, however. Employment in global NGOs affects more, and employment in global corporations still more. But what form of solidarity they produce remains to be studied.

Feeling at home cannot be enough of a basis for life in modern global society (and in its sense of exclusive localism cannot readily be recovered). Attenuated cosmopolitanism won't ground mutual commitment and responsibility. Some relationship between roots – local or other – and broader relationships and awareness needs to be found to provide the solidarity on which cosmopolitan democracy must depend. The view from the frequent traveler lounges does not provide an adequate sense of how people in very different circumstances can feel, gain voice and realize their individual and collective projects.

Notes

- 1 This chapter draws on presentations to conferences at the International Studies Association in February 2001; Istanbul Bilgi University in May 2001; the University of North Carolina in March 2001; and at Candido Mendes University in May 2001. I am grateful for comments on all these occasions and especially from Michael Kennedy, Laura MacDonald, Thomas McCarthy, Umut Özkırmılı and Kathryn Sikkink. Parts of the chapter were published in *South Atlantic Quarterly* (101) 4: 869–97, and are reprinted with permission.
- 2 Held, Archibugi and colleagues conceptualize democratic cosmopolitan politics as a matter of several layers of participation in discourse and decision-making, including especially the strengthening of institutions of global civil society, rather than an international politics dominated by nation-states.

- 3 Liberalism of course embraces a wide spectrum of views in which emphases may fall more on property rights or more on democracy. So too cosmopolitanism can imply a global view that is liberal not specifically democratic. Archibugi prefers 'cosmopolitics' to 'cosmopolitan' in order to signal just this departure from a more general image of liberal global unity (see Archibugi 2000).
- 4 It is this last tendency which invites liberal rationalists occasionally to ascribe to communitarians and advocates of local culture complicity in all manner of illiberal political projects, from restrictions on immigration to excessive celebration of ethnic minorities to economic protectionism. I have discussed this critically in Calhoun 1999.
- 5 This hyperTocquevillianism appears famously in Robert Putnam (2000), but has in fact been central to discussions since at least the 1980s, including prominently Robert Bellah *et al.* (1984). The embrace of a notion of civil society as centrally composed of a 'voluntary sector' complementing a capitalist market economy has of course informed public policy from America's first Bush administration with its 'thousand points of light' forward. Among other features, this approach neglects the notion of a political public sphere as an institutional framework of civil society and grants a high level of autonomy to markets and economic actors; it is notable for the absence of political economy from its theoretical bases and analyses. As one result, it introduces a sharp separation among market, government and voluntary association (non-profit) activity that obscures the question of how social movements may challenge economic institutions, and how the public sphere may mobilize government to shape economic practices.
- 6 See Stephen Toulmin's analysis (1990) of the seventeenth-century roots of the modern liberal rationalist worldview. As Toulmin notes, the rationalism of Descartes and Newton may be tempered with more attention to sixteenth-century forebears. From Erasmus, Montaigne and others we may garner an alternative but still humane and even humanist approach emphasizing wisdom that included a sense of the limits of rationalism and a more positive grasp of human passions and attachments.
- 7 Amartya Sen (1999) lays out an account of 'capacities' as an alternative to the discourse of rights. This is also adopted by Martha Nussbaum in her most recent cosmopolitan arguments. While this shifts emphases in some useful ways (notably from 'negative' to 'positive' liberties in Isaiah Berlin's terms), it does not offer a substantially 'thicker' conception of the person or the social nature of human life. Some cosmopolitan theorists, notably David Held, also take care to acknowledge that people inhabit social relations as well as rights and obligations.
- 8 See, for examples, Habermas's surprisingly sharp-toned response to Charles Taylor's 'The Politics of Recognition', both in Amy Gutman (1994); or Janna Thompson's distorting examination of 'communitarian' arguments (1998).
- 9 One is reminded of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's account of human rights as the new Christianity. It makes Europeans feel entitled, he suggested, to invade countries around the world and try to

subvert their traditional values, convert them, and subjugate them. Mahathir was of course defending an often abusive government as well as local culture, but a deeper question is raised.

- 10 'Jihad and McWorld operate with equal strength in opposite directions, the one driven by parochial hatreds, the other by universalizing markets, the one re-creating ancient subnational and ethnic borders from within, the other making war on national borders from without. Yet Jihad and McWorld have this in common: they both make war on the sovereign nation-state and thus undermine the nation-state's democratic institutions' (Barber 1995: 6). David Held similarly opposes 'traditional' and 'global' in positioning cosmopolitanism between the two ('Opening Remarks' to the Warwick University Conference on 'The Future of Cosmopolitanism').
- 11 Arguing against Archibugi's account of the nation-state, Brennan rightly notes the intrinsic importance of imperialism, though he ascribes rather more complete causal power to it than history warrants.
- 12 Richard Sennett cites (and builds on) a French usage of 1738: 'a cosmopolite ... is a man who moves comfortably in diversity; he is comfortable in situations which have no links or parallels to what is familiar to him' (1977: 17).
- 13 For a sampling, see Archibugi and Held (1995), Archibugi *et al.* (1998). David Held's argument (1995) is perhaps the best sustained theoretical account of what such a cosmopolitan politics might look like, and how it might differ from an international politics dominated by nation-states.
- 14 Local communities are of course not unitary; many are culturally heterogeneous and were so before the latest wave of global migrations. Local traditions, thus, are not simply products of homogenous local communities but include local versions of and resources for good relations across lives of difference. Such local versions of 'actually existing cosmopolitanism' are as important and as integral to local communities and especially cities as enmities, rivalries, and suspicions among groups.

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Belongings: in between the Indigene and the Diasporic

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Nationalist ideologies and practices have sought to appropriate and reconstruct notions of belonging. Various historians and theoreticians of nationalism have shown how nationalist discourses have come to replace other forms of belonging, whether local, religious or associated with specific lines of loyalties to specific political hierarchies. Under hegemonic discourses of nationalist politics of belonging the 'nation-state' has come to be the Andersonian (1983) 'imagined community' in which people, territories and states are constructed as immutably connected and the nation is a 'natural' extension of one's family to which one should be prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice oneself. Or is it?

This chapter aims to deconstruct some contemporary notions of belonging as they relate to ethnic and national processes. In particular, it aims to explore alternative narratives to hegemonic discourses of 'national self-determination' and to suggest a model of belonging that encompasses both identity and citizenship. Its main focus will be the contrasting, multi-layered and paradoxical narratives of the 'authentic indigenes' versus those of the 'diasporic strangers'. While doing so it will also engage in a comparative gaze with an earlier attempt of such deconstruction by the Austrian Marxist theorist Otto Bauer.

Several books and collections of papers have recently been published on the question of belonging (for example Fortier 2000; Geddes and Favell 1999; Lovell 1998). In some way, one could claim that one of the prime concerns of sociological theory since its

establishment and hence its writings, has been the differential ways people belong to collectivities and states – as well as the social, economic, and political effects of instances of the displacement of such belongings as a result of industrialization and/or migration. Some basic classical examples are Toennies' distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, Durkheim's division of mechanical and organic solidarity or Marx's notion of alienation. Anthony Giddens (1991) has argued that during modernity, people's sense of belonging becomes reflexive and recently Manuel Castells (1997) claimed that contemporary society has become the 'network society' in which effective belonging has moved from civil societies of nations and states into reconstructed defensive identity communities.

So, what does it mean to belong? Elspeth Probyn (1966) has emphasized what she calls the affective dimension of belonging – not just that of be-ing but of longing, or yearning, as Avtar Brah (1996) relates to a similar emotion among diasporic people.

The Oxford Dictionary gives three interconnected definitions of the term: (1) to be a member of (club, household, grade, society etc.); (2) be resident in or connected with; (3) be rightly placed or classified (in, under, etc.); fit a specified environment. These definitions, although they do not relate to the deep emotional meaning belonging – and displacement from belonging – can evoke, highlight the scope of belonging as encompassing both formal and informal membership, the spatial dimension that belonging usually is wound in, and its multi-layered characteristic – that we all belong to more than one community or collectivity. Primordial definitions of nations would impose a specific hierarchy among the different layers of belonging. Other discourses on the politics of belonging would not necessarily do so.

My own work on belonging has been developing out of my work on multi-layered identity politics on the one hand and citizenship on the other hand. Part of my frustration with identity politics (Yuval-Davis 1994, 1997a and b) has been a result of its usually not differentiating between elements of identification and elements of participation in the construction of belonging, and I shall come back to this point later. Another reason for my decision to focus on the issue of 'belonging' is that recently there have been attempts to develop alternative narratives of belonging to that of the 'nation-state' around the notions of 'diaspora' and 'diasporic space' (Boyarin

1994; Brah 1996; Gilroy 1997; Raz-Karkotzkin 1994). Alternative narratives of a different kind have been developed around narratives of belonging of indigenous people movements, such as the Zapatistas (Marcos 2001; see also Dickanson 1992; Geschiere and Gugler 1998; Reynolds 1996). The growing voices of these narratives have been part of what Charles Taylor (1994) has called 'the politics of recognition', the normative move to recognize previously excluded or marginalized voices and identities, and to legitimize their 'right of self determination'. This 'politics of recognition' can be part of a wider movement to build a global civil society in which, it is often assumed, all these different claims for self-determination can be accommodated, at least in principle. I find this very problematic, especially when these claims are constructed in ethnic, rather than territorial basis, as is most often the case.

I shall, therefore, explore first some general issues of 'the politics of belonging' and 'self determination' and then move to examine some of the specific issues concerning this that emanate from narratives constructed as 'indigenous' and 'diasporic'.

The politics of belonging

Several issues are of central concern when analysing the notion of belonging. Like other hegemonic constructions, belonging tends to become 'naturalized' and thus invisible in hegemonic formations. It is only when one's safe and stable connection to the collectivity, the homeland, the state, becomes threatened, that it becomes articulated and reflexive. It is then that individual, collective and institutional narratives of belonging become politicized.

This politicization tends to focus, as John Crowley argues, on the 'dirty work of boundary maintenance' (1999: 30). Adrian Favell argues that the 'boundary problem' is archetypal to the politics of belonging (1999: 211). Constructing borders and boundaries that differentiate between those who belong and those who do not, determine and colour the meaning of the particular belonging. All too often people talk about Otherness on the one hand and crossing the borders on the other, without paying attention to the ways these borders and boundaries are actually imagined by people who are positioned in differential ways *vis-à-vis* them. At the same time, so many recent theories of identity emphasize – and often celebrate – the ever

changing, fluctuating and contested nature of identities. Such theoretical articulations can sometimes disguise the power dimension that often fixes identities and creates what Amrita Chhachhi calls 'forced identities' and Kubena Mercer in somewhat different conditions calls 'the burden of representation'.

However, it is important to relate the notion of belonging to the differential positionings from which belongings are imagined and narrated, in terms of gender, class, stage in the life cycle, and so on, even in relation to the same community and in relation to the same boundaries and borders. These boundaries and borders can be contested not only between those who are in or out of them, but also as a result of the differential social locations and differential social values of people who see themselves and are seen as belonging to the same collectivity, or even by the same people in different times and situations. The contested and shifting nature of these boundaries and borders may reflect not only dynamic power relations between individuals, collectivities and institutions but also subjective and situational processes.

One of the crucial intervening factors in these dynamics is the fact that people tend to belong – in a differential way and in a differential intensity – to more than one collectivity and polity. Local, ethnic, national, inter- and supranational political communities are just some of the 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) with which people may identify, in which they are active, at least to a certain degree and to which they may feel a certain sense of attachment. One level of exploration, following Anne-Marie Fortier (2000), is the ways common histories, experiences and places are created, imagined and sustained in what Vicky Bell (1999) calls 'the performativity of belonging'. Another level, however (although interwoven in the first) is the examination of the hierarchy and dynamics of power that are exercised in between these collectivities and their degree of cooperation or conflict. In other words, the relationship between society and polity is crucial to the understanding of the multi-layered and multiplex constructions of belongings of both individuals and groupings.

Following a terminology first used by Michael Walzer (1994), Crowley argues that the idea of 'belonging' is an attempt to give a 'thicker' account of political and social dynamics of integration to that of citizenship, which he relates to as a formal membership in a nation-state (1999: 22).

In my own work on citizenship (1991, 1997a and b; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999) I have followed a wider definition of the concept. Using Marshall's definition of citizenship (1950, 1975) as a 'full membership of the community with rights and responsibilities', I have argued that the concept can be used in relation to other polities than that of the 'nation-state', to the extent that membership in other collectivities endows them with rights and obligations in a similar manner. Historically, citizenship emerged as active participation in political communities that evolved in cities (the Greek Polis) and then developed as legal status in empires (such as the Roman Empire). Jean Cohen (1999) argues that in the nation-state these two elements of citizenship have come together. However, as Yasemin Soysal (1994), David Held (1995) and others have argued, new transnational and supranational forms of citizenship are developing, forms what Bryan Turner has called (1998) Post-Fordist citizenship. As I have argued, human rights international legislation can be seen from such a perspective just as another layer of citizenship. At the same time I have pointed out that in terms of affecting personal lives and constructing rights and obligations, sub-national and cross-national communities can also become bearers of significant citizenships, in specific local, religious and ethnic contexts.

The notion of citizenship, however, needs to be differentiated from that of belonging. If citizenship signifies the participatory dimension of belonging, identification relates to the more emotive dimension of association. Feeling that one is part of a collectivity, a community, a social category, or yearning to be so, is not the same as actually taking part in a political community with all the rights and responsibilities involved. This is a differentiation that identity politics has tended not to make, and thus has tended to neglect the complex and contested relationship between individuals, groupings and collectivities. In identity politics, individuals and collectivities are interchangeable emotionally and thus questions of representation, accountability and governability have tended to be ignored (Bourne 1987; Cain and Yuval-Davis 1990; Yuval-Davis 1994, etc.). One of the normative agenda points of this paper is to call for a politics of belonging that encompasses the politics of citizenship as well as that of identification. I shall come back to this point towards the end of the chapter.

'National self-determination' and narratives of belonging

Since the 1789 French Revolution, the principle of 'national self-determination' has gradually grown in legitimacy and become endorsed by both Right and Left. It received full global acceptability in the post-First World War period (around the divisions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and was incorporated into the 1945 United Nations charter that states that 'all peoples have the right to national self determination'. In August 2000 the First International Conference on the Right to Self-Determination and the United Nations took place in Geneva and one of its resolutions was to call for a special UN High Commissioner for Self-Determination. The image constructed by this principle is of an ideal world in which all people constitute part of specific homogenous nations, mutually exclusive, who reside in particular non-overlapping territories, enclosed by 'natural' borders, governed by autonomous nation-states. Such an ideal world has never existed, and the cartography of the world is always going through processes of contestation and challenge, especially in periods in which the global social order is unstable as a result of major wars or the disintegration of empires. As Azmi Bishara claims, self-determination has tautologically to do with determining the self. It assumes the existence of a collective national self and presupposes that this self is represented and articulated by its spokespeople. The political projects of such spokespeople can vary greatly, and as a result so would be the national 'imagined community', its collectivity boundaries and the territorial borders claimed as belonging to the nation. Indeed, this might explain why the UN has never defined precisely what is meant by 'national', by 'self' and by 'determination' (Yiftachel 2001). This created a vague context (conveniently open for shifting political circumstances) in which a variety of political struggles in different parts of the globe could find space and legitimation for themselves.

In the 2000 special UN conference very different claims for 'self-determination' have taken place, ranging from claims for regional independence, such as in the case of Kashmir, to claims of justice and reparations, such as in the case of the African Americans. Various discussions in the conference defined the right for self-determination as a 'natural', or at least a legal, result of other principles and

struggles, not necessarily compatible, against discrimination, for a desire to expand democracy, for cultural autonomy and reproduction and for governance rights.

And yet, as Delanty (1995) has commented, the principle of national self-determination has first and foremost created a 'moralization of geography'. This morality can gain a fundamentalist flavour when the holy unity of the trinity of people, state and territory is sanctified in religious, as well as nationalist, discourse. This happens often, but not exclusively, in settler societies, when the claim for self-determination is reinforced by narratives about the 'promised land', 'the chosen people' and 'New Jerusalem' (Stuart and Yuval-Davis 1999).

'How ... does space become place?', ask Carter *et al.* in the introduction to their edited volume *Space & Place* (1993: xii). 'By being named: ... by embodying the symbols and imaginary of a population. Place is space to which meaning has been ascribed.'

The meaning of the 'homeland' can be inscribed via its physical nature. 'What is a man who has no landscape?' asks Athos in *Fugitive Pieces* (Michaels 1996: 86): 'Nothing but mirrors and tides.' The inscription can also be highly ideological: 'Every true republican has drunk in love of country, that is to say love of law and liberty, along with his mother's milk. This love is his whole existence' said Rousseau (1953 [1772]).

Women/mothers are often constructed as the embodiments of the homeland. In peasant societies, the dependence of the people on the fertility of 'Mother Earth' has no doubt contributed to this close association between collective territory, collective identity and womanhood. Women are associated in the collective imagination with children and therefore with the collective, as well as the familial, future. Women represent the homeland, as well as the home.

A figure of a woman, often a mother, symbolizes in many cultures the spirit of the collectivity, whether it is Mother Russia, Mother Ireland or Mother India. In the symbol of the French Revolution, 'La Patrie' was a figure of a woman giving birth to a baby, and in Cyprus a crying woman refugee on roadside posters was the embodiment of the pain and anger of the Greek Cypriot collectivity after the Turkish invasion.

However, it is not the figures of the women/mothers alone that symbolize the homeland but rather the imaginary social relations networks in which they are embedded. As Doreen Massey stated

(quoted by Robins 1993: 325): 'Instead, then, of thinking of places as areas with boundaries around, they can be imagined as articulated movements in networks of social relations and understanding.'

I would disagree with Massey concerning the relative (lack) of importance of borders and boundaries of both places and collectivities (as mentioned above and see Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, forthcoming). However, she does highlight the crucially important trait of the imagining of places in general and homelands in particular, as embedded in social relations and history around which narratives of belonging are woven. As Michael Billig has elaborated in his book *Banal Nationalism* (1995), discourses of nationalism and belonging do not necessarily need to appear in the form of specific and explicit discourses. On the contrary, their power is in their 'naturalness'. Claiming a flower, a fruit, a bird, let alone specific lands as belonging to a particular national collectivity is one of the most affective as well as effective ways in which belonging are claimed. When governments and regimes are rejected, it is memories of smells and landscapes that are remembered and yearned for by political exiles. And in cases of contestations, such as in Israel/Palestine, the 'Jaffa orange', the prickly pear 'Sabres' as well as territorial 'holy sites' and archeological digs become centre spatial and object-related sites for the contesting politics of belonging to take place.

Otto Bauer and the deconstruction of the 'holy trinity'

Attempts to construct alternative narratives of belonging and of citizenship to those in the conventional national self-determination principle have existed for a long time. Notable among those attempts has been the one by Otto Bauer (2001), the Austro-Hungarian Marxist, who attempted to find a solution to the 'national question' in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bauer made general important contributions to the theorization of nationalism and nations, especially in his emphasis on the element of 'common destiny' rather than 'common origin' as a primary element around which narratives of national solidarity tend to be constructed. In addition, Bauer rejected the common approach that saw national boundaries as necessarily constructed around what he called 'the territoriality principle'. He argued that any socio-political historical context which would

reproduce the boundaries of the nation as a distinct 'community of communication' would do (he thus defined the Jews in pre-capitalist Europe as a distinct nation, although he claimed that under capitalism the historical conditions that have made them into a separate nation do not exist anymore and therefore were no longer a nationality).

Bauer called for self-determination according to what he called 'the personality principle'. Given the large waves of migration that accompany the processes of industrialization and urbanization, Bauer saw continued territorial ethnic segregation within the Empire as impossible. Even within the rural areas, patterns of residence were becoming less and less segregated, the larger the demarcated region. And in the cities there were concentrations of migrant workers from a variety of regions and nationalities. The territorial principle of national autonomy, therefore, claimed Bauer, would of necessity bring an end to instances of national oppression, exclusion and conflict.

Unlike the territorial principle, the personality principle relates to self-governance of people, the members of each national grouping. They would govern only their own members and would be responsible for their schools, libraries, theatres, museums and institutions of popular education, and of providing the nation's members with translators and legal assistance when dealing with the state authorities.

Three important characteristics differentiate between Bauer's proposal and contemporary forms of multiculturalism. First, in order, as Bauer argues, to defend the nations from the state, he recommends that the administration of the state would be recruited from the national bodies. Thus, the nations would have autonomy from the state, but the state would not have autonomy from the nations. Second, each national body would have the right to raise taxes from its members. This would give the nations financial autonomy from the territorial state and would also not put members of different nationalities in direct competition for the financial resources of the state. Bauer admitted that this would not solve the differential class positionings of the members of the different nations, but he did not see any real solution for this except a socialist revolution. Third, each nation would have its own formal register (based on the free choice of the mature members of the society) and the representative bodies of each nation would be democratically elected by the members of these registers. This would make the national/ethnic bodies

accountable to their members and not just 'represent' them by self-appointed community leaders and activists.

As mentioned above, Bauer developed his model in relation to the Austro-Hungarian empire, and the personality principle of self-determination aimed at maintaining the territorial borders of the state after the demise of the empire. As we know, this did not happen, and US President Woodrow Wilson oversaw the territorial division of the Empire after the First World War into nation-states in which the holy trinity was supposed to uphold. As we know, until today, when a forceful hegemonic central state power is absent, the inadequacies of the 'territorial principle' to solve the national question in the area are glaring and even flared to attempts of 'ethnic cleansing' in many different locations in the globe.

As Michael Walzer commented in his book *On Toleration* (1995), however, multinational states similar to the kind Bauer recommended (e.g. Lebanon, Cyprus and Former Yugoslavia) tend to be most stable and tolerant under the non-democratic control of Empires. When the polity contains only two national groupings, any major political or demographic change can upset the balance. This raises some fundamental questions, which I shall not even try to answer within the boundaries of this chapter, about the relationship between justice, democracy and conflict resolution. After a period of initial euphoria, the failure or only very partial success of the negotiations to resolve the Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland situations, or even the process of 'truth and reconciliation' in South Africa might attest to it. However, the alternative, which is foreign occupation in places such as Kosovo and Beirut is not really any more palatable.

Going back to the model suggested by Bauer, it seems to be more democratic than either assimilatory nation-state on the one hand, or multicultural state structures in many Western states on the other. However, it does reify and reproduce the separate boundaries of the different national groupings. Bauer's argument, like that of many multiculturalists would be that there are no just 'humans' – everyone has their own ethnicity, language and culture. He felt it was more democratic to try and cultivate these different cultures as important and positive assets, except in cases where he judged that, with all the help in the world, there would not be suitable conditions to reproduce these distinguished 'communities of communication', such as, he considered, in the case of the Jews.

Another issue is that Bauer related only to ethnic and national minorities that 'belonged' to the Empire, rather than also to outside migrations as is the case in contemporary multicultural societies. As in Norman Tebbit's infamous 'Cricket Test' in the UK (in which he suggested that all those who would cheer the opponent team to the British one in international cricket games are not 'truly' British) the challenge to racial and ethnic minorities is often in terms of the informal emotive dimensions of belonging rather than just the formal ones of citizenship rights. On the contrary, given the strength of supranational polities, the autonomy of states in these respects would often be quite limited. In the contemporary global political economy, belonging is being threatened and reinforced at the same time. The global-market McDonaldisation effect as well as ease of movement of commodities and people also enable the global distribution of cultural artefacts and personal/communal communications that enable the continuous reproduction of cultures, loyalties and most importantly identities in a way Bauer could not have foreseen. As the barrister Majid Traboo, the Executive Director of the International Council of Human Rights asserted at the UN conference on self-determination in 2000, the popular political concept of self-determination has developed a division into, what is called in the report, 'two limbs': an external one 'confined to populations of fixed territorial entities' and an internal one 'evolving into what seems to be an articulation of the type of rights most often demanded by national minorities' (<http://www.hri.ca/racism/Submitted/Author/self-det.htm>).

In an attempt to explore some of the characteristics of the politics of belonging that accompany these contemporary forms of the demand for self-determination, I now explore narratives of belonging of both indigenes and of diasporism. Unlike in multicultural discourses, and also unlike Bauer's suggested solution to ethnic diversity and governance, neither of these approaches is inherently linked to state governance.

Discourses of indigenes

To be an indigene, means to 'really' belong to a place, and to have the most 'authentic' claim for rights over it. The discourse of 'indigenes' has been used by hegemonic majorities who have used it as an exclusionary means to limit immigration, prevent

citizenship rights, call for repatriation and, in its most extreme forms, for 'ethnic cleansing'. In such a discourse, the immutable links of people, state and territory is formulated in its most racialized forms.

However, the discourse of 'indigenoussness' has also played a central role in the politics of inclusion and recognition, of claiming rights. It is used by movements of the largely excluded, dispossessed and marginalized remnants of the societies that existed before or on the margins of settler and other nation-states (Feldman 2001). They are frequently seen, by themselves and by others, as an 'organic' part of the land and the landscape, and all other inhabitants as part of the 'imposing society' (to use an Australian Aboriginal expression) who dispossessed them. A major focus in their struggles is the call to recognize their 'land rights' and claims of ownership of the lands where they used to reside before the European invasion. As they had often been stateless nomadic populations, they had no official land titles registered to their name, as would be the case under bureaucratic state apparatus. As the land they claim is often now privately as well as state owned, their claims have frequently been faced with fierce resistance by settler societies and states, as well as endorsed by human rights discourse.

One of the questions that arise in the attempts to define who are the indigenous inhabitants of a particular territory concerns the temporal dimension. Although in the narratives of indigenous people's movements 'they have occupied a specific territory from time immemorial' (Abu-Saad and Champagne 2001: 158), usually the crucial date of authenticity is fixed as that of occupation at the time of European colonization. This can prove to be Eurocentric. It constructs the past as if history started when the contact with the Europeans was established, and covers up previous population movements and colonizations (as happened in Algeria, for instance, with the Arab settlement and with Amerindians in empires such as the Aztec and the Maya).

Another question, however, even more central to our discussion here concerns the form of ownership to be claimed by those 'land rights' movements. Should it be given to individual members of the 'first nation', in a way that would not limit their freedom to sell the land? Or should it be transferred collectively, as a Trust (and who should have the decision-making power in these Trusts)? And most importantly – should their rights to the land be exclusive, or could other members of the society (as well as the state itself) continue to have rights on the land as well? What are the political, let alone the

economic conclusions of indigenous land claims? Indigenous people often claim a spiritual unity with the land:

We are the land. More than remembered, the Earth is the mind of the people as we are the mind of the earth ... It is not a means of survival ... It is rather part of our being, dynamic, significant, real. (A Laguna author, quoted in Tsosie 2001: 184)

Feldman (2001) would argue that such claims are part of critical transformative pedagogy, a 'strategic essentialism', to use a well-known expression of Gayatri Spivak, which can prepare the ground for an exclusive claim on the land, when enough political power would be accumulated, for self-government as an enclave within the nation-state, if there is not enough power/number of people to claim a full 'take-over' of the state (as happened in Algeria, Zimbabwe and in a somewhat different manner, South Africa). However, there are also arguments (e.g. Reynolds 1996) that the aboriginal perception, for instance, that 'they belong to the land', rather than that the land belongs to them, paves the way for an alternative, non-exclusive, mode of ownership and sovereignty, more similar to the Bauerian 'people's principle' than the 'land principle'.

Such a claim, for an alternative nationalist discourse, has also been argued by Gilroy (1997) and others (e.g. Boyarin 1994; Raz-Karkotzkin 1994), as applying to diasporic discourses.

Diasporism as an alternative discourse of belonging

Gilroy attempted to contrast nationalist sentiments based on 'notions of soil, landscape and rootedness' with the idea of diaspora as 'a more refined and more worldly sense of culture' (1997: 328). Avtar Brah (1996) incorporated into her normative notion of 'diaspora space', not just racialized diasporic minorities but also the hegemonic majority in a decentred and non-privileged positioning. Postmodernist discourses on 'travelling cultures' (Clifford 1992), 'nomadism' (Bradiotti 1991), 'hybridity' (Bhabha 1994) and 'living at the border zones' (Anzaldúa 1987), both inspired and echoed these constructions of diasporism.

Unfortunately, some of the critiques of such literature (e.g. Anthias 1998; Helmreich 1992; Ifekwunigwe 1999; Yuval-Davis 1997a and b) pointed out the binary, naturalized and essentialist ideas about kinship, nature and territory, so characteristic of more traditional

nationalist rhetoric, that often creep up 'through the back door' in these theorizations. Moreover, diasporic politics often tend to have a very different set of values and political dynamics. Unlike the Simmelian (1950) and Schutzian (1976) constructions of 'the stranger', members of diasporic communities are often engaged in narratives of belonging, or of yearning to belong, not only in relation to the country/society where they live, or even a 'cosmopolitan' boundary-less humanity, but also in relation to their country, nation and/or state of origin. As Sara Ahmed (2000) pointed out, the construction of 'the stranger' is a form of fetishism that is produced in the naming and is devoid of any real human characteristics. It is just a reflection of the gaze of the one who has named her/him as such.

As Robin Cohen (1997) has shown, diasporas are much more heterogeneous than the above theories would have us believe. Moreover, as the NGO document of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism in Durban pointed out, Western people living in the third world are often described as 'ex-patriates' while third-world people living in the West are described as migrants or immigrants. The hegemonic Western gaze prevailed in this, as in so many other instances.

Also, what Gilroy and some others do not take into account is the effects 'diaspora yearning and ambivalence' can have on 'the homeland'. Mechanisms of identity regulation which have symbolic meaning of boundary reproduction to the members of the diaspora in the countries where they live, can have serious effects on the continuation of national and ethnic conflicts in 'the homeland' (Anthias 1998; Yuval-Davis 1997a). Contributing funds to various 'causes' and struggles in the homeland can often be the easiest and least threatening ways to members of the diaspora to express their membership and loyalty to the collectivity. Such acts of symbolic identification, which are part of contemporary identity politics (Safran 1999; see also Yuval-Davis 1997b) can, however, have very radical political and other effects in the 'homeland', a fact that might often be only of marginal interest to the people of the diaspora. As Ben Anderson (1995) has pointed out, diasporic politics is often reckless politics without accountability and without due democratic processes. At the same time, as more and more ethnocracies develop, in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the third world, laws parallel to the Israeli and German 'laws of return' are being developed, and states are constructed that see as their body of citizens all the members of their ethnic collectivity rather than those who are living in their territory.

In states like Lithuania – but also Ireland – the presidents of the state have been living all or most of their lives, until being called to fill in the post, outside the borders of the state.

As I mentioned earlier in the chapter, the development of transport and communicative technologies in the second half of the twentieth century has produced new possibilities of maintaining contact between diasporas and homelands. The spatial/temporal shortcuts in the communication between diasporas and homelands have intensified the level of information as well as the level of interaction between the two. Maybe even more importantly, they have enabled people in the diaspora who were previously isolated from each other new possibilities of getting together and might have changed discourses of belonging.

Conclusion

Today – and probably always – belonging is multiplex and multi-layered, continuous and shifting, dynamic and attached. This is true both in terms of the subjective and in terms of the political. The notion of belonging should be examined not as an abstract notion but as one that is embedded in specific discourses of power, in which gender, class, sexual and racialized social divisions are intermeshed. The task is to explore the extent to which, given this, it is possible to develop a political form of participation in which differential belongings as well as positionings are acknowledged in a non-exclusionary way. The extent to which transnational models of citizenship (Delanty 1995; Held 1995; Soysal 1994) could incorporate the ‘thicker’ politics of belongings and relate different constructions of national belonging – e.g. multiculturalism (Goldberg 1994; Rex 1996), multinationalism (Bauer 2001 [1924]) and hybridity (Bhabha 1990, 1994) to questions of democracy and governability.

Constructions of nationhood were changing in the late twentieth century. Today, territories continue to carry crucial symbolic and emotional meaning to nationalist discourses but in a world in which technologies of transport and communication as well as free market ideologies rule, it is ethnic boundaries that are playing a more and more central role in nationalist ideologies. The Bauerian ‘people’s principle’ can become regressive defensive identities leading to spatial as well as social segregation rather than the democratic principle of pluralist societies Bauer sought.

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8

Conclusion: the Futures of Nationalism

Will Kymlicka

We can identify four main questions that underlie many recent debates about nationalism, including the chapters in this volume. I will label these as questions about the *nature* of nationalism, the *value* of nationalism, the *alternatives* to nationalism, and the *global diffusion* of nationalism. In this short conclusion, I will say a few words about each, and about why I think they remain so controversial.

The first question, then, concerns the nature of the 'nation' as it is imagined within nationalist movements and ideologies. In particular, how does nationhood relate to, or differ from, other categories, such as race, ethnicity, religion, cultural lifestyles? To what extent does a sense of common nationality depend on the sharing of these other features of social life, and to what extent do nationalist movements and nationalizing states seek to homogenize its members with respect to these features?

A cursory glance around the world would suggest that nationalist movements differ considerably on this issue. Some are more 'thicker' than others, in the sense of requiring or seeking a much higher degree of racial, religious, ethnic or cultural uniformity. Other nationalisms, by contrast, seem 'thinner', in the sense of allowing and tolerating a high level of diversity within the nation, although virtually all nations at least seek to diffuse a common language and common political values throughout their territory.

In the past, this contrast often was discussed in the terminology of 'civic' versus 'ethnic' nationalism, which was then often rephrased as

'tolerant' versus 'intolerant', or 'inclusive' versus 'exclusionary'. It is now increasingly realized that this is not the most helpful way to identify or explain the differing natures of nationalisms. The problem is not only that all nationalist movements contain a mixture of both 'ethnic' and 'civic' elements, but also that there are many different dimensions of thinness and thickness, and nationalist movements can be thick on some while thin on others. There is not a single comprehensive choice to be made about being civic or ethnic, but rather a hundred ongoing decisions to be made about education, immigration, citizenship, language policies, symbols, settlement decisions, legal structures, and so on. All of these decisions, in all nations, reflect ongoing contests about the necessary forms of commonality and homogeneity, and the desirable forms of tolerance and diversity. Nations can be inclusive/tolerant one day on one issue, but not the next day, or on the next issue. Attempts to categorize groups as either 'civic' or 'ethnic' obscure this more contested and fluid reality.¹

A more salient question, perhaps, concerns the changing nature of nationalism. More specifically, can we say that there has been a general trend, at least in the West, towards a thinner and more tolerant conception of nationhood? In his chapter, John Hall describes the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century as an age of 'homogenization' in Europe. Can we say that the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are an age of increasingly benign and tolerant ideas of nationhood, reconceived as multiracial, multicultural and multi-faith societies?

This is one of the central dividing lines in contemporary debates, including the chapters in this book. For some authors, contemporary conditions in the West of economic prosperity, collective security, and democratic consolidation make it possible, perhaps even inevitable, that conceptions of nationhood will become thinner and more inclusive. Others argue, however, with Nira Yuval-Davis, that nationalisms are becoming 'more and more ethnic', or in any event that exclusionary conceptions of the nation are always present at least latently, below the surface, ready to emerge whenever the economy weakens, or whenever the hegemony of a dominant group starts to be challenged.

This debate is related to the second major question, about the value of nationalism, and more specifically whether nationalism can

be reconciled with the basic liberal-democratic values of human freedom, equality and democracy. Those observers who see a stable trend towards more inclusive forms of nationalism are inclined to assume that nationalism can be rendered consistent with liberal-democratic values. Indeed, an entire school of thought recently emerged defending the ideal of a 'liberal nationalism'. According to these writers, nationhood is not only consistent with liberal-democratic values, but in fact provides the best home for them. Liberal democracy, it is said, is only viable, or most viable, within national political units. Nationhood provides the trust, solidarity and mutual understanding needed for liberal-democratic institutions to flourish (see, for example, Tamir 1993; Miller 1995; Canovan 1996).

By contrast, those who assume that ethnic and racial exclusion are always latent within nationalist ideologies dispute the compatibility of nationalism and liberalism. These competing normative assessments of the value of nationalism are complicated by the fact that nationalism has both an internal and external dimension. Nationalisms that are tolerant and open internally might nonetheless seek to oppress or conquer other nations. This raises the question, emphasized by Fred Halliday, about the consistency of nationalism. Nations often demand rights of self-determination or of self-defence which they deny to other nations.

According to Halliday, this is the most important challenge to the normative acceptability of nationalism. Nationalism is not inherently inconsistent with universal values of human rights in the way it organizes its own domestic society, but it is prone to hypocrisy and selectivity in its response to the claims of other nations.²

Halliday is surely right, although one could question whether this problem does not arise for all political ideals and movements. White males who demanded political rights in the name of 'democracy' were often reluctant to extend the same rights to women and blacks. Yet this hypocrisy does not undermine the legitimacy of the ideal of democracy: rather, the task is to fight for a more consistent application of the ideal. So too, one might argue, with the ideal of national self-determination.

So people disagree about the likelihood that nationalism can be reformed to make it more consistent with liberal-democratic values, either internally or externally. This then leads to the third question, concerning the alternatives to nationalism. Whether we decide to

invest our energies in reforming nationalism in a liberal direction will depend, at least in part, on whether we think there is a viable alternative that avoids some of the problems associated historically with nationalism. This alternative is typically labelled as some sort of 'post-nationalist' or 'cosmopolitan' alternative. Indeed, many commentators believe that we already live in such a post-nationalist world, and that the era of nation-states and nation-building states is over.

This is perhaps the deepest disagreement in the contemporary literature. Many of those who defend the liberal nationalist position do so, not because they are unaware of the difficulties it raises, but simply because they believe there is no serious alternative to nationhood as a way of organizing modern political life. By contrast, those who emphasize the intrinsic dangers of nationalism do so, in part, because they think there is a post-nationalist alternative that we should all be working towards.

What would such a post-nationalist alternative look like? A range of phenomena has been identified by scholars as the harbingers or vanguard of a new post-national order. These include the rise of immigrant transnationalisms, substate regionalisms, international human rights law, international advocacy networks, international regulatory bodies, like the World Bank, and transnational political institutions, like the European Union. All of these are said to challenge traditional ideals or models of sovereign, territorially bounded, unitary, homogeneous nation-states, and hence to be pushing us towards a post-national or cosmopolitan reordering of political space.

My own view, however, is that most of these allegedly 'post-national' phenomena presuppose the ongoing existence and vitality of territorially-bounded national political units, and that indeed none of them offers any alternative model of how to organize self-governing political communities or to allocate democratic political authority.³ Moreover, as John Hutchinson emphasizes in his chapter, there are good reasons to think that the globalization of trade and communications is in fact stimulating nationalisms and contributing to nation-formation.

In any event, even if there is a post-nationalist alternative waiting in the wings, we would still need to ask whether this alternative is preferable to an international order based on liberal nation-states. Or, put another way, for whom would it be preferable to move to a post-national order?

This is the central issue discussed in Craig Calhoun's chapter. He emphasizes the danger that cosmopolitan conceptions of politics are likely to be even more elitist than our current nation-based politics. National political units have the important virtue of tying political elites to the masses. They share a common national language, a common national media, often are educated in a common national educational system, as well as sharing national myths, symbols and narratives. This is very different from pre-national political systems in Europe, in which aristocratic or imperial elites were typically separated from the masses linguistically, culturally and institutionally. One could argue that many proposals for a 'post-national' political reordering of political space run the danger of returning to this pre-national condition in which elites govern in a language, culture and institutions that the masses view as foreign to them. Indeed, I think this helps to explain why the general public has shown little enthusiasm for the construction of post-national political institutions, and why nationalism, which originated as an elite project, is now most firmly defended by the working class. As both Calhoun and Partha Chatterjee argue, empowering people means empowering them within their own communities and traditions.⁴

So we have three interconnected debates about the nature and value of, and alternatives to, nationalism. These are all important debates, and are unlikely to be resolved soon. But one could argue that in the West there is actually relatively little at stake in these debates. After all, whatever one views as the likely future evolution of national identities and national political units in the West, it is unlikely to dramatically affect certain basic features of Western life, such as the rule of law, human rights, democratic elections, economic prosperity and individual freedom. No matter how the balance between national and post-national elements evolves in Western Europe, no matter whether we see the European Union as supplementing or supplanting the nation-state, this is unlikely to affect the overwhelming public support for, and institutional consolidation of, liberal-democratic values.

Yet things are very different in most other parts of the world, where peace, freedom and democracy are far from consolidated. And it is here, in the post-communist and developing worlds, where the nature and evolution of nationalism is a matter of critical importance for people's well-being, and perhaps even a matter of life and

death. And this raises our final question, about the global diffusion of nationalism.

As Hutchinson notes, many developing countries are in the first stages of nation-formation, and it is far from clear how these nation-building efforts will fare. It is unlikely to simply follow the Western trajectory, since, as Hall notes in his chapter, the nature of the ethnic differences and ethnic conflicts that need to be managed are very different. Many postcolonial states lack a dominant national group, but instead are composed of many different smaller groups, none of which has a clear majority. Moreover, the tools available to the state today for nation-building are more constrained than those available to the West 150 years ago.⁵ Under these circumstances, efforts to simply mimic Western models of nationalizing states are unlikely to succeed, and may instead generate greater instability and violence.

And yet here again we confront the question of the alternatives to the nation-state. If nation-states have indeed been 'black man's burden' (Davidson 1992), it is not as if post-national experiments at constructing pan-African (or pan-Arab or pan-Asian) forms of political community have had much success either. It is here, outside the West, where the future of nationalism will be most contested. And whatever we think about the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic nation-states that have arisen over the last two centuries in the West (and that are perhaps now receding), our ultimate moral judgement of the legitimacy and value of nationalism must surely depend on how well or badly it serves the needs of the billions of people for whom the era of the nation-state is just beginning.

Notes

- 1 For an attempt to distinguish these different dimensions on which nationalist movements can be liberal or illiberal, see Kymlicka and Opalski 2001: 53–60.
- 2 Michael Walzer calls this the test of 'the next nation'. See Walzer 1990.
- 3 Or so I argue in Kymlicka 2002.
- 4 Whereas Calhoun invokes this argument in defence of nationalism against cosmopolitanism, Chatterjee invokes it in defence of subnational ethnic politics against centralized nationalist politics.

- 5 David Laitin provides a nice example of how our views regarding state coercion have changed over the centuries:

It is said that in Spain during the Inquisition gypsies who were found guilty of speaking their own language had their tongues cut out. With policies of this sort, it is not difficult to understand why it was possible, a few centuries later, to legislate Castilian as the sole official language. But when Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia pressed for policies promoting Amharic, infinitely more benign than those of the Inquisition, speakers of Tigray, Oromo, and Somali claimed that their groups were being oppressed, and the international community was outraged. Nation-building policies available to monarchs in the early modern period are not available to leaders of new states today. (Laitin 1992: xi)

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